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This timely book presents rare ethnographic data within an outstanding analysis 
of current debates on predictive policing. Conceptualising predictive policing 
as a sociotechnical system, the book describes various translation processes that 
lay bare the political, cultural and organizational forces at work. This welcome 
book sets the standards for future research on data-driven policing.
—Janet Chan, Professor, UNSW Law
Wary of simplistic dystopia/utopia dichotomies, Criminal Futures offers a 
theoretically sophisticated and empirically rich account of predictive policing 
as a sociotechnical process. This is a landmark study, providing frameworks 
and analytical tools for understanding – and responding to – the rapid 
datafication of security that is unfolding. 
—Dean Wilson, Professor of Criminology, University of Sussex

This book explores how predictive policing transforms police work. Police departments 
around the world have started to use data- driven applications to produce crime forecasts and 
intervene into the future through targeted prevention measures. Based on three years of field 
research in Germany and Switzerland, this book provides a theoretically sophisticated and 
empirically detailed account of how the police produce and act upon criminal futures as part 
of their everyday work practices.
The authors argue that predictive policing must not be analyzed as an isolated 
technological artifact, but as part of a larger sociotechnical system that is embedded in 
organizational structures and occupational cultures. The book highlights how, for crime 
prediction software to come to matter and play a role in more efficient and targeted police 
work, several translation processes are needed to align human and nonhuman actors across 
different divisions of police work.
Police work is a key function for the production and maintenance of public order, but it 
can also discriminate, exclude, and violate civil liberties and human rights. When criminal 
futures come into being in the form of algorithmically produced risk estimates, this can have 
wide- ranging consequences. Building on empirical findings, the book presents a number of 
practical recommendations for the prudent use of algorithmic analysis tools in police work 
that will speak to the protection of civil liberties and human rights as much as they will speak 
to the professional needs of police organizations.
An accessible and compelling read, this book will appeal to students and scholars of 
criminology, sociology, and cultural studies as well as to police practitioners and civil liberties 
advocates, in addition to all those who are interested in how to implement reasonable forms 
of data- driven policing.
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This book is the product of a windfall encounter. Each of us individually would 
have probably written a quite different book – or, even more likely, no book 
at all. We were lucky enough that our paths crossed at a workshop in Freiburg, 
Germany, in March of 2017. At the time, both of us had, independent of each 
other, only recently started to engage with predictive policing. The research 
outlines that both of us presented at that workshop were remarkably similar, 
and as it turned out during a couple of longer follow- up conversations, we 
were in fact interested in almost identical questions surrounding the use of 
algorithmic crime analysis software. There was a large overlap in the theoretical 
and conceptual literature that we had been reading. And we had at that point 
even started to interview some of the same police representatives and software 
developers.
The decision to join forces and proceed with our research together there-
fore only felt natural. Admittedly, conducting a multiyear qualitative research 
and writing project across a physical distance came with a set of challenges. 
In- person meetings were few and far between, so not only did the weekly 
coordination of activities have to be done via video- conferencing but also the 
coding and analysis of our empirical material, the interpretations of interview 
segments and ethnographic observations, debates about arguments, and so on. 
Matters were further complicated by the usual struggles of academic precarity: 
funding ran out, applications were written, and jobs and cities were changed. 
The book manuscript was finished from the confines of our homes, as the 
COVID-19 pandemic forced universities to shut down.
Three years after we first met at the said workshop, we are, however, more 
than happy with how things turned out. Almost needless to say, our profes-
sional relationship has turned into a friendship. And this book has offered us the 
opportunity to work through our empirical material at adequate length and in 
adequate depth. It will, so at least our modest hope, contribute some nuance 
to current debates about algorithms, data, and the prediction and prevention 
of crime.
Obviously, we could not have realized this book without the support of a 
number of people and institutions. First and foremost, although for reasons of 
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anonymization we cannot do so by name, we must thank our research partici-
pants for sharing their thoughts, concerns, experiences, and daily work prac-
tices with us. We are aware that access to security agencies and their lifeworlds 
is not always easy. All the more do we appreciate the willingness of police 
departments and other predictive policing actors to support our research.
Over the years, our work has benefited from countless conversations with 
colleagues, whose generous engagement with our thoughts has continuously 
pushed the boundaries of our project. We would like to particularly high-
light the support and feedback we received from John Austin, Myriam Dunn 
Cavelty, Dominik Gerstner, Jens Hälterlein, Lucas Introna, Mareile Kaufmann, 
Anna Leander, Thomas Linder, Monique Mann, Lars Ostermeier, Bettina 
Paul, Nikolaus Pöchhacker, Tobias Singelnstein, Dean Wilson, Aleš Završnik, 
and Nils Zurawski, as well as series editors Jenny Fleming and Jennifer Wood.
Last but not least, our work was to a large extent facilitated by the institu-
tional support from our employers. The Universität Hamburg, the Technische 
Universität Berlin, and ETH Zurich provided us with the necessary freedom 
and financial means to finish our manuscript. Our appreciation goes to Susanne 
Krasmann, Ingo Schulz- Schaeffer, Andi Wenger, and Arnold Windeler. Addi-
tionally, Simon Egbert’s contribution was partly financed by the Fritz Thyssen 
Foundation (grant number 10.16.2.005SO).
We would also like to extend our gratitude to Dominika Hadrysiewicz for 
her relentless assistance in administrative matters. Björn Ewert, Konstantin 
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assistance. A  special thanks to Gerard Holden for turning our scribbles into 
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In a commercial released in 2012, IT giant IBM shows us a criminal and a police 
officer on their journeys to the same convenience store.1 The dramaturgy of 
the scene leaves little doubt that the criminal’s intention is to rob the place. The 
police officer, however, informed by the high- tech equipment installed in his 
patrol car, is already fully aware of what the criminal is up to and makes sure to 
arrive at the soon- to- be crime scene just before the offender. Waiting for him 
in the parking lot in front of the store with a cup of coffee, the police officer 
recognizes the criminal and raises his cup to him – and the latter, realizing that 
his plans have been anticipated before they could materialize, turns around and 
leaves empty- handed. Has a brave new world of policing arrived? Obviously, 
the logic of a commercial is to attract attention, and IBM’s techno- utopian 
story of data- driven crime prevention should thus be taken with a grain of salt. 
Yet it gives us a good impression of the general idea behind predictive policing: 
to anticipate crime and to be able to implement operational measures that deter 
offenders and prevent the anticipated crime from happening.
Fast- forward to summer of 2016. It is a quiet Monday morning in a Swiss 
police station. In a back office next to the control room, a police officer 
imports citywide data on residential burglaries from the weekend into a note-
book computer, runs the crime analysis software PRECOBS (Pre Crime 
Observation System), and, after a couple of mouse clicks, creates graphically 
supported insights into areas where increased risk for follow- up incidents is 
estimated within the next 72 hours. The officer double- checks each of the 
algorithmically calculated alerts for plausibility by revisiting the underlying 
data and dismisses one alert that does not seem to meet the criteria: rather 
than professional offender behavior that could be part of a potential series of 
burglaries in the neighborhood, this one appears to be related to relationship 
troubles and is therefore likely a one- off event. He does, however, confirm the 
rest of the alerts, and for each of them, he produces a short memo that includes 
a map with a color- coded risk grid and a set of recommended operational 
measures. Finally, he forwards the memos to central planning and operations, 
from where they will be further disseminated to local police stations. Based 




attention to the areas identified, possibly conduct traffic controls, or check 
persons – hoping to potentially deter burglars from striking again or even catch 
them red- handed.
Clearly, there are some major discrepancies between the scenario presented 
by IBM and the actual practices of algorithmic crime prediction this book inves-
tigates. The most striking difference is that one of them targets the behavior 
of individual persons, and the other identifies specific spaces as particularly 
susceptible to criminal activity. These are fundamentally different approaches 
to predictive policing, and they rely on different theories, models, algorithms, 
and datasets. While it is true that particularly in the US (and other parts of the 
world with lenient data protection legislation), individual risk profiling is seen 
as a promising avenue toward the prevention of crime and violence, most cur-
rently used approaches to predictive policing are not concerned with persons. 
Instead, they target the distribution of criminal activity across time and space 
and seek to identify areas where there is an allegedly higher crime risk during 
certain periods. This is the type of predictive policing that this book engages 
with empirically.
A second major difference is the way in which technology is imagined to 
work. In the first scenario, predictive policing is presented to us as something 
that miraculously and invisibly operates in the background, thriving on auto-
mation and not necessarily requiring human intervention. The officer only 
needs to look at the screen in his patrol car to get precise information about 
a crime forecast, after which he can drive to the predicted crime scene where 
harm can then almost effortlessly be prevented from unfolding. In the real 
world, however, predictive policing is hard work. It requires coordinated efforts 
between different specialized police divisions, including the production and 
consolidation of crime data, the actual analytical process, the dissemination of 
results, resource management, and the implementation of operational preven-
tion measures. And in the end, patrols might never even see a criminal, as the 
rationale of crime prevention is largely based on the logic of deterrence that is 
created by the visibility of the police in public space.
Is predictive policing not as sexy as it is at times presented then? We believe 
it very much is. Once we strip away any superficial science- fiction layers, pre-
dictive policing offers a window into the ongoing transformation of police 
work along the lines of digitization, data, and algorithms. An analysis of pre-
dictive policing allows us to gain insights into larger reconfiguration patterns 
that concern the relations between society, crime, and the police. Accordingly, 
this book is interested in practices of crime prediction and the changes in 
police work that emanate from the use of predictive policing software. It first 
and foremost provides an academic perspective on knowledge production and 
social order in a digital age. Just as well, however, it does also offer a civil liber-
ties perspective on the undesirable societal effects that algorithmic analytics in 
police work can unfold. Last, but not least, from the angle of police profes-
sionals, it affords an opportunity to use insights from the study of predictive 
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policing as a guide for a responsible implementation of data- driven tools that 
speaks to the protection of human rights as much as it speaks to the operational 
needs of police organizations.
Our study will inevitably debunk some of the grand claims with which 
the theme is associated. Contrary to the techno- utopian narratives that we 
often find in the statements of police managers, politicians, private companies, 
and – not least – the media, there is in fact little “Big Data”, “artificial intel-
ligence”, or “real- time awareness” to be found in everyday crime prediction. 
Most approaches to predictive policing mobilize well- established criminologi-
cal theories, are based on rather simple models and a limited amount of data 
points, and are interested in clear- cut and easily implementable forecasts that 
need not necessarily be “true” but merely accurate enough to inform opera-
tional measures.
Predictive policing is also not “new” in the sense of a disruptive innovation. 
It builds logically on several larger trajectories within police work, including 
crime analysis, the turn toward prevention and corresponding patrol strategies, 
and the mobilization of scientific methods and tools. Notwithstanding these 
lineages, predictive policing has the potential to reconfigure the ways in which 
the police constitute knowledge about the intricate relationships between soci-
ety and deviant behavior. Algorithmic crime analysis tools represent a qualita-
tive leap for the police, as they make it possible to go deeper into data, explore 
them in more systematic ways, produce situational insights much quicker, 
and – at least in theory – spark more dynamic and flexible operational 
measures. Predictive policing in this sense comes with the promise to restruc-
ture the use of resources in a more efficient fashion, geared toward targeted 
interventions in criminal activities as they unfold. And at the same time, it 
speaks very much to an increasing managerialism that forces public agencies 
to rationalize and optimize their activities, particularly in times of political and 
public pressure and budget cuts.
In order to understand the impact of predictive policing, we believe two 
things are necessary. First of all, we need to study algorithmic crime analysis not 
as an isolated technological artifact but as a sociotechnical practice. Predictive 
policing consists not only of software, algorithms, and data sources. While it is 
important to understand how data are turned into criminal futures, the ques-
tion if and how predictive policing comes to matter in everyday police work 
hinges on how police departments incorporate algorithmic crime analyses into 
their organizational structures and occupational cultures and how they manage 
to turn them into operational measures. Predictive policing, as we will illustrate 
throughout this book, involves police officers, morning briefings, patrol cars, 
election campaigns, data protection, and gut feelings as much as it involves data 
and algorithms. Studying predictive policing as a sociotechnical system means 
to pay attention to a multiplicity of technical, human, organizational, cultural, 
political, ethical, legal, and – not least – economic elements that matter in the 








Figure 1.1 Predictive policing as a chain of translation
Predictive policing is, in its essence, about the question of how algorithms 
can direct the actions of patrol officers in the streets. In order to do so, it needs 
to align a variety of human and nonhuman elements. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, 
predictive policing includes a number of interrelated steps. It starts with the 
occurrence of crime and the data that the police create from and about crime. 
It continues with the analytical process during which the technical character-
istics of predictive policing software come to matter as much as the question 
of how algorithms and humans work together and split tasks. Insights from the 
analytical process must subsequently be rendered intelligible and actionable and 
be disseminated across multiple specialized divisions until they can eventually 
inform patrol work. Finally, if predictive policing is to have an effect on the 
occurrence of crime, allegedly criminal futures must be acted upon by street 
patrols. The result of the predictive policing process is an altered criminal envi-
ronment that forms the basis for new data creation and sparks the next iteration 
of the cycle.
Our analysis draws attention not only to these distinct steps, but just as well 
to what happens in the gaps between them. Predictive policing takes place in 
patrol cars just as much as it does at crime scenes where data are created, in the 
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back office where risk estimates are produced, and in meetings where resources 
are coordinated and shifts scheduled. These different professional lifeworlds 
need to be connected, and their actors need to be aligned behind a common 
cause. Only then can knowledge and power be produced and travel through 
police organizations in order to inform the work of street patrols. Throughout 
this book, we will draw particular attention to the translation processes that 
bridge the gaps between different domains of police work. Translation is what 
brings criminal futures into being in everyday police work – and understanding 
translation work will allow us to situate how predictive policing comes to mat-
ter not only vis- à- vis the police themselves, but vis- à- vis society.
Second, in order to study how sociotechnical relations come into being and 
how such translation takes place, an empirical approach is paramount. Look-
ing at policy- making, legal discourses, algorithms, or software interfaces will 
reveal important insights about some of the imaginaries that underpin predic-
tive policing, but these insights will remain partial accounts if not properly 
contextualized within actual police practices. Sociotechnical systems, in other 
words, must be studied “in the wild” in order to account for the frictions, con-
tradictions, appropriations, institutional learning processes, and general change 
that occurs with and through them. At the time of writing this introduction, 
few detailed studies that investigate these issues are available. Although pre-
dictive policing has more recently been one of the most prevalent topics in 
research on crime, (domestic) security politics, the police, and criminal justice, 
the studies by Manning (2008) on digital crime mapping and Brayne (2017, 
2021) on policing and surveillance stand out as comprehensive accounts that 
empirically investigate how the police are attempting to venture into the future 
in order to tame it.
Other works that have already been published have studied the role of algo-
rithms and data in the constitution of insecure and criminal futures (Amoore 
and Raley, 2017; Aradau and Blanke, 2017; Kaufmann, 2018, 2019; Kaufmann 
et  al., 2019), often with a critical edge that foregrounds potential issues of 
discrimination, profiling, and social sorting vis- à- vis digitized and automated 
modes of policing (van Brakel and de Hert, 2011; Mantello, 2016; McCull-
och and Wilson, 2016; van Brakel, 2016; Andrejevic, 2017; Ferguson, 2017; 
Sanders and Condon, 2017; Sanders and Sheptycki, 2017; Bennett Moses and 
Chan, 2018; Wilson, 2018; Završnik, 2019). These important literatures shed 
light on the ways in which data and algorithms can be mobilized in ways that 
create concerns from ethical and legal perspectives, and their warning calls 
resonate well within debates about how worrying developments in policing, 
law enforcement, and criminal justice might be curbed. Despite this, they tend 
to predominantly approach predictive policing from an exclusively technologi-
cal vantage point that foregrounds the workings of algorithms while bracketing 
the “social side” of policing – that is, the organizational structures and everyday 
occupational practices and routines that shape how predictive policing comes 
to matter.
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There exists another body of work that foregrounds practical and policy- 
oriented questions around predictive policing, for instance regarding best prac-
tices and optimal modes of implementing software tools (Beck and McCue, 
2009; Pearsall, 2010; Perry et al., 2013; Babuta, 2017; Hardyns and Rummens, 
2018). However, this “applied” literature is in most cases interested in solving 
taken- for- granted problems rather than in theoretically informed engagement 
with predictive policing and the wider implications that it holds for the ways 
in which the police produce and act upon criminal futures. Last, but not least, 
the current scholarly discourse on predictive policing is very US- centric, lead-
ing to an analytic overrepresentation of risk profiling approaches to predictive 
policing. With this book, we seek to address these gaps in the literature by pro-
viding a multiyear empirical case study of predictive policing in two European 
countries: Germany and Switzerland.
Our study
Conceptually building on sociological and criminological works that have 
investigated the implementation and use of information and communication 
technologies in police work and the frictions and transformations that these 
new tools undergo as they enter into institutional, organizational, and practi-
cal contexts (Marx, 1988; Ackroyd et al., 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; 
Chan, 2001; Manning, 2001, 2008), this book presents a detailed account of 
predictive policing as a sociotechnical practice of constituting and addressing 
criminal futures. The case selection – Germany and Switzerland – was, to a 
certain extent, dictated by the locations of our workplaces as well as by the 
fact that both of us are native German speakers. In Europe, German and Swiss 
police departments were, however, among the trailblazers that started experi-
menting with predictive policing early on (particularly the Zurich Municipal 
Police Department and the State Police Department of Bavaria). They there-
fore presented suitable research sites within a field that was still very much in its 
infancy and undergoing continuous changes during the period of our research 
(2016–2019), with regard to both technological development and organiza-
tional and operational implementation (Egbert, 2017; Seidensticker et  al., 
2018). Finally, a number of German and Swiss police forces (the state police 
departments of Bavaria and Lower Saxony and the cantonal police depart-
ments of Aargau, Basel- Land, and Zurich as well as the Zurich Municipal 
Police Department) opted to experiment or work with the same software tool 
(PRECOBS by German manufacturer IfmPt), thus enabling us to compare to 
a certain extent how predictive policing was beginning to take shape within 
different organizational contexts.
However, our empirical work should not be mistaken for a comparative 
investigation in a formalized sense. There was considerable variation in organi-
zation, resources, political context, strategic orientation, scope of predictive 
policing, and software use between the departments we studied. A large degree 
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of this variation can be attributed to political structures. Both Switzerland and 
Germany are federally organized countries, in which the political competen-
cies for domestic security are organized at state level (German Bundesländer, 
Swiss Kantone). This means that there may be considerable differences between 
even neighboring jurisdictions not only in terms of the government constel-
lations and corresponding political programs that impact police competencies 
and budgets but also in terms of larger strategies of patrolling and crime pre-
vention (Wilz, 2012). Against this backdrop, our study should be understood 
as a multisite perspective on predictive policing practices that provides in- depth 
empirical insights into the ways in which predictive policing reconfigures local-
ized police practices (Maguire, 2018: 140).
We conducted empirical research with 11 police departments, four of them 
located in Switzerland (the cantonal police departments of Aargau, Basel- Land, 
and Zurich as well as the Zurich Municipal Police) and seven in Germany 
(the state police departments of Bavaria, Berlin, Baden- Württemberg, Ham-
burg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine- Westphalia, and Brandenburg). All these 
departments were, during the research period, either already using predictive 
policing software on a regular basis, running field experiments in order to 
determine whether to use and/or how to best implement predictive policing, 
or developing their own predictive policing tools. This fragmentation must be 
seen as a testament to the novelty of predictive policing at the time, with a lot 
of uncertainty surrounding key decisions such as whether to purchase off- the- 
shelf commercial software or try to build custom- tailored tools in- house, how 
to fit algorithmic modes of data analysis into existing IT infrastructures, and 
how to accommodate special attention to risk areas within patrol practices.
As there is, as of the time of writing, only one commercial German- language 
predictive policing application available (PRECOBS), those police departments 
who decided not to develop their own in- house solution inevitably wound up 
with PRECOBS. In our case, six out of 11 departments used the software 
at some point between 2016 and 2019. Having been the first ready- to- use 
predictive policing tool on the market, PRECOBS was also used as a major 
reference point for the development of in- house software tools by other police 
departments. Although our empirical material includes several other predic-
tive policing tools (KLB- operativ, KrimPro, PreMAP, SKALA), most technical 
references throughout this book relate to PRECOBS in either its first version 
(now called PRECOBS Classic) or the second iteration (PRECOBS Enter-
prise) that was rolled out in 2019.
PRECOBS primarily specializes in residential burglary prediction. Its theo-
retical model is predicated upon near- repeat victimization theory (Polvi et al., 
1991; Farrell, 1995; Townsley et al., 2003). In simplified terms, PRECOBS 
computes risk estimates for residential burglaries based on “trigger incidents” 
that indicate a high likelihood of follow- up crimes in the spatial and temporal 
vicinity (i.e., “near repeats”). The underlying assumption is that domestic bur-
glaries are mostly committed by professionalized serial offenders who identify 
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profitable target neighborhoods, rationally assess the risk of detection and 
arrest, and in case of a positive cost- benefit ratio, strike multiple times within 
a short time period and move on to another neighborhood or city before the 
police can take countermeasures (Johnson et al., 2007; Farrell and Pease, 2014; 
Sidebottom and Wortley, 2016).
The rationale behind PRECOBS is to put the police in a position where they 
can identify ongoing burglary series and actively intervene in order to prevent 
further offences (Schweer, 2015; Balogh, 2016; Schweer, 2016). PRECOBS is 
thus a highly selective analytical tool, as it not only exclusively focalizes domes-
tic burglary but also primarily targets a specific offender type (the professional 
serial burglar). The data analysis in the prediction process rests on relatively few 
data points. Usually these are the time of the incident, modus operandi, haul, 
type of housing, and street address and GIS coordinates of a burglary (Balogh, 
2016: 336). Assuming that these characteristics are sufficient to identify trigger 
incidents within crime data, the software issues an alert that indicates increased 
crime risk for specific neighborhoods and time frames as soon as it detects 
a combination of predefined trigger criteria. What PRECOBS predicts, in 
a strict sense, is thus the replication of an already recorded criminal activity, 
which is extended along the dimensions of time and space.
Overall, the model as well as the algorithms applied here are arguably not 
very complex or advanced. On the contrary, it could be argued that the main 
contribution of PRECOBS is an automation of previously manually performed 
crime analysis. However, in doing so, it provides significant increases in speed 
and scale, enabling timely reactions to ongoing criminal activity that would not 
have been possible before. Whereas in the past, crime forecasts tended only to 
become available when they were already outdated, algorithmic crime analy-
sis provides an opportunity to apply prevention strategies while a presumed 
burglary series is still active and the offender is looking to strike as many times 
as possible within a short time frame and within a small local radius. This 
knowledge, so the rationale, can then be used to maximize the effectiveness 
and efficiency of prevention measures (Okon, 2015; Schweer, 2015). The most 
important aspect of predictive policing is, in this sense, that it minimizes the 
time period between data collection, analysis, and the production of action-
able intelligence, meaning that operational crime prevention measures can be 
implemented more quickly and in a more targeted fashion. Knowledge pro-
duction and action must thereby not be understood as separate domains, but as 
closely entwined elements of the predictive policing process.
We opted to methodologically triangulate this process in our research 
through a combination of interviews, ethnography, and document analysis. 
First of all, we conducted a series of 62 qualitative, semistructured interviews. 
The majority of our interlocutors were police officers on the analytical, tacti-
cal, and operational levels, thus covering all practical police levels of relevance 
for predictive policing (i.e., crime analysis, central planning and resource man-
agement, local police chiefs and shift supervisors, patrol forces). This was not 
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always possible within each police department, but we were able to assemble 
cross- cutting perspectives from all relevant levels. Moreover, we spoke with 
senior officers who were responsible for the integration of predictive polic-
ing into their departments, including political, administrative, and managerial 
aspects. Last, but not least, we engaged with designers and programmers in 
order to incorporate the imaginaries and decisions that shaped algorithms, user 
interfaces, and modes of visual representation.
Second, we conducted focused ethnographies in order to understand the 
concrete ways in which predictive policing becomes a part of everyday police 
work. We were able to shadow crime analysts during their work with predictive 
policing software, and this gave us insights into the details of the crime analysis 
process and the challenges, insecurities, and contingencies that are attached to 
this process. We also had the opportunity to participate in an end- user meeting 
that was organized by PRECOBS manufacturer, IfmPt, and facilitated by the 
Cantonal Police Department of Aargau in 2018. During the meeting, police 
representatives from Germany, Switzerland, and Austria exchanged practical 
experiences from their work with PRECOBS and gave feedback to the soft-
ware manufacturer. Last, but not least, we facilitated a workshop with Swiss 
police departments at ETH Zurich in 2018. Overall, 40 field protocols were 
produced.
Finally, we complemented our field research with document analysis. 
Throughout the research period, we collected a total of 378 relevant doc-
uments with reference to predictive policing in Germany and Switzerland, 
including presentation slides, handbooks, manuals, best practice guidelines, 
screenshots, photographs, reports, evaluations, parliamentary debates, official 
statements, and personal correspondence. Some of these documents were for 
internal use only, and we were not given permission to cite or reference them 
in our work. They did nonetheless help us to understand organizational chal-
lenges and practices with regard to predictive policing. Overall, the inclusion 
of a wide variation of official and internal documentation amended the subjec-
tive perspectives provided by interviews and ethnographic research by adding 
insights into the specific problem constellations, use cases, and controversies 
that surrounded the development and implementation of predictive policing in 
Germany and Switzerland.
All data were analyzed through thematic coding and subsequent qualitative 
content analysis to further structure the material. For the coding process, we 
used the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA (Kuckartz and Rädiker, 
2019). In concrete terms, interview transcripts, field protocols, and documents 
were in an initial round of analysis coded with reference to predefined main 
categories that had been derived from the literature and from our primary 
research interests (e.g., “data”, “crime prevention”, “space”). The code struc-
ture was extended throughout subsequent rounds of analysis and refined in an 
inductive fashion, accommodating thematic complexes that emerged from the 
data. This combination of deductive and inductive coding was informed by 
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grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 1994), speaking 
to the fact that throughout empirical research processes, mutually constitu-
tive effects between iterative rounds of data collection and analysis are to be 
expected. Rather than subscribing to a radical form of induction, our analysis 
was thus epistemically underpinned by a notion of “theoretical empiricism” 
(Kalthoff et al., 2008) that presupposes an inseparable and fundamentally recip-
rocal relationship between theory and empirical research.
Per agreement with our research participants, all data have been anonymized 
to an extent that individual persons, places, and institutions cannot be iden-
tified. In cases where information was freely available in the public domain 
(e.g., which police departments use predictive policing applications, details on 
software packages, or information publicly communicated by police depart-
ments), we have opted not to anonymize. References to our empirical material 
throughout this book are marked as “I” (interviews), “P” (protocols), or “D” 
(documents) and numbered according to the production of documentation 
throughout the research process. In some cases, therefore, numbering is not 
continuous.
In summary, we believe the multisited, multimethod fieldwork approach that 
we pursued is well suited to explore how predictive policing transforms the 
ways in which the police produce knowledge about crime and society and act 
upon that knowledge. It allowed us to empirically situate algorithmic modes 
of crime analysis within larger trajectories of police work, technology, and the 
political rationales that underpin the turn toward data analysis and preventive 
intervention. And while our findings might not be easily generalizable due to 
the idiosyncrasy of national, regional, and local models of police organization 
and policing strategies, they do in fact correspond closely with those of exist-
ing works on digitization and security, the transformation of policing, and the 
societal and ethical challenges that algorithmic means of knowledge production 
pose.
Our main message
The first main message that we seek to convey through our empirical analysis 
is that predictive policing must be understood as a process that is embedded 
within a set of complex sociotechnical relations. In order to come to matter in 
everyday police work, crime forecasts must be able to connect various special-
ized police divisions and their professional lifeworlds. Only when key human 
and nonhuman elements are properly aligned will knowledge and power be 
successfully be transmitted from the back office to the street level and be able to 
inform patrolling and crime prevention strategies. An analytical lens on transla-
tion processes allows us to understand the challenges, frictions, and unintended 
consequences involved in complex sociotechnical systems.
The second main message of this book is that the implementation and use of 
predictive policing software can in many regards be seen as a blueprint for the 
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further digitization of police work. Criminal futures must be understood not 
only with regard to the spatiotemporal forms of risk that the police create and 
act upon with predictive policing software but also with regard to the future of 
policing itself. Even though predictive policing in everyday practice might not 
always live up to the lofty and futuristic ambitions of some of its advocates, it 
is safe to say that the police’s turn to the future in a systematic and data- driven 
fashion has significant repercussions for how police work is conducted, how 
the police shape their relations with the public, how crime is conceptualized 
as a social phenomenon, what should be done about it, and how it should be 
done.
Predictive policing might in fact be considered as a first, careful step toward 
“datafication” and “platformization” of police work. As police departments 
are starting to scratch the digital surface, it has created the awareness that the 
police need to reform IT infrastructures, foster data literacy, strengthen crime 
analysis divisions, and lobby for legal frameworks that enable data sharing across 
jurisdictions if they want to follow in the footsteps of private industry and sys-
tematically exploit the data treasures they have already been creating for a long 
time. Our research leaves us with little doubt that these larger trajectories will 
resonate with political priorities and technology development. Even though 
predictive policing in its current form might appear to be pedestrian and piece-
meal, it is in all likelihood here to stay, to be further developed and refined, to 
be expanded to cover new types of crime, to include more and larger datasets, 
and to continue transforming the ways in which we are policed.
These tendencies foreground the need to critically accompany how algo-
rithmic tools become part of police work. Advanced data- driven analytical 
methods change the ways in which the police perceive the world, make sense 
of it, and act within it. When criminal futures come into being in the form 
of algorithmically produced risk estimates, this can have wide- ranging conse-
quences for how the police prioritize crime prevention measures differently 
across neighborhoods, how patrol officers interact with citizens, and it can 
impinge on the accountability of police organizations for their actions. Police 
work is a key function for the production and maintenance of public order, but 
it can also discriminate, exclude, and violate civil liberties and human rights. 
When algorithms mediate how the police produce power and knowledge, 
close investigation of these processes is paramount.
Studying how predictive policing comes to matter in everyday police work 
helps us to understand and situate these challenges. Engaging the sociotechni-
cal practices of algorithmic crime analysis and the operational measures based 
upon it highlights how predictive policing is a complex, multilevel process that 
is embedded in organizational structures and occupational cultures. It cannot 
be understood in an isolated fashion (e.g., as a techno- utopian tool that will 
revolutionize policing), but needs to be carefully put into context. Such an 
approach presupposes to take seriously both the social and the technical side 
of predictive policing and to take into account the contradictions, frictions, 
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and adjustments that are produced at their intersections. These insights can 
be mobilized to identify strategies for how predictive policing can be imple-
mented and used in responsible ways, and we will end the book with some 
practical recommendations that can help in doing so.
The structure of this book
The structure of this book is informed by the classical “Coleman boat” (Cole-
man, 1990). It starts on the macro level with general theoretical and conceptual 
considerations, then dives into the micro level of empirical study, and finally 
reaggregates the findings and provides an evaluation and an outlook. This means 
that readers interested in an overview of predictive policing and its origins and 
connections to changing models of patrolling and crime prevention as well as 
its effects on organizational change are invited to focus on Chapters 2 and 3. 
For those who look for a detailed reconstruction of predictive policing prac-
tices and the translation efforts involved in bringing algorithmic crime forecasts 
to the street level, we can offer a shortcut to Chapters 4–7. And readers with 
an interest in an evaluation of predictive policing from the perspective of the 
police as well as from a wider societal angle might want to jump to Chapters 8 
and 9. Eventually, Chapter 10 gives an outlook and some practical advice for 
a responsible use of data- driven tools for crime prevention and wider issues of 
security and social order. Reading the entire book from start to finish will, of 
course, make for the best overall experience. In the following paragraphs, we 
briefly summarize each of the chapters.
Chapter 2 situates predictive policing within larger trajectories of innovations 
in police work and crime prevention. The emergence of predictive policing, 
as the chapter illustrates, must be understood in light of general tendencies to 
render policing more future oriented, scientifically informed, and data driven. 
Moreover, it must be seen within a lineage of crime prevention strategies since 
the 1970s, including the likes of community policing, problem- oriented polic-
ing, hot- spot policing, and intelligence- led policing. The chapter proceeds to 
present an overview of different approaches to predictive policing. Differen-
tiating between person- based and place- based approaches, it details different 
strategies for how data, theories, and models can be mobilized to come up with 
statements about possible futures. Overall, predictive policing, so we argue, 
presents yet another step in a rather long history of efforts to render police 
work more effective and efficient. There is considerable continuity in the ways 
in which police organizations seek to predict and address the future. Predic-
tive policing should, in summary, be understood as an evolution rather than a 
revolution – however, as an evolution that nonetheless bears the potential to 
fundamentally reconfigure organizational routines and policing practices.
Chapter  3 provides an overview of the existing literature on technology 
and police organizations and develops a conceptual and analytical understand-
ing of technology as embedded within larger sociotechnical systems. From an 
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organizational point of view, technological tools are likely to unfold a number 
of repercussions that go beyond the originally intended scope, including the 
possibility to cause active resistance as they unsettle long- standing routines and 
habits. In order to understand how such repercussions come about, we suggest 
to approach crime prediction technology as interwoven into social and organi-
zational contexts and to highlight the relations that predictive policing forms 
with its environment. Eventually, the chapter introduces the concept of transla-
tion, which allows us to trace the production and transmission of knowledge 
and power throughout police work. Drawing attention to the coordination and 
alignment activities between different human and nonhuman elements that are 
necessary to make predictive policing work, translation addresses the question 
of how an algorithm eventually manages to move patrol officers through space 
for the sake of crime prevention.
Chapter 4 explores the relation between data and speed in predictive polic-
ing. It starts by examining how the police produce data from crime scenes and 
illustrates how the representation of criminal activity in datasets is impacted by 
epistemic uncertainties and the translation of social phenomena into fixed clas-
sification systems. Generally speaking, the police usually have to grapple with 
data that tend to be incoherent, inaccurate, and unreliable – and thus need 
to be subjected to multiple layers of amendment and quality control before 
they can be analyzed. This creates considerable tension with regard to predic-
tive policing and the presupposed need to run analyses as quickly as possible 
in order to be able to intervene in ongoing criminal activity. As the quality 
of crime data usually only improves over the course of investigations, police 
departments face a trade- off situation where they have to decide whether to 
immediately run analyses based on potentially unreliable data or whether to 
wait for consolidated data but run the risk of receiving already outdated results. 
This trade- off must, however, also be understood vis- à- vis the daily rhythm of 
public life and criminal activity within which police work takes place. Overall, 
the chapter foregrounds the complexity of data and multiple temporalities in 
predictive policing.
Chapter 5 looks into the relations between algorithms and human analysts. 
As predictive policing applications aim to facilitate analytical work through the 
automation of complex tasks, they aim to reduce the workload for humans 
and accelerate crime analysis. In doing so, they do, however, inevitably remove 
(parts of) the analytical process from sight. The chapter investigates how pre-
dictive policing reconfigures the relationship between humans and machines 
and discusses some pertinent regulatory and normative questions that come to 
the fore when analytical tasks are hidden in black- boxed algorithmic systems. 
Our analysis shows how the police still consider human operators essential in 
order to review the data basis on which predictive policing software computes 
outputs. At the same time, from a legal and ethical perspective, police depart-
ments are bent on keeping decision- making an exclusively human affair. This 
is, however, not easy, as arguing against a machine can be quite challenging for 
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human operators. Police departments have, therefore, come up with a number 
of safeguards that are supposed to support humans and keep the algorithm in 
check.
Chapter 6 engages how crime risk, once computed, is made intelligible and 
actionable and how it is disseminated throughout various stages of police work: 
from the analyst’s desk to central planning and operations, and from there to 
local police stations, shift supervisors, and patrol officers. The analysis pays 
particular attention to two aspects. First, it highlights how the dissemination 
of results from algorithmic crime analysis must speak to different audiences 
if it is to successfully bring risk on the street and inform targeted prevention 
measures. In other words, it needs to enroll different human and nonhuman 
elements in a common cause and be able to speak to different rationales and 
logics. Second, our analysis investigates how risk is visualized in order to do so. 
Specifically, we explore how the use of maps puts risk in relation to space and 
establishes the existence and coordinates of criminal futures in an intuitive and 
actionable fashion.
Chapter 7 analyzes how risk estimates become enacted by patrol units in 
their work practices. It places predictive policing within larger trajectories of 
patrol techniques and, particularly, within the conflict between an occupa-
tional culture of discretion on the one hand and aspirations of managerialism 
and micromanagement of police work on the other. Vis- à- vis the entrenched 
conflict between “craft” and “science”, the narrow spatial and temporal para-
meters for targeted patrolling in predictive policing have the potential to favor 
rationalization over professional experience and intuition. However, as police 
departments have virtually no possibility to track and monitor patrol units, they 
need to convince patrol officers of the meaningfulness of algorithmically pro-
duced risk. Eventually, the chapter explores how the notion of criminal futures 
impacts the behavior of patrol officers. While the logic of the patrol is generally 
geared toward the production of deviance and suspicion as a function of the 
(mis)fit between persons and their surroundings, there is reason to believe that 
predictive policing might reinforce already existing concerns in patrolling such 
as racism, discrimination, or spatial prejudice.
Chapter  8 investigates the question whether predictive policing actu-
ally prevents the occurrence of crime. In light of the political prioritization 
of burglary prevention and the public attention that predictive policing was 
subjected to, police departments needed to demonstrate that what they were 
doing was in fact successful. Coming up with proof for the success of targeted 
crime prevention is, however, not easy. Complex social settings with dynamic 
interaction effects, as well as numerous possible intervening variables, render 
it almost impossible to attribute the nonoccurrence of crime to the use of 
predictive policing software in a causal fashion. When faced with these chal-
lenges, evaluation studies of predictive policing thus opted to redefine suc-
cess criteria instead. Rather than aiming to establish statistical evidence for 
the assumed relation between algorithmic crime analysis, operational measures, 
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and decreasing residential burglary numbers, police departments opted to high-
light the long- term organizational benefits of the use of crime prediction soft-
ware. By foregrounding aspects such as improved data- handling capacities and 
communication processes, success was framed in a sociotechnical fashion as the 
capability to produce and transmit knowledge and power across different parts 
of police work and to bring risk from the analyst’s desk to the streets.
Chapter  9 widens the perspective and looks into the societal and ethical 
ramifications of predictive policing. Against the backdrop that algorithmic 
crime analysis tools are often used to allegedly rationalize police work and 
frame its technoscientific character as innovative, impartial, and superior to 
human behavior, it discusses a number of concerns with regard to the algo-
rithmic production of risk estimates and targeted crime prevention measures. 
First, the chapter looks into the data basis of predictive policing. For a number 
of reasons, crime data are likely to be biased. Used as input for algorithmic 
processing, such bias is likely to persist, although potentially in rationalized and 
less obvious forms. Second, the chapter engages the behavior of patrol officers 
within presumed risk spaces. The notion of risky environments can lead to 
increased suspicion, more aggressive patrolling practices, and aggravate exist-
ing racial and/or ethnic prejudice. Third, the chapter explores how predictive 
policing applications, by design, encourage law enforcement–heavy policing 
strategies. Predictive policing has been developed on the basis of the same 
assumptions as situational crime prevention and thus replicates the preference 
to treat symptoms rather than to address root causes of crime. Finally, the chap-
ter reviews how predictive policing removes analytical processes from sight and, 
in doing so, potentially undercuts the accountability of police departments for 
their actions.
Chapter 10 presents a brief summary of the book’s main arguments as well 
as an outlook and some practical advice for the use of predictive policing and 
other algorithmic crime analysis applications. It discusses how experiences 
from the implementation and everyday use of predictive policing have revealed 
a number of technical and organizational shortcomings in police departments 
and how the political and public exposure of predictive policing was mobilized 
to put these shortcomings high on the reform agenda. Reviewing a number 
of legal and technological initiatives for future data- driven policing in Ger-
many and Switzerland, the chapter illustrates how predictive policing is likely 
to aggravate already existing trends toward “datafication” and “platformization” 
in police work. We conclude the book with a call to carefully balance predic-
tive policing with civil liberties and human rights and line out seven practical 
recommendations for a prudent use of algorithmic analysis tools in everyday 
police work.
Note
 1 www.youtube.com/watch?v=5n2UjBO22EI (accessed 30 April 2020).
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Predictive policing did not appear out of the blue. Rather, it is firmly anchored 
within a long lineage of policing strategies, which have in turn been impacted 
by technological advancements and political programs. To understand specific 
forms of predictive policing and their effects on police work, it is important to 
situate their emergence vis- à- vis larger historical trajectories of how the police 
produce knowledge and prevent crime. There is in fact little consensus about 
whether and, if so, how predictive policing can be clearly differentiated from 
earlier forms of crime analysis, crime mapping, and other computer- supported 
forms of management, planning, and action. This chapter places predictive 
policing within multiple overarching trends in policing: digitization, scientifi-
cation, the turn to future- oriented action, economic and political pressure on 
police organizations, as well as the policing strategies, patrolling techniques, 
and crime prevention programs that have emerged vis- à- vis these trends.
Moreover, predictive policing is not a single phenomenon. We might define 
it as the proactive use of algorithmically mediated data analysis for the purpose 
of finding patterns in datasets, based on which risk estimates are produced for 
either individuals or locations and are operationalized in the form of targeted 
prevention measures. It is, however, not one model, not one process, not one 
algorithm, and not one software application.
Rather, over the past decade “predictive policing” has emerged as a collec-
tive term for a plethora of ways in which the police seek to address the future 
by using algorithmic data analysis in order to modulate it. It can be based on 
narrow sets of crime data produced by the police themselves, or it can venture 
into “Big Data” and integrate heterogeneous data sources. It can be founded on 
static and rule- based algorithms, or it can incorporate the dynamics of machine 
learning. It can be used to predict crime in particular places, or it can be used 
to predict crime by specific persons. It can integrate dynamic environmental 
information such as weather or traffic data. It can target burglary, car theft, 
pick- pocketing, or gang violence. It can be developed and designed by the 
police or by private companies. And these are just some of the possible features 
that account for variations between different approaches. We thus need to care-
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The second part of the chapter provides an overview of person- based and 
place- based approaches that can currently be encountered.
The police and the future
The police have by no means only started to look into the future with the 
advent of predictive policing applications. On the contrary, having always been 
concerned with the possibility of preventing crime rather than investigating 
already materialized offenses, police forces have throughout history sought 
to identify regularities in the occurrence of crime and to estimate possible 
future trends based on past events (Guerry, 1833; Quetelet, 1842; Burgess, 
1928). And yet, with the digital age, the foundations on which the relation-
ship between the police and the future rests are undergoing major changes, 
as actionable future- related intelligence is now available  – intelligence that 
can, and sometimes must, be put on the street by patrol officers more or less 
instantly. As Manning (2008: 3) has put it, with regard to the introduction of 
crime mapping tools that were able to process unprecedented amounts of data 
and provide hitherto impossible glimpses into possible criminal futures, the 
police “are being dragged into the information age, an age that imagines the 
future prior to executing it”.
In line with the themes of digitization (i.e., the continuous production of 
unprecedented amounts of data, almost unlimited storage capacities and pro-
cessing power, and novel ways of algorithmic knowledge extraction from large 
and heterogenous datasets), criminological literature has in recent years engaged 
at length with the police’s reinforced, data- driven turn toward the future, the 
means of bringing possible criminal futures into being, and the operational 
measures that might be used as ways of intervening in these futures. Ericson 
and Haggerty (1997) have identified at an early stage the changing role of the 
police as “knowledge workers” within a society gravitating toward the estima-
tion and prevention of risks. The role of the police throughout the 1990s was, 
they argued, increasingly seen as a managerial one that was supposed to assemble 
intelligence in order to administer threat. This tendency was largely supported by 
the widespread implementation of powerful new IT systems that could store and 
handle data on an unprecedented scale (Ackroyd et al., 1992; Chan et al., 2001; 
Cope, 2008; Manning, 2008). This development placed police knowledge on a 
broader epistemic basis than ever before when it came to quantifying the relation 
between society and crime and transformed the ways in which the police were 
able to bring futures into being in order to inform prevention.
The newfound technological ability to create and systematically handle 
information, in turn, led to what Maguire (2016: 229) has called a “veritable 
‘data explosion’ in the field”, and sparked new methodological possibilities of 
engaging with the future. More data, the underlying assumption ran, could 
ultimately be turned into more intelligence and thus into more operational 
capacities to actively shape the future. The thirst for more and more data has 
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resonated well with narratives of “Big Data” that thrive on the notion that even 
unstructured datasets, if properly explored, would almost inevitably yield new 
insights into the intricate workings of society and the occurrence of crime 
within it (McCue and Parker, 2003; Beck and McCue, 2009; Babuta, 2017). 
It has moreover been accompanied by the development of more complex and 
sophisticated algorithmic means of data analysis that, coupled with increased 
processing power, allow for novel ways of exploiting large datasets (McCue, 
2007; Završnik, 2019).
Larger trajectories of digitization in policing must be contextualized with 
reference to two more specific developments. First of all, police work has since 
the 1980s increasingly been undergoing what Ericson and Shearing (1986) 
have identified as “scientification”  – that is, the fact that police work, not 
unlike scientific practice, is framed as “a form of action with attendant sym-
bolic and rhetorical features, used to discover the truth and settle problems 
by constructing a view that ‘satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability’ ” 
(Ericson and Shearing, 1986: 132). Reference to academic theories and mod-
els, as well as the application of advanced statistical methods, has in this sense 
played a prominent role in how the police have sought to strengthen their 
capacities of “truth construction” (Haggerty, 2001). Technological innovations, 
and particularly the implementation of information and communication tech-
nologies, have further helped to put these principles to practice (Ericson and 
Shearing, 1986).
With the onslaught of digital data and the accompanying possibility of 
extracting new insights from data that had always been produced on a regular 
basis, police organizations today show an increased willingness to push the 
scientific mindset further, in terms of both methods and the epistemic assump-
tions that underpin them, with paradigms such as “intelligence- led policing” 
leading the way (Ratcliffe, 2016). Practices of experimenting and tinkering 
with data in order to explore modes of practical intervention, supported by an 
empiricist belief in “science as a mechanism that allows us to discover the truth 
in the world” (Miranda, 2015: 424), have largely contributed to the reinforced 
role of “intelligence” for all kinds of police and criminal justice activities (Gill, 
2000: 18).
Second, the turn toward digital futures has resonated with a political- legal 
mindset that is increasingly set on preventing undesired events before they 
materialize. As McCulloch and Wilson (2016: 4) write, what can be wit-
nessed at the intersection of digitization and scientification are “broader socio- 
political transformations in understandings of security and risk [that] have 
reoriented criminal laws, and criminal law- like processes and practices, towards 
future threats”. Using slightly different terms such as “prediction” (Aradau and 
Blanke, 2017), “pre- crime” (Zedner, 2007), or “prepression” (Schinkel, 2011), 
scholars have intensely engaged the wider repercussions of a preoccupation 
with threat, anticipation, and intervention for policing and the criminal justice 
system. Data- driven modes of anticipation and prevention have, in this sense, 
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been fiercely criticized for their potential to engender practices of surveillance 
and profiling that aggravate individually targeted modes of knowledge produc-
tion and interaction (Schauer, 2003; Harcourt, 2007; Gandy, 2009; van Brakel 
and de Hert, 2011), while operating on the basis of the assumed “predictability, 
impartiality, and objectivity of technoscientific solutions” (Mantello, 2016: 2). 
We will pick up some of these questions with particular regard to predictive 
policing in more depth in Chapter 9.
The evolution of crime prevention
Predictive policing aims at overhauling the ways in which the police patrol 
through the dynamic production of crime risk. It implies new strategies of 
policing and crime prevention, and it has the potential to change parts of 
the police profession into a more scientific, data- focused way of working. 
But it did not come out of the blue. Even though algorithmic crime analy-
sis tools are at times presented as a “revolution” in policing (Back, 2016; 
Thomson, 2018), they should rather be understood as an evolutionary 
amalgam of different strands of technological, practical, and organizational 
developments in policing. As Bierschenk (2016: 163) points out, “like all 
social phenomena, police – whether in the sense of a particular police idea 
or of a particular institution – are the result of their own history”. Explor-
ing how predictive policing picks up on larger trajectories of crime preven-
tion strategies will allow us to better situate it within a changing policing 
landscape and will also enable us to foreground the unique characteristics 
that set predictive policing apart from other methods such as crime mapping 
or hot- spot policing.
Historically, as Jones and Newburn (1998: 18) put it, police tasks have evolved 
around “organised forms of order- maintenance, peace- keeping, rule or law 
enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investiga-
tion and information- brokering”. These basic pillars have not changed, yet the 
particular strategies and methods through which they have been enacted have 
been subject to ongoing reform. We will limit ourselves to questions related to 
crime prevention efforts here, as this is the main impetus of predictive polic-
ing approaches. Although crime prevention can be traced back to Robert Peel 
and the invention of the “new police” as an organization that had the explicit 
task of preventing crime (Jobard, 2014: 520; Mulone, 2019: 215f), the preven-
tion of criminal activity was for quite some time after the Second World War 
overshadowed by a preference for more repressive forms of law enforcement. 
Crime prevention only became a higher political priority against the backdrop 
of rising crime levels in the US in the 1970s and early 1980s. By that time, 
the standard model of policing that was predicated upon random patrols and 
responses to calls for service had proved to be little effective in bringing crime 
levels down (Weisburd and Eck, 2004: 43; Tilley, 2008: 373; Jones et al., 2017: 
779), resulting in a penal pessimism that questioned the general possibility 
Predictive policing and its origins 23
of effectively controlling or reducing crime (Kelling et al., 1974; Martinson, 
1974; Garland, 1995).
New and innovative ways of policing that problematized the standard model 
of policing were thus politically encouraged, and this agenda sparked the emer-
gence of new, proactive approaches to police work (Tilley, 2008; Willis, 2014). 
Backed by criminological research, the “preventive turn” (Crawford and Evans, 
2012: 798) suggested that the police should attempt to intervene more strongly 
in the future rather than simply reordering the past (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003). The newfound desire to actively shape the future was closely accompa-
nied by political efforts to render the police – and the criminal justice system 
more generally  – more effective and more efficient (Garland, 2001; Savage, 
2007; Jones et al., 2017: 779). In fact, all major strategic, tactical, technologi-
cal, and managerial developments in policing since the 1970s – i.e. commu-
nity policing, problem- oriented policing, hot- spot policing, crime mapping, 
COMPSTAT, intelligence- led policing  – are underpinned by a common 
rationale of streamlining police work and optimizing the use and allocation of 
resources (Nix, 2015: 276–278; Maguire, 2016: 228; Jones et al., 2017: 780). 
In the following paragraphs, we will briefly engage with each of these innova-
tions. In doing so, we will show that predictive policing can be understood 
as yet another step in this quite long lineage of anticipatory and managerial 
developments.
In the 1970s, community policing approaches were initiated against the 
backdrop of rising crime levels and increasing frustration about the lack of effi-
cacy of established forms of police work. Community policing programs took 
the increasingly difficult relations between the police and minority communi-
ties in the US as a starting point and made an improvement of these relations 
a priority (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Jones et al., 2017: 780). Best 
understood as a high- level strategy or philosophy rather than a concrete pro-
gram (Terpstra et al., 2014: 417), community policing aspires to transform the 
attitudes of local communities toward the police from hostility to productive 
partnership. One way to achieve such a change would be to have designated 
“neighborhood cops” who are supposed to regularly engage with communities 
and build trust in order to produce knowledge about local problems, thus put-
ting the police in a position to devise custom- tailored and cooperative solution 
strategies (Skogan, 2008). Conceived of as an approach that tackles the roots 
of crime rather than dealing with its effects, community policing is often pre-
sented as an effective means of crime prevention (Tilley, 2008: 376).
A similar approach can be found in models of problem- oriented policing 
that were first introduced in the late 1970s and got more traction in the early 
1990s (Goldstein, 1979, 1990). Starting from the observation that police work 
was arguably not structured and systematic enough in tackling crime, problem- 
oriented strategies suggest to broaden the scope of policing. Enforcement 
should not be considered the prime focus, as it would not amount to an end 
in itself, but merely an alleviation of symptoms (Terpstra et  al., 2014: 419). 
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Rather, the focus should be on the systematic analysis of the causes and phe-
nomenology of crime, thus aspiring to identify patterns and acquire knowledge 
about the conditions under which crime occurs – particularly, with regard to 
place and time (Jones et al., 2017: 781). Notably, the origins of repeat victimi-
zation theory can be traced to works on problem- oriented policing (Farrell and 
Pease, 2001; Laycock and Farrell, 2003). Moreover, problem- oriented polic-
ing has paved the way for criminological theories to more strongly enter and 
inform practical police work – particularly, rational choice theories, routine 
activity theory, and works on environmental criminology and situational crime 
prevention (Garland, 2001: 16). Last, but not least, problem- oriented polic-
ing incorporated early attempts to detect crime clusters, which would later 
be taken up and further developed under the label of hot spots (Sherman and 
Weisburd, 1995; Tilley, 2008: 380).
In the 2000s, hot- spot approaches attempted to combine a focus on the 
spatial distribution of crime with the analytical scope of problem- oriented 
policing. Considered a key step toward place- based predictive policing, these 
approaches could moreover be seen as a tactical incorporation of crime map-
ping techniques to inform preferred patrol locations (Chainey, 2014: 703f). 
The concept of the “hot spot” was originally triggered by analyses of police call 
data and the insight that a large percentage of calls came from the same areas 
(Sherman et al., 1989). In line with the desire to prevent crime rather than to 
react to its occurrence, the identification of such pertinent crime clusters was 
thus seen as an opportunity to render policing more effective and efficient, as 
patrols could be increased in these areas in a targeted fashion (Bottoms, 2012: 
471).
This development tied in closely with technological advances in geographic 
information systems (GIS). The increased availability of geo- coded informa-
tion and the possibility of linking police data to GIS data presented new ways 
to turn crime mapping from a descriptive means into an analytical technique 
(Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005). Rooted in environmental criminology (Brant-
ingham and Brantingham, 1981; Wortley and Townsley, 2017), crime mapping 
picks up on two assumptions: that the occurrence of crime is not a random 
phenomenon and that the spatial distribution of crime can provide hints about 
possible future occurrences (Chainey, 2014: 669). Moreover, crime mapping 
and hot spots both foreground the importance of visual representation in order 
to make analytical insights tangible and actionable (Bowers and Hirschfeld, 
2001: 1) – a theme that is prevalent within predictive policing and that we will 
analyze in more depth in Chapter 6.
Another key innovation in the lineage of predictive policing was the intro-
duction of COMPSTAT, a software tool for police organizational management 
that was first used by the New York Police Department in the mid- 1990s 
(Bratton and Knobler, 1998; Eterno and Silverman, 2006). Combining crime 
mapping techniques with performance measurement and assessment ration-
ales, COMPSTAT was predominantly geared toward the optimization of work 
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processes and the targeted allocation of resources so that police departments 
could maximize their efforts in the fight against crime vis- à- vis shrinking 
budgets (Walsh, 2001; Bratton and Malinowski, 2008). COMPSTAT signi-
fied an important step in the computerization of police work, as it mobilized 
digital analytical processes to steer police work based on criteria of effectiveness 
and efficiency (Chainey, 2014: 702). With COMPSTAT, crime mapping and 
computer- generated knowledge production were established for the first time 
as standard components in everyday police work.
With its focus on computer- generated information and its drive of consis-
tently drawing on geographical information on crime and on crime statistics in 
general for the guidance of police work, COMPSTAT can also be understood 
as a stepping stone for intelligence- led policing approaches that originated in 
the 1990s and increasingly gained traction throughout the 2000s (Ratcliffe, 
2016: 24f). Defined as “a policing business model that incorporates data analy-
sis and criminal intelligence into a strategy that coordinates strategic risk man-
agement of threat with a focus on serious, recidivist offenders” (Ratcliffe, 2014: 
2573), intelligence- led policing highlights the role of knowledge production 
in police work through the notion of intelligence, thereby pointing to the 
work of national security and intelligence services as an inspiration for policing. 
Intelligence- led policing suggests that knowledge about crime can be obtained 
from a variety of data sources, ranging from undercover agents and informants 
to systematic data analysis on a large scale. With intelligence- led policing as 
a larger paradigm of how the police mobilize a multiplicity of different data 
sources and modes of knowledge production, some have even argued that pre-
dictive policing should be understood as a particular form of such intelligence 
production rather than a genuinely new approach to policing (Ratcliffe, 2016: 
151f; Hardyns and Rummens, 2018: 203).
Predictive policing: doing more with less?
What exactly sets predictive policing apart from established methods and 
police strategies, then? Looking at the ways in which practitioners and schol-
ars have attempted to define predictive policing provides some clues. Bratton 
et al. (2009: 3) suggest we should understand predictive policing as “forward- 
thinking crime prevention” that “connects technology, management practices, 
real- time data analysis, problem solving and information- led policing to lead to 
results – crime reduction, efficient agencies and modern and innovative polic-
ing”. Quite similarly, Uchida (2009: 1) puts forward a framing of predictive 
policing as a “multi- disciplinary, law enforcement–based strategy that brings 
together advanced technologies, criminological theory, predictive analysis, and 
tactical operations that ultimately lead to results and outcomes – crime reduc-
tion, management efficiency, and safer communities”.
Both definitions foreground crime reduction as a main goal of predictive 
policing. While this seems intuitively convincing, such a focus on outcomes 
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has sparked some controversy. Demonstrating cause- effect relations between 
the use of predictive policing software and decreasing crime numbers is in fact 
not easy, and there is no clear evidence that less crime can be empirically attrib-
uted to algorithmic crime forecasts (Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018: 815ff; 
Benbouzid, 2019; Gerstner, 2019). We will engage with questions of “success” 
and “proof” in predictive policing in more detail in Chapter 8.
Less goal- driven definitions are provided by Pearsall (2010: 16), who argues 
that “predictive policing, in essence, is taking data from disparate sources, ana-
lyzing them and then using results to anticipate, prevent and respond more 
effectively to future crime”, and Ferguson (2012: 265), who writes that “pre-
dictive policing has become a generic term for any crime fighting approach 
that includes a reliance on information technology (usually crime mapping data 
and analysis), criminology theory, predictive algorithms, and the use of this data 
to improve crime suppression on the streets”. These views tie in with Perry et 
al.’s (2013: 1f) description of predictive policing as “the application of analytical 
techniques – particularly quantitative techniques – to identify likely targets for 
police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical 
predictions”.
Throughout these diverse conceptual takes, a number of cross- cutting 
themes can be identified. First of all, scholars agree that predictive policing 
is about estimates of possible futures and about operational policing measures 
that can be custom tailored on the basis of such estimates. Second, and more 
importantly, they stress that predictive policing is a data- driven process that is 
facilitated by technological advances. It builds upon the availability of sophisti-
cated algorithms, unprecedented amounts of data, and rapidly increasing stor-
age capacities and computational power. Third, and not least, authors point 
to the fact that predictive policing is conceived of as a scientifically informed 
way of police work that mobilizes criminological theories as much as empirical 
insights into crime and its occurrence. Taken together, these characteristics are 
believed to provide the police with the means for better situational awareness, 
to put them in a situation where they can respond swiftly and flexibly to ongo-
ing criminal activities, and to direct their resources in a more targeted and thus 
more efficient fashion.
None of these themes are genuinely new, but all of them have a history 
in the organizational development of the police over recent decades. Their 
combination did, however, turn out to provide a suitable response strategy 
to increasing political, public, and economic pressure on the police to find 
new ways to deal with rising crime levels. In 2012, then LAPD police chief, 
Charlie Beck (cit. in Orr, 2012) pinpointed the pragmatic appeal of predictive 
policing as follows: “I’m not going to get more money, I’m not going to get 
more cops. I have to be better at using what I have. And that’s what predic-
tive policing is about.” As the aftershocks of the financial crisis of 2008 had 
put severe budgetary pressure on public agencies, police organizations were 
forced to find creative ways to maintain their level of service. Beck and McCue 
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(2009: 24) had in fact argued early on that new forms of crime analysis and 
crime prevention would need to be all about “do[ing] more with less”. Tech-
nological innovation was in this sense widely conceived as a potential way to 
ramp up the efficiency and effectiveness of police work through more targeted 
and informed ways of acting (Beck and McCue, 2009; Bratton et al., 2009; 
Saunders et al., 2016). The rationale of predictive policing was thus, from its 
early days, to a large extent characterized by business logics.
Some have argued that predictive policing should, in light of these moti-
vations, be primarily understood as an internal management tool that aligns 
police work with modern business methods in order to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness (Benbouzid, 2019; Wilson, 2019). Others have foregrounded 
alleged algorithmic impartiality as a driving force (Miranda, 2015; Shapiro, 
2019). As Ferguson (2017: 21ff) notes, the implementation of predictive polic-
ing in the US was in fact not least driven by the increasing tension between 
police forces and ethnic minorities, especially against the backdrop of the Black 
Lives Matter movement. Predictive policing was in this regard seen as a way 
to get rid of human bias and let a machine decide where to patrol and who to 
control. The notion of an impartial algorithm is of course a myth in the first 
place, and several studies have over the last few years demonstrated how bias 
enters algorithmic decision- support systems in policing and criminal justice in 
many different ways (Angwin et al., 2016; Lum and Isaac, 2016; Richardson 
et al., 2019). We will deal with these issues in more depth in Chapter 9.
The origins of predictive policing can, however, be traced back even further. 
In the US, police departments started to experiment with technical means for 
systematic data analysis in the early 2000s. The Richmond Police Department, 
for example, started using SPSS data mining applications for threat assessment 
and risk- based deployment of tactical units in 2003 (McCue and Parker, 2003; 
McCue, 2007), and similar methods spilled over to other departments in the 
following years (Robinson and Koepke, 2016). Data- driven, risk- oriented 
approaches to police operations were only explicitly framed as “predictive 
policing” for the first time in 2008 (Bratton et al., 2009; Perry et al., 2013: 4), 
and this framing was decisively reinforced by the media attention that accom-
panied the implementation of the software tool PredPol – short for Predictive 
Policing – by the police departments of Santa Cruz and Los Angeles in 2011. 
PredPol was the product of a collaboration between the Los Angeles Police 
Department and researchers from the University of California, who had aspired 
to bring together criminological theory and police data in order to come up 
with an easily usable analytical application for police work (Short et al., 2010; 
Mohler et al., 2015).
An important role in the advancement of algorithmic crime analysis methods 
was also played by the US National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA), which organized two seminal symposia on predictive 
policing in order to further explore its potential, its organizational prerequi-
sites, and its possible impacts on policing routines and practices (Pearsall, 2010). 
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In doing so, they consulted with William Bratton, a prominent figure in the 
American police scene and former commissioner of the police departments of 
Boston and New York as well as former police chief of Los Angeles – thereby 
making sure to receive plenty of attention from the law enforcement commu-
nity (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2009; Perry et al., 2013: 4). In addition, the 
NIJ awarded grants to researchers and police departments to conduct basic and 
applied research on predictive policing. Together, these efforts can be seen as 
a considerable boost to the development of crime prediction software and its 
implementation in the US (Nix, 2015: 278; Ferguson, 2017: 32).
In summary, predictive policing takes up and incorporates a number of 
technical, economic, and political trajectories. The use of algorithmic crime 
analysis tools is generally presented as an elegant way to resolve organizational 
shortcomings and external pressures. Not surprisingly, then, predictive polic-
ing has over the past decade spread rather quickly into multiple national and 
local contexts around the globe. In the following sections, we provide a brief 
overview of current methods and tools. We structure this overview along the 
lines of person- based approaches (who to police?) and place- based approaches 
(where and when to police?).
Person- based approaches
Person- based approaches to predictive policing address the question of who 
could become a criminal or a victim of a crime at some point in the future. At 
times also referred to as “predictive profiling” (de Hert and Lammerant, 2016; 
Sommerer, 2017: 149), “person- based predictive targeting” (Ferguson, 2017: 
34), or “individual- based predictive policing” (Brayne et al., 2015: 3), person- 
based approaches operationalize estimates about individual human behavior 
based on data about a particular person and/or group. Person- based predictive 
policing bears a strong resemblance to methods that are applied in violence 
prevention, extremism prevention, counterterrorism programs, or recidivism 
prognosis in the criminal justice system (Brayne and Christin, 2020). All these 
methods are based on the assumption that certain characteristics in past and 
present behavioral patterns, individual characteristics, and social contacts could 
be used as indicators to predict future actions of individual persons. Generally 
speaking, there are two main ways in which person- based approaches to pre-
dictive policing can come into being: through risk profiling and through social 
network analyses (Ferguson, 2017: 34ff).
Risk profiling approaches model the probability that a person could com-
mit a crime or become the victim of a crime on the individual level. They 
do so by identifying particular personal or group- related characteristics that 
are considered to be risk factors (Hildebrandt, 2008; Leese, 2014). The idea 
here is to predict criminal behavior by comparing the individual characteristics 
of a particular person to the characteristics of known offenders. A significant 
congruence between the profiles will then be considered as an indication that 
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the target person could present a risk or be at risk (de Hert and Lammerant, 
2016: 148). Risk profiling approaches can be operationalized in several dif-
ferent ways. For example, they can be based on questionnaires, use clinical- 
psychiatric evaluation models, or analyze aggregate data (Kemshall, 2003: 64ff). 
In practice, different forms of constructing a profile are often combined. In 
most cases, risk profiles do not directly correspond with police work but rather 
with the criminal justice system (Ferguson, 2016). They are, in this sense, pre-
dominantly mobilized in court proceedings or probation hearings in order to 
support human review and human expertise (Latessa and Lovins, 2014: 4457f; 
Hannah- Moffat, 2019).
Social network approaches, on the other hand, assess crime risk through an 
individual’s social contacts, such as friends, relatives, neighbors, or colleagues. 
As social networks are today to a large extent mirrored in online networks or 
digital contact data, they can be traced and modeled with increasing accuracy. 
The idea behind social network analysis is that the number of arrests among a 
person’s social circle can be used as an indicator for this person’s future behav-
ior. Analytically, network approaches refer to criminological literature that 
has examined correlations between victimization and the social connections 
to persons with gang affiliations or to homicide victims (Papachristos, 2009; 
Papachristos et al., 2012). These studies suggest that persons whose circle of 
acquaintances and relatives includes victims or perpetrators of gun- related acts 
of violence have a high risk of also being involved in such acts in the future. 
Risk estimates that come into being through social network analysis thus do 
not focus on individual characteristics, but present a form of collective liabil-
ity. In other words, “it’s not just shooting somebody, or being shot. It has to 
do with the person’s relationships to other violent people” (Wernick, cit. in 
Stroud, 2014).
The most prominent example of social network analysis is probably the 
Strategic Subject List (SSL), more widely known as the “heat list”, that the 
Chicago Police Department started using in 2013 (Gorner, 2013). Aiming to 
reduce gun violence, the SSL targets those individuals who show the highest 
risk of becoming victims or perpetrators of firearm- related violence (Saunders 
et  al., 2016; Ferguson, 2017: 37ff). Identified “high risk” persons are then 
subsequently personally addressed by the police to let them know that they 
are already “on the radar” (McCarthy, 2015), thereby presenting a form of 
“focused deterrence” that aims at informing and sensitizing high- risk individu-
als so that they may reconsider any future criminal activities (Ferguson, 2017: 
35; Ratcliffe, 2019: 121ff).
Such targeted warnings can already be conceived of as a significant form 
of discrimination and interference with individual privacy and freedom, and 
they have been heavily criticized by human rights groups and other civil lib-
erties advocates (Stanley, 2014; Jouvenal, 2016). Intervention strategies based 
on individual risk estimates do, however, not stop there. Presumed high- risk 
individuals can be subjected to targeted prevention measures – for instance, 
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specialized intervention programs for juveniles or violence prevention pro-
grams. Moreover, surveillance measures can be put in place to collect further 
information and/or enable the police to interfere in case of pending criminal 
action. Again, the boundaries between policing and national security programs 
such as extremism prevention and counterterrorism become blurred in such 
cases. In Germany, in the aftermath of recent terrorist incidents, software tools 
such as RADAR- iTE or hessenDATA appear to already aspire to bridge the 
gap between domestic policing and national/international security. We will 
deal with these trends in some more detail in Chapter 10.
Person- based approaches to predictive policing are also used to provide risk 
estimates to police patrols when they respond to calls. Applications such as 
Beware by US technology company Intrado are informed by the rationale that 
central dispatch can issue warnings to officers in the field when they are on 
their way to an address presumed to be dangerous or when they are about to 
interact with a potentially violent person (Jouvenal, 2016; Intrado, no date). 
Based on such information, police officers could then adapt their behavior and, 
for example, be extra cautious when entering a building inhabited by known 
gun owners with a record of violent behavior or when driving through an area 
that is known as gang territory. Last, but not least, risk profiling techniques are 
also mobilized retroactively to identify potential suspects in criminal investiga-
tions. Automated police database queries, algorithmic analyses of field inter-
view cards, and other digital means of police intelligence are used to tie certain 
profiles to criminal offenses and narrow down the pool of potential suspects 
(Perry et al., 2013: 103).
Most critical academic discourse on predictive policing has – for obvious 
reasons – revolved around the notion of person- based risk profiling approaches 
(Harcourt, 2007; Mantello, 2016; McCulloch and Wilson, 2016; Andrejevic, 
2017; Aradau and Blanke, 2017; Sheehey, 2019). The dangers of risk profiling, 
even when carefully curated and cautiously implemented, are numerous and 
range from discrimination (the creation of profiles based on variables such as 
sex, age, nationality, and religion) and collective liabilities (the creation of risk 
by association) to the production of false positives (the danger that innocent 
people will be marked as suspicious). Despite these ethical and legal concerns, 
risk profiling is an area in which tech companies continue to make strong 
pushes, mobilizing narratives of “Big Data” and machine learning as promises 
of better and more efficient law enforcement (Brayne, 2017; Hannah- Moffat, 
2019). Future developments in this branch of predictive policing warrant close 
monitoring and critical evaluation, as they might fundamentally clash with 
human rights, individual liberties, and societal values.
Place- based approaches
The majority of predictive policing approaches today are, however, not primar-
ily concerned with individuals. Place- based models of predictive policing have 
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proved to offer a comparatively straightforward way to support police work, as 
they more easily align with established forms of crime analysis and can be inte-
grated more or less seamlessly within existing patrolling and crime prevention 
strategies. The general idea of place- based approaches is to identify geographic 
areas that might, within a certain period of time, be more susceptible to crime. 
Based on the spatiotemporal risk estimates produced, police departments can 
then devise strategies for preventing or deterring criminal activity within these 
areas. However, just like with person- based approaches, there is consider-
able variation between different ways of identifying risky places. Place- based 
approaches can be differentiated with regard to the data that they use as well 
as the theories and models they mobilize to generate predictions (Groff and La 
Vigne, 2002; Perry et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al., 2019).
Arguably, the simplest means of risk production in relation to space is the 
temporal extrapolation of hot spots. Hot spots are usually small- scale geographic 
units that have historically shown higher crime rates than their environment. 
In this approach, crime rates from the past are extrapolated into the future in 
a linear fashion, meaning that a similar amount of crime is expected to repeat 
for this area (Groff and La Vigne, 2002: 34ff). This implies that if crime is fre-
quent enough in certain places, it can be rendered manageable – that is, patrols 
and other crime prevention measures can then be intensified in these areas in 
order to bring crime figures down (Chainey, 2014; Ratcliffe, 2019: 116). The 
general assumption that underpins hot- spot methods is that the occurrence 
of crime is relatively stable over time and that its spatial distribution does not 
vary significantly. It has been argued that hot- spot methods should explicitly 
not be understood as predictive policing, as they are not necessarily reliant 
on algorithmic support and simply reproduce patterns of the past rather than 
producing estimates about new risk areas (Telep and Weisburd, 2014; Weisburd 
and Telep, 2014; Braga, 2017).
One approach that promises to do exactly this is the near- repeat approach. 
Originally referred to as “prospective hot- spotting” (Bowers and Johnson, 2004; 
Bowers et al., 2004) or “predictive mapping” (Groff and La Vigne, 2002; John-
son et al., 2009), the near- repeat approach is today the one most commonly 
used in predictive policing. It is based on the observation that certain types of 
crime are likely to be followed by similar offenses in the immediate vicinity and 
future (Townsley et al., 2003) as well as the assumption that professional crimi-
nals act inherently rationally (Becker, 1968; Cornish and Clarke, 1986). The 
near- repeat hypothesis has been empirically validated most extensively with 
reference to domestic burglaries (Johnson et al., 2007; Glasner et al., 2018). 
A successful burglar, imagined as an “optimal forager” who carefully scouts a 
neighborhood in order to identify worthwhile targets and potential dangers 
(Sidebottom and Wortley, 2016: 168), would in this sense be likely to stick to 
a once- successful formula of action and commit further offenses in the near 
environment and shortly after the initial deed. In this way, acquired knowledge 
can be further maximized and risks minimized (Johnson et al., 2007).
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A second important theoretical point of reference for near- repeat approaches 
is routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Clarke and Felson, 1993). 
In close correspondence with ideas about rational actor behavior, routine activ-
ity theory presupposes that the occurrence of crime is constituted and facilitated 
by a number of factors including the presence of a motivated perpetrator, the 
availability of a suitable target, and the absence of sufficient protection measures 
safeguarding the target. The constellation of these factors changes throughout 
the day as people move through the city on their way to their daily activities, 
thereby opening up windows of opportunity for criminals (Felson, 2006). As 
most people leave their homes in the morning to go to their workplace or pur-
sue other tasks and do not return until early evening, burglars are assumed to 
make use of the absence of guardians for their activities. Particularly pertinent 
in this respect is the fall/winter period, when there is a prolonged time frame 
between dusk and the return of residents, during which professional burglars 
prefer to operate. We will come back to the temporal aspects and what the 
rhythm of crime means for predictive policing in Chapter 5.
Assumptions of rational choice and routine activity theory are also closely 
mirrored in the situational crime prevention models that were first devised 
in the 1970s and 1980s (Clarke, 1980, 1995). Based on the idea that crime 
could be prevented if opportunities and facilitating variables could be effec-
tively removed from the environment, situational crime prevention strate-
gies attempt to identify possible targets and deterrents. Increased protection 
of targets and the establishment of deterrents would then, so the assumption, 
discourage criminals from carrying out their activities. Situational crime pre-
vention can include a wide variety of different measures and a broad range of 
different actors. Prominent examples are improved lighting in dark streets and 
alleys, reinforced locks and doors, gates and fences, surveillance cameras, alarm 
systems, and neighborhood watches (Ekblom, 1998; Eck and Guerette, 2012; 
Smith and Clarke, 2012).
Taken together, situational crime prevention strategies aim at increasing the 
perceived efforts that criminals would need to invest, at increasing the per-
ceived risks that criminals would subject themselves to, and at reducing the 
anticipated rewards of criminal activities. These principles in fact also form the 
basis for most operational intervention strategies based on predictive policing. 
While some situational crime prevention measures such as installing surveil-
lance cameras and alarm systems could be considered to be the responsibility 
of property owners, and others such as street lighting the responsibility of the 
municipality, police departments usually operationalize the estimation of risk 
areas by devising increased patrols to these areas in order to create visibility and 
possibly deter criminals.
Two major advantages of near- repeat approaches in predictive policing 
are that they require comparatively few data points as input and that they 
are mostly predicated upon dedicated crime data that are produced by the 
police and which are thus already available for analysis right away. Software 
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packages such as PredPol or PRECOBS operationalize the near- repeat 
hypothesis through a two- step process. First, past crime data are analyzed with 
regard to the identification of specific patterns that could indicate professional 
offender behavior. In a second step, future criminal activity is estimated on the 
basis of the occurrence of “trigger” criteria and models relating to where and 
when they could be followed by further offenses. PredPol, currently being used 
on a regular basis by major US police departments such as Los Angeles, New 
Orleans, and Atlanta (Robinson and Koepke, 2016: 14ff; Chan and Bennett 
Moses, 2019: 45f), as well as currently or previously in London, Kent, and 
Yorkshire in the UK (Hardyns and Rummens, 2018: 209), does so by taking 
inspiration from the study of earthquakes. Its algorithm for the prediction of 
domestic burglaries, car theft, and theft from vehicles is based on a self- exciting 
point process model that predicts follow- up crimes in the form of aftershocks 
after an initial earthquake (Mohler et al., 2011).
PRECOBS, on the other hand, uses historical spatiotemporal distributions 
of crime as the basis for dynamic estimates of future risk. The implementa-
tion process of PRECOBS, therefore, starts with a simulation study that retro-
actively predicts past residential burglary series. The simulation results in the 
identification of areas that have historically proven to be most vulnerable to 
near- repeat patterns. These “near- repeat- affine areas” are then used as the base-
line for the computation of risk (Balogh, 2016: 336). The assumption here is 
that once a professional case of residential burglary can be identified in one of 
these areas, an alert for potential near- repeat offenses will be produced in an 
automated fashion. Near- repeat- affine areas are updated regularly, and usually 
there are different seasonal configurations that adjust the analysis for shorter 
daylight hours in winter and corresponding increases in burglary activities dur-
ing dusk/darkness (Balogh, 2016; Schweer, 2016).
The criteria for alerts are based on a list of “trigger” and “anti- trigger” criteria 
that is in turn based on information about modus operandi or haul – with trig-
ger criteria pointing to professional offender behavior and anti- trigger point-
ing to random, spontaneous, and nonprofessional criminal activity (Schweer, 
2015: 14). It is assumed that only professional burglars would commit an entire 
series of temporally and spatially connected offenses. A second assumption is 
that professionals would not, for example, smash a window (as this would cre-
ate noise) or steal large items such as TV sets (as this would pose transportation 
problems), but that they would silently drill the window and only go for small 
items that could be easily carried and later sold, such as jewelry.
Finally, a third main approach to place- based predictive policing is risk ter-
rain modeling. Compared to hot spots and near- repeat approaches, risk terrain 
modeling presents a more complex method in both technical and analytical 
terms. The general idea here is that risk will not be estimated on the basis of 
the occurrence of actual crime, but that it can be modeled through a wide 
range of data points that provide dynamic insights about social and material 
constellations that can be used to estimate dynamic vulnerabilities of different 
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areas (Caplan et al., 2011; Kennedy et al., 2011; Caplan and Kennedy, 2016). 
Large crowds gathering in particular places would, for example, in this logic 
present an increased risk of pick- pocketing, whereas congested traffic during 
rush hour would make a quick getaway more difficult and could thus be seen as 
decreasing the risk of burglary. Risk terrain approaches provide lots of freedom 
for modeling assumed causal relations between environmental factors and the 
occurrence of crime.
What sets the risk terrain approach apart from other forms of place- based 
predictive policing is the fact that models need not be limited to predefined 
datasets (i.e., police data). On the contrary, risk terrain modeling opens up 
the possibility of including almost any conceivable data source as long as it 
can be logically connected to the occurrence of crime (Kennedy et al., 2018). 
Data could, for example, refer to the infrastructural characteristics and socio-
economic compositions of specific areas, including the likes of income distri-
bution, household size, building stock, highways, metro stations, or nightlife 
spots (Perry et  al., 2013: 50ff; Caplan and Kennedy, 2016; Kennedy et  al., 
2018). Over recent years, a diverse and growing (applied) criminological and 
computer science literature has emerged that attempts to dynamically model 
crime risks according to movement patterns of people throughout cities based 
on traffic data and public transport data, weather data, and/or social network 
data (Wang et  al., 2012; Bogomolov et  al., 2014; Tayebi and Glässer, 2016; 
Brüngger et al., 2017; Pelzer, 2018; Kadar et al., 2019).
The implicit notion that underpins many risk terrain modeling approaches 
is that in order to be as accurate as possible, analyses should integrate as many 
data sources as possible – which ties in with narratives of “Big Data” that sug-
gest that if only enough data about the world were available, hitherto hidden 
insights about the mechanisms of the world could be extracted through the 
data themselves (Anderson, 2008; Beck and McCue, 2009). While most risk 
terrain modeling applications at least partially refer to criminological theories 
and empirical studies, some available software packages do in fact embrace a 
fully data- driven way of creating risk estimates. The most prominent current 
example of such an approach is arguably HunchLab by US company Azavea 
(who sold it to ShotSpotter in 2018). HunchLab is presented as a cutting- edge 
method for crime prediction, as it is predominantly based on the recognition 
of correlation patterns in heterogeneous data samples (Azavea, 2015: 16f). Its 
algorithm, building on machine learning techniques, continuously adapts on 
the basis of the data that it processes, thus allegedly enabling “the software to 
‘think’ like a crime analyst by imitating years of experience drawn from a police 
department’s own data” (Azavea, 2015: 16).
In summary, there is a broad range of ways in which policing can be ren-
dered “predictive”, and there is considerable variation when it comes to the 
theories, models, and datasets that different approaches require. However, no 
matter whether they are static or dynamic, whether they are based on limited 
data points or large and heterogeneous datasets, whether they make use of 
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police data or mobilize commercial or open data sources, and whether they are 
based on rule- based or adaptive algorithms, what all place- based approaches to 
predictive policing have in common is the fact that they need to be translated 
into operational measures. Crime cannot be prevented on the basis of advanced 
analytics alone, but insights from crime analysis must be put into action on the 
street level in order to unfold possible impacts. This is where predictive polic-
ing software meets larger trajectories of police strategies and practices.
The central promise of predictive policing is to reconfigure the patrol as 
one of the central interaction points between the police, society, and crime 
and tweak it so that it can be rendered more effective and efficient. The patrol 
is a key element of police work, and it is particularly pertinent for crime pre-
vention, as it creates police visibility as a key deterrent to criminal behav-
ior. However, the ways in which the police patrol have, in conjunction with 
technological developments and new crime prevention strategies, undergone 
major changes over the past few decades. In order to understand how predic-
tive policing fits into these trajectories, the next chapter will provide a brief 
overview of the role of technology in crime prevention and policing.
Conclusion
In summary, policing innovations going back to the 1970s have produced 
numerous novel forms of crime prevention that have paved the way for today’s 
predictive policing tools. Many of them were already heavily predicated on 
the accumulation and analysis of data. Most importantly, they are connected 
by the desire to render police work more effective and efficient as a response 
to a number of external pressures. Predictive policing, we might in this sense 
conclude, is new – but it is not groundbreaking. It should be considered an 
evolution rather than a revolution. And yet, it comes with a couple of distinct 
characteristics that set it apart from older ways of knowledge production, crime 
prevention, and patrol strategies.
There is also considerable analytical continuity in the development of pre-
dictive policing tools. Despite often mobilized narratives about data mining, 
machine learning, and artificial intelligence, most currently used types of pre-
dictive policing are built around theory- based models. In other words, the 
theory defines the pattern that the algorithm looks for in the data, and not the 
other way around. A similar argument applies to the data basis that predictive 
policing operates on. Rather than large, unstructured, and heterogeneous data-
sets from multiple sources (i.e., “Big Data”), most current predictive tools use 
small and select datasets to model particular assumed relations between vari-
ables. These datasets are usually produced by the police themselves, but they 
can also integrate data from other sources.
Despite these continuities, predictive policing has the potential to funda-
mentally reconfigure police work. The criminal futures that it creates have 
repercussions for internal communication processes within police departments, 
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for infrastructural and technical reform, for the professional skills required from 
today’s police officers, for career paths, for public relations, and not least for the 
ways in which new patrol practices change the ways in which the police and 
society interact. Before we explore these issues empirically, the next chapter is 
devoted to the development of a theoretical framework that will enable us to 
study the implementation of predictive policing and the everyday practices of 
crime prediction and crime prevention that it engenders.
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This chapter develops an understanding of technology within police contexts 
and introduces a theoretical framework for our analysis of predictive policing 
practices. The police do have a long- standing relationship with technology. 
Technology is at times framed as a “silver bullet” that will be able to fix all of 
the police’s problems (Marx, 1995), and police organizations have over the 
past century or so incorporated a plethora of technological tools for different 
purposes, from patrol cars and two- way radio to DNA forensics (Nogala, 1995; 
Byrne and Marx, 2011; Ariel, 2019). At times, the police have been the drivers 
of technological innovation. At other times, they have had to cope with the 
repercussions of implementing new technologies into established strategies, 
tactics, and operations. Against this backdrop, the relationship between the 
police and technology is not easily defined. Research suggests that it should 
best be understood as a mutually constitutive one in which the police shape 
technologies, and technologies simultaneously reshape how the police fulfil 
their tasks by facilitating new capabilities and forms of action (Ackroyd et al., 
1992; Manning, 1992a, 1992b; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Chan, 2001; Chan 
et al., 2001; Manning, 2008). The first part of this chapter reviews the specific 
relations between technology and police organizations.
The second part of the chapter conceptualizes the emergence of sociotech-
nical systems around new technological tools. Building on seminal works from 
criminology, sociology, and Science and Technology Studies (STS), we propose 
to study technology not as a variable that can be analytically isolated. Rather, 
it should be understood as entangled within larger sociotechnical systems that 
involve a multiplicity of human and nonhuman as well as material and nonma-
terial elements. Implementing a new technological tool into an already com-
plex police assemblage that consists of data and patrol cars as much as it does of 
formal divisions of labor, occupational cultures, and established work practices 
tends to produce a number of frictions, adjustments, unintended side effects, 
and practical reappropriations. STS approaches that highlight how technologies 
come into being through a web of relations can help us to understand how they 
end up in a specific form and with specific functionalities that correspond with 
their operational environment. As Ackroyd et  al. (1992: 26) have diagnosed 
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with regard to the implementation of early information technology (IT) sys-
tems in police organizations:
Devising information systems that can serve as instruments of police work 
requires some conception about the nature of that work, how it is organ-
ized day- to- day, what tacit understandings are built into this organization, 
its situatedness within a network of other organizational arrangements, and 
so on. And, wider than this, what authoritative expectations are placed on, 
in our particular concern, the police themselves and what relation their 
work is to have to, for example, the public, the state, the community and, 
not to be forgotten, its own members. All of these considerations, and 
more, are important to understand the role of IT within the police.
Building on such an understanding of how sociotechnical systems emerge in 
practice, we analyze how police departments were able to carve out an experi-
mental space within which they could observe the formation of sociotechnical 
relations and tweak these formations such that predictive policing would align 
with a number of organizational and political priorities. They primarily man-
aged to do so by framing the implementation of predictive policing in terms 
of trial runs, field tests, and research projects, allowing them to explore its 
capacities and effects in mutual dialogue with developers. Due to the degree 
of variation between different police departments, there can in fact hardly be 
any off- the- shelf solutions for predictive policing. Instead, we highlight how 
predictive policing needed to be carefully shaped with regard to specific insti-
tutional needs and infrastructures.
The last part of the chapter introduces the notion of “translation” (Callon, 
1980b, 1984; Latour, 1984) as an analytical lens for the everyday practices of pre-
dictive policing with which we are primarily concerned throughout this book. 
STS scholars have developed a sociology of translation to study how knowledge 
and power are produced through the interactions of different human and non-
human elements within sociotechnical systems. We suggest an understanding of 
translation processes that allows us to investigate the “hinges” in predictive polic-
ing processes: How crime is turned into data, how algorithmically produced 
risk estimates become confirmed and communicated, and how patrol officers 
bring analytical insights to the streets. The question that translation allows us 
to formulate and address, in its essence, is this: How does an algorithm move 
people? Studying predictive policing practices as a “chain of translation” (Latour, 
1999: 311) foregrounds how different social and technical elements need to be 
brought together and aligned in order to make predictive policing work.
Technology and police organization
The impetus of technology, as Mastrofski and Willis (2010: 79–80) write, per-
tains to virtually all domains of police work, including “coercion (weapons and 
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martial arts), mobility (transportation vehicles), detection (forensics methods, 
such as DNA analysis), surveillance (closed- circuit- television [CCTV], digital 
imaging for facial recognition, and remote sensing devices), and analysis (data 
mining software)”. In fact, technology appears attractive for the police for vari-
ous reasons. From a practical perspective, it equips them with new capacities 
and modes of action (Harper, 1991). And from a political and managerial point 
of view, technological innovation is often regarded as a suitable strategy to 
address perceived police failure (Weisburd and Braga, 2019: 11). This applies, 
as we discussed in the previous chapter, to the issue of crime itself (i.e., crime 
rates and clearance rates) but also to questions of efficiency and accountability 
of the police, both internally and vis- à- vis the public (Chan et al., 2001: 3). 
Technology has in this sense sparked an increased managerialism that measures 
police work according to criteria that have carried over from the business world 
such as efficiency, controlling, and optimized working processes (O’Malley and 
Palmer, 1996). Finally, the incorporation of new technological tools has, over 
the last few decades, contributed to the professionalization of the police as an 
organization (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997).
In light of such considerations, criminologists and sociologists have studied 
how specific technologies have transformed the police in particular ways. Sem-
inal empirical works such as those by Ackroyd et al. (1992), Manning (1992a, 
1992b, 2008), Ericson and Haggerty (1997), and Chan (Chan, 2001; Chan 
et al., 2001) have drawn attention to the intricacies of “fitting” technologies 
into police organizations. These studies, broadly revolving around the imple-
mentation of IT systems in police departments, show how the effects of new 
technologies are anything but straightforward and might in some cases differ 
considerably from the goals and intentions that were the initial drivers behind 
their development or procurement. In the words of Manning (1992b), the 
introduction of new technologies can even cause outright “drama” in the form 
of internal resistance and discursive statements that counter the alleged benefits 
of new tools. Such resistance can be traced to the capacities of disruptive tech-
nological tools to “erode or destabilize long- standing organizational practices” 
(Manning, 1992b: 328). The more a new technology is seen to threaten to 
restructure entrenched working cultures, the more likely it is to be met with 
hostility (Sanders and Condon, 2017).
Other scholars have similarly foregrounded modes of actively resisting the 
impact of new technologies and how such resistance is facilitated by the insti-
tutional inertia of police organizations. Chan et al. (2001) have shown that even 
though structural conditions might be changing due to the novel or enhanced 
capacities that technologies bring to police work, cultural assumptions and 
traditional policing practices often remain unchanged. Thus, new tools may at 
times end up being aligned with established processes rather than fundamen-
tally reforming how police officers approach their tasks. As they argue, “giving 
police access to computers, increasing the range and quantity of informa-
tion that is stored electronically and automating what were previously manual 
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processes will not change how the business of policing is conducted by the 
agency” (Chan et al., 2001: vii). These findings do not rule out the possibility 
of organizational change. They do, however, direct our attention to the fact 
that technology is not the clear- cut, easily applicable variable that politicians, 
private companies, and not least police managers at times seem to believe it is. 
Technology, in fact, “more often . . . has changed police work in unexpected 
ways; less often has it enhanced work” (Ackroyd et al., 1992: 13).
From the perspective of organizational theory, the clash between techno-
scientific imaginaries of improvement and efficiency on the one hand and the 
unanticipated or negligible consequences of implementation and everyday use 
of technological tools on the other does not in fact come as much of a surprise. 
Maguire (2003) has pointed out how the organization of police departments 
is firmly rooted in historical trajectories and national, regional, and local spe-
cificities. Together these specificities account for the large degree of varia-
tion between different police organizations, but they also hint at why change, 
although often inevitable in the long run, is likely to occur only slowly and 
over longer periods of adjustment (Vera and Jablonowski, 2017). These find-
ings correspond closely with Braga and Weisburd’s (2019: 556) argument that 
“police history shows that it takes a long time for new models of policing to 
fully develop”.
Others have pointed out how technological innovation, once it found trac-
tion within police organizations, has transformed the ways in which the police 
carry out their mandate and how they position themselves vis- à- vis society. 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997) have analyzed how the introduction of comput-
ers and incipient digitization of police data throughout the 1990s enabled the 
police to turn to risk as a practical guiding principle in unprecedented ways. 
Driven by the newly found desire to accumulate data in order to render risk 
assessment procedures more powerful and accurate, the profession of the police 
officer took a turn toward “knowledge work” (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997) 
and “rationalization” (Manning, 2001, 2008) that was characterized by the abil-
ity to exploit data and quantify decision- making processes and ensuing action. 
Technology can in this sense contribute to the formation of novel organiza-
tional goals and strategies at a higher level (Byrne and Marx, 2011: 17). As 
we argued in the previous chapter, such strategic change became particularly 
pertinent with regard to new approaches to crime prevention and their devel-
opment alongside technological innovations.
Just as well, technological tools have given the police a scientific appeal. 
Police work, understood in terms of the production and management of 
knowledge, in fact in some regards closely resembles scientific practices. This 
is demonstrated, for example, by methods such as digital forensics (Holt et al., 
2015), DNA analyses (McCartney, 2005), fingerprinting (Cole, 2001), and 
drug testing (Paul and Egbert, 2016). These practices claim to produce cred-
ible evidence by means of the application of scientific theories and methods, 
thereby claiming to establish “truth” in criminal investigations (Lynch et al., 
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2008). In doing so, they make use of criminological theories or hypotheses 
(usually quantitative ones) that guide and support innovative forms of mobiliz-
ing technologies and data for police purposes. The assumption here is that a 
scientifically informed perspective will not only yield superior results but also 
be more objective and accountable (Cole, 2017).
As became apparent throughout our research, the production of crime risk 
makes no difference in this regard (D013; D016). Police departments would 
claim that their philosophy was fundamentally based on research (I02; I18; 
I35; I48; I62; P49; P75) and referred to predictive policing as “the science of 
where” (P49). As a matter of fact, German and Swiss police departments have 
subscribed to a technoscientific attitude that includes sending representatives to 
conferences and generally keeping an open mind toward allegedly innovative 
and research- based technologies (I07; I12; I76; I80). The presentation of pre-
dictive policing as an avenue toward data- driven, evidence- based police work 
that would be superior to traditional crime analysis thus fell on fertile ground 
(P49). A scientific approach to the production of risk was in this sense seen as 
a possibility to lend enhanced credibility to crime analysis, both internally and 
toward the public (I20).
However, scientific aspirations and the crime analysis techniques that go with 
them also require new skills and forms of knowledge that are necessary to per-
form police work. Being literate in working with information and communica-
tion technologies became a requirement for keeping up with the changing tools 
and methods of police work throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (Wilz and 
Reichertz, 2008). As Chan et al. (2001: xvii) have argued, police knowledge 
became “synonymous with data that are too complex and voluminous for the 
human brain to cope with”, and the capacity to command new technological 
tools to harness and apply such knowledge became essential for the profession of 
the police officer. Modern police work is increasingly conceived of as an inter-
disciplinary process that relies on specialized knowledge in a number of distinct 
domains and requires collaboration between different experts in order to achieve 
the desired results (Ericson, 1994; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 19ff).
When it comes to predictive policing in particular, police departments now 
face the challenge to assemble expertise in data science. As data need to be 
cleaned and prepared for analysis, data from different sources need to be inte-
grated and managed, and algorithmic crime analysis tools need to be config-
ured and maintained, skilled personnel are needed. Our interviewees in fact 
foregrounded how the police are in need of specialized experts and how this 
need clashes with established police career paths and training programs (I31; 
I50; P61; D142). Traditionally, within Swiss and German police organizations, 
officers are considered “generalists” who need to be proficient in all fields of 
police work (Mahnken and Rabitz- Suhr, 2019: 23f). Accordingly, standard 
career tracks require that officers pass through different specialized divisions in 
order to gain a coherent perspective on the tasks and organizational processes 
of police departments. Importantly, this is seen as a requirement for promotion 
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into strategic or management positions. On the flip side, such a career path, 
however, means that specialized knowledge periodically gets lost, as individual 
officers are transferred between divisions.
As a result, police departments are looking for new methods of institutional 
knowledge management (I12; I17; I18; I31; P49). Calls for new career tracks 
within single domains have been put forward (Wendekamm and Model, 2019: 
275), and some departments have used the implementation of predictive polic-
ing technology as an opportunity to consider or put into practice such special-
ized career paths for data scientists and other scientific staff (I31; I51; P61). 
In some departments, this has produced up to a 50/50 split between police 
officers and scientists/researchers within crime analysis divisions (I79; P19). 
And in cases where the requirements for this “new knowledge and informa-
tion culture” (P61) could not be met from internal staff, additional scientific 
expertise was brought in from the outside (P30). The turn toward science is 
also reflected in the fact that some of the departments we studied had started to 
recruit staff with degrees in forensics or crime analysis straight out of university 
(I18; I26; I42; I78; I79; P18) or had implemented their own in- house research 
and development units (I75; I76). We will pick up these tendencies once more 
in the context of structural reform in Chapter 10.
This reinforced attention to specialized skills and expertise was generally con-
sidered a welcome tendency, as it could arguably help to overcome entrenched 
yet ineffective internal organizational structures. More senior officers, in par-
ticular, tended to look strategically beyond the immediate operational capaci-
ties of predictive policing and hinted at the potential long- term effects of a 
reinforced focus on advanced algorithmic forms of data analysis:
[Predictive policing] has a number of positive side- effects: you change 
police culture, and there is a need for our police culture to change. There 
will be new professional fields within the police, analysts will have a very 
different status. Technology will have a very different status.
(I77)
Another way in which scientific aspects figured into the emergence of predic-
tive policing technology concerned the modes in which field trials were set up 
and evaluated. Framed as “research projects” to begin with, development and 
field- testing of predictive policing software were scientifically accompanied or 
supported by external research institutions (P49) or carried out in coopera-
tion with universities (I02; I18). Such collaborations were supposed to ensure 
that both methods and results could be considered “scientifically sound”, thus 
creating legitimacy for predictive policing methods. Evaluation was moreover 
supported by several accompanying studies in the form of bachelor’s and mas-
ter’s theses (I18; I44; I51; I76; I77; I78; I79; P20; D013; D016) that served to 
further demonstrate the scientific seriousness with which police departments 
approached predictive policing.
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Despite the various ways in which the police render themselves and their 
activities “scientific”, one should, however, keep in mind that differences 
remain between the formalized, rigorous ways of scientific knowledge produc-
tion that take place within the academic community and the “practical science” 
that can at times be encountered in police work. Geared toward the practical 
prevention of crime, police scientification should in fact be understood as a 
much more hands- on and less rigorous practice. When in doubt, in other 
words, not everything needs to comply with high scientific standards, but it 
suffices when things are workable and applicable (P49).
Scholars have also pointed out how new technologies have changed the 
ways in which the police regulate themselves internally (Mastrofski and Willis, 
2010: 57). Digital work practices can rather easily be quantified, tracked, and 
analyzed (Whitson, 2013; Walz and Deterding, 2014). From a managerial per-
spective, technology renders the police transparent not only toward the public 
but also for internal purposes of human resources management, the assessment 
of officers’ performance, and decisions about promotions (Sheptycki, 2017). 
However, the continuous measurement of performance rates has also produced 
a number of unintended side effects, the most prominent of these being the 
adjustment of work practices so that they are more likely to produce outcomes 
matching the evaluation criteria. Innovations like COMPSTAT, widely praised 
for incentivizing rationalization and efficiency in police work (Willis et  al., 
2007), have in this sense brought about a “gamification” of police work that is 
primarily interested in tangible and quantifiable results such as individual arrest 
rates or the “improvement” of crime statistics for a given district (Eterno and 
Silverman, 2012).
New police technologies, mainly those geared toward surveillance and 
intelligence production, have also been met with a good deal of normative 
skepticism in academic analyses. The implementation of information and com-
munication technologies, in particular, has sparked concerns. Against the back-
drop of unprecedented capacities to accumulate and process data, scholars have 
warned against increased, potentially pervasive police powers (Marx, 1988; 
Lyon, 1992). Such concerns are still prevalent, although they are, against the 
backdrop of digitization, large databases, and complex algorithmic analyses, 
now geared toward novel challenges. Fears of a “maximum security society” 
(Marx, 1988: 221) within a liberal democratic framework (Lyon, 1992) are, 
however, persistent in current debates about surveillance, discrimination, pro-
filing, and algorithmic bias in predictive policing (Ferguson, 2017; Bennett 
Moses and Chan, 2018; Brayne, 2021). We will return to such questions in 
more detail in Chapter 9.
Finally, sparked by insights into the largely unforeseeable and sometimes 
even creative methods with which police forces have absorbed new tech-
nologies and accompanying managerial logics, a prevalent theme throughout 
criminological and sociological analyses of technology and police organiza-
tions has been the question of how to determine whether the implementation 
The police and technology 51
of a specific tool or set of tools can be considered a “success”. The ques-
tion of success must be understood in relation to the hopes and rationales that 
motivated the decision to implement a technology in the first place. Success 
would thus usually be defined in terms of questions such as “Did the technol-
ogy improve effectiveness and efficiency?” or “Did the technology produce 
the desired results (for example, reducing crime statistics or improving clear-
ance rates)?” However, this kind of straightforward conceptualization of success 
would hardly align with the findings from the literature we have discussed.
Rather than subscribing to determinist arguments about the capacities 
of technological tools, their success (or failure) must be carefully measured 
against wider contexts that affect how the police function as an organization 
and within society. In order to do so, Chan et al. (2001: 8) propose that when 
thinking about technological change, we should not only consider technical 
factors but also account for cultural and political ones. Cultural factors, in their 
view, include the values and assumptions that informed the development and 
design of a technology and how these correspond with the values and assump-
tions of the organizational context in which the technology is supposed to be 
used. Political factors are the interests and positions of different actors within 
processes of technological change. In cases where technical, cultural, and polit-
ical positions cannot be broadly aligned, it is likely that internal resistance will 
occur and undermine at least some of the potential new technical capacities 
(Manning, 1992b). As Chan and Bennett Moses (2017: 316) have argued with 
regard to predictive policing,
a better understanding of how cultural assumptions (part of habitus) can 
influence the impact of new technology is not only important for manag-
ing technological change within organisations, but also for designing regu-
latory or governance regimes (other techniques of security) for the benefit 
of the broader community.
Overall, Chan et  al. (2001: 13) propose five criteria that are likely to play 
decisive roles in answering the question of whether the implementation of 
a new technology can be considered a success: (1) the technology itself and 
its design, (2) the form of the implementation process, (3) potential clashes 
between the technological imaginaries of designers and the practical needs 
of users, (4) resulting shifts in power balances and responsibilities within the 
organization, and (5) resulting additional forms of accountability toward the 
public. All these criteria are in themselves complex issues that might not be eas-
ily resolved. Taken together, they outline the multilevel challenges that police 
agencies have to face in coming to terms with new technological tools that are 
often imposed on them from the outside (i.e., by politicians, police managers, 
and private companies). We will empirically pick up questions of the success 
of predictive policing and how such success (or failure) might be measured and 
evaluated in Chapter 8.
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In summary, existing criminological and sociological works on the role of 
technology within the police have pointed to the complex and sometimes 
unpredictable ways in which organizational change happens. Most of the litera-
ture agrees that while organizational change will occur on many different levels 
of police work, it will seldom do so exclusively in the intended forms. Rather, 
studies have highlighted how technologies have restructured the tasks that the 
police need to address and how they do so, they have highlighted how the pro-
fession of the police officer has changed according to new organizational goals, 
and they have highlighted how managerialism has increasingly colonized how 
the police analyze themselves and carry out internal checks. Overall, as Braga 
and Weisburd (2019: 555) argue, police organizations are averse to fundamen-
tal change, as they “most easily adopt innovations that require the least radical 
departures from their hierarchical paramilitary organizational structures, con-
tinue incident- driven and reactive strategies, and maintain police sovereignty 
over crime issues”. These findings are in fact very much in line with what our 
interlocutors told us (I09; I18; I77). As one senior officer framed it:
The job description favors skepticism, and many police officers are rather 
conservative. They are comfortable within a familiar environment, where 
they know how things work, where they can replicate successful routines. 
And if there’s something new, regardless in which area . . . new things in 
our department were always difficult and it took some time to settle in. . . . 
There are simply lots of people who have their routines, who have been 
doing their thing for twenty years – and it has worked for twenty years. And 
then there’s some innovation or reform, and the reaction is: “But we have 
always done it like this and it has worked, why should we change it now?”
(I09)
Moreover, general concerns about technology- induced change are aggravated 
by the digital, arguably reinforced through the dystopian narratives about 
predictive policing that can be found throughout science fiction and media 
accounts of future law enforcement (Mor, 2014; Gent, 2017). These narratives 
are largely characterized by imaginaries of automation, artificial intelligence, 
and black- boxed technologies that can no longer be understood by humans. It 
is interesting to note that fears about such scenarios are not only prevalent in 
critical academic analyses or civil rights activists’ accounts but are also uttered 
by police officers. As one respondent framed it:
Automation is something that creates concerns: should we be afraid of 
algorithmization, of robotization, and such things? That’s probably not 
only a police concern, but also a concern for other professional fields. 
There are already police robots in America, devices that patrol with sensors 
and report incidents. This will happen here as well.
(I76)
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We will deal at greater length with how the police deal internally with auto-
mation and novel configurations between humans and machines in Chapter 5. 
For now, in light of the multiple ways in which police organizations and tech-
nologies mutually influence and transform each other, the task is to develop a 
theoretical understanding of the relationship between the police and technol-
ogy. For this task, we propose to turn to STS literature. The criminological and 
sociological findings we have discussed so far correspond well with conceptual 
STS work pointing to the inevitable embeddedness of technology within wider 
societal and organizational frames.
The emergence of sociotechnical systems
For Jasanoff (1996, 2004), science and technology and the forms of knowledge 
and action they enable and facilitate are key to understanding how particular 
forms of social order are produced and maintained. STS as a discipline to a large 
extent emerged from conceptual discontent with sociology’s treatment of sci-
ence and technology in the attempt to explain the constitution of social order. 
Rather than upholding an artificial analytical separation between the technical 
and the social as different spheres, STS scholars propose to think of the social 
and the technical as inextricably entangled within a “seamless web” (Hughes, 
1986). In the words of Law (1991: 10), “what appears to be social is partly 
technical. What we usually call technical is partly social. In practice nothing is 
purely technical. Neither is anything purely social.”
STS thus suggests to study the social and the technical in an entwined fashion, 
conceptually understanding them as sociotechnical systems that are comprised 
of heterogeneous material and nonmaterial elements (Latour, 1991; Bijker and 
Law, 1992). However, approaching the social and the technical as enmeshed and 
mutually constitutive phenomena does not merely mean acknowledging the 
complexity (and messiness) of empirical realities but also serves to problema- 
tize reductionist ontologies and to dismantle naive or consciously simplistic 
(political) statements about the capacities of technologies.
STS proposes that technology is neither something that is exclusively the result 
of social relations (and that thus would be fully controllable by humans) nor an 
uncontrollable external force that determines social order. Rather, technology 
comes to matter through a multiplicity of relations and interactions with its envi-
ronment. Research into the role and effects of sociotechnical systems thus needs 
to account for specific configurations around technologies in order to enable 
localized and context- dependent perspectives on how technology comes to mat-
ter (Suchman, 2007). To a certain extent, such a stance rules out generalizable 
statements about science and technology and their role within society. STS must 
rather be understood as an empirical research program that aspires to cover socio-
technical constellations through qualitative and especially ethnographic methods 
that serve to create an in- depth understanding of the variegated relations and 
entanglements throughout sociotechnical systems (Latour, 1993).
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Such an approach corresponds well with analyses of technology within idio- 
syncratic contexts of regional or local police agencies. In fact, Ackroyd et al. 
(1992) similarly draw on a sociotechnical understanding when exploring how 
new technological tools enter police organizational contexts. As they write:
As a social object, technology needs to be understood not simply as the 
nuts and bolts, the wires and transistors, the keyboards and semiconduc-
tors, but also as the collage of activities involved in its use. One could 
go further and insist that technology as nuts and bolts is but the material 
instantiation of a complex set of ideas, knowledge and activities, which not 
only make it possible to design and build a piece of technology, but also to 
shape and guide its use.
(Ackroyd et al., 1992: 10)
An important strand of STS literature concerns the question of how technol-
ogy comes into being. Starting from the premise that “both science and tech-
nology are socially constructed cultures and bring to bear whatever cultural 
resources are appropriate for the purposes at hand” (Pinch and Bijker, 1984: 
404), STS scholars have analyzed these cultural resources and the ways in which 
they factor into the creation of scientific knowledge and the design of techno-
logical objects. Researchers have in this sense highlighted how technological 
innovations come into being through dense networks of multiple actors and 
in close correspondence with existing infrastructures and other material fac-
tors (Callon, 1980a; Hughes, 1983; Bijker et al., 1987; Callon, 1991). Going 
against the popular notion that innovations can be reduced to the ideas of a 
single brilliant inventor, the STS paradigm thereby contends that epistemic 
and material innovation emerges through complex social interactions, cultural 
norms, political dynamics, and historical trajectories (Callon, 1984; Pinch and 
Bijker, 1984; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Law, 1987).
In doing so, STS approaches reject the teleological assumptions that can be 
found in essentialist or determinist understandings of technology. Innovation 
does not follow a predefined path of incremental technological development 
that will inevitably lead to some (desirable) end point (Godin and Vinck, 2017). 
Instead, what is highlighted is the general open- endedness of development 
and design. Technological trajectories are susceptible to change or adjustment 
through a plethora of choices at technical, legal, moral, political, or economic 
junctions throughout the innovation process:
During invention and development inventor- entrepreneurs solve criti-
cal problems; during innovation, competition, and growth manager- 
entrepreneurs make crucial decisions; and during consolidation and 
rationalization financier- entrepreneurs and consulting engineers, especially 
those with political influence, often solve the critical problems associated 
with growth and momentum.
(Hughes, 1987: 57)
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In retracing how such choices emerge, STS scholars emphasize that technology 
is never the neutral tool it is at times presented as in political discourse and/
or marketing. Rather, any sociotechnical system must be understood as highly 
political, as it has been continuously exposed to social, institutional, economic, 
legal, ethical, and not least, material possibilities and constraints alongside the 
preferences of, and frictions between, developers, engineers, designers, and 
eventually users (Winner, 1980).
Predictive policing is no exception in this regard. As we detailed throughout 
the previous chapter, the currently available software tools have not emerged in 
a technical vacuum but come with considerable conceptual baggage in terms of 
policing strategies, crime prevention paradigms, and organizational change. How-
ever, these larger trajectories were by no means the only factors that were involved 
in the development and design of specific predictive policing applications. On 
the contrary, they came into being through a complex assembly of criminological 
theories, technical means, data, crime rates, politics, and not least police depart-
ments themselves. Some of our interlocutors in fact interpreted their role within 
this assemblage as “mediators” that tied together different parts of the network and 
facilitated innovation (I02; I31; I80). As one police officer detailed, their depart-
ment had been monitoring developments in algorithmic crime analysis software 
for some time and had been waiting for the right opportunity to get actively 
involved in the further development and operationalization of predictive policing:
We have our networks [with regard to predictive policing] at the national 
and international level. So we are aware of any new developments and of 
course we think of ways we might be able to make use of innovations and 
how we could possibly implement them. And then we got the opportunity 
to start something . . . and everyone was like: “Alright, let’s see how this 
works out.” And the Ministry of the Interior told us: “We’ll give you the 
opportunity and finance a pilot study. So you guys do your thing and then 
you’ll tell us whether this is something worthwhile, ok?” It’s a lot of things 
that needed to come together.
(I02)
An important factor in the implementation of new technological tools and 
the resulting formation of sociotechnical systems is the level of complexity of 
both technology and environmental context. The more relations a technology 
needs to form with its surroundings, the more pertinent will be the reper-
cussions of environmental factors. STS scholars have pointed, for instance, to 
the preeminent roles of infrastructures and technical standards that need to 
be considered during innovation processes and that have considerable effects 
on the emergence of sociotechnical systems (Hughes, 1986; Star and Griese-
mer, 1989; Star, 1999). Others have emphasized how research funding prede-
fines research agendas as well as eventual outcomes and have problematized 
the monetary interests that exert influence on the formation of sociotechnical 
systems (Downey and Lucena, 1995; Möllers, 2017).
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Not surprisingly, financial questions also played an important role in the 
development and design of predictive policing software, and in considerations 
related to whether predictive policing would be a worthwhile investment in 
the analytical and operational capacities of police departments in the first place. 
We have already hinted at the crucial role of project grants from the Bureau of 
Justice (BJA) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for the development of 
crime prediction software in the US (Perry et al., 2013: 4; Ferguson, 2017: 32). 
Cost considerations were also a major issue in Germany and Switzerland (I07; 
I80). As one respondent told us, police departments would carry out careful 
cost- benefit analyses before deciding whether to start experimenting with pre-
dictive policing applications or not:
The costs were an issue. Particularly when you measure the costs vis- à- 
vis potential application areas. It’s only for residential burglary . . . so you 
need to ask yourself whether there’s a reasonable relation between costs 
and effects. But we were convinced by the method, particularly in relation 
to other things that we do, and so our outlook was: it’s not just about the 
idea, but in the future this is supposed to become a system that will support 
crime analysis and situational assessment, and that will spill over to other 
areas. So we decided to think ahead.
(I80)
The cost- benefit analysis was in this case underpinned by an understanding 
of how the department saw its future positioning, strategies, and work prac-
tices within an increasingly digitizing police environment. Such imaginaries 
form another important analytical theme in the emergence of sociotechni-
cal systems. Understood as technoscientific and cultural visions that inform 
innovation processes, sociotechnical imaginaries lay out blueprints for desirable 
social and political order according to which technologies will be designed, 
and which they in turn will help to engender once implemented and used on 
a regular basis (Rammert, 2002; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009).
Predictive policing tools are underpinned by an imaginary of crime as a 
normalized, pattern- related social phenomenon that can, due to its regular 
occurrence, be identified and preventively targeted (Kaufmann et al., 2019). 
Equally, predictive policing relates closely to technoscientific imaginaries of 
modernization, innovativeness, “Big Data”, efficiency, and speed (Brayne, 
2017; Ferguson, 2017: 28ff; Egbert, 2018). Together, they bring about a vision 
of a society in which crime will continue to exist but can be largely controlled 
by innovative and powerful means of knowledge generation and “smart” opera-
tional measures.
In order to turn such imaginaries into concrete applications, predictive 
policing must thus be understood through a set of sociotechnical relationships 
that were already partly formed long before specific software packages entered 
operational police contexts. It was subject to the formation of a network 
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of actors and materials that made its emergence possible in the first place. 
It needed to be coordinated between companies from the private sector and 
police departments, negotiated between politicians and police managers, and 
aligned between designers and users. It needed to be financed and facilitated. 
It needed to be conceptually integrated into existing systems and processes 
through suitable interfaces. It needed to correspond with legal frameworks and 
public perception. And, not least, it needed to be analytically compatible with 
already available crime data that the police generate (P49; I07).
For Woolgar (1987), these diverse influences and entanglements throughout 
innovation processes are reflective of larger epistemic and normative questions 
concerning the relations between the social and the technical. As he frames it, 
“discussions about technology – its capacity, what it can and cannot do, what 
it should and should not do – are the reverse side of the coin to debates on 
the capacity, ability, and moral entitlements of humans” (Woolgar, 1987: 312). 
At the same time, as Winner (1980: 121) reminds us, technology will always 
be productive of social and political power relations and thereby reconfigure 
social orderings: “The machines, structures, and systems of modern material 
culture can be accurately judged not only for their contributions of efficiency 
and productivity, not merely for their positive and negative environmental side 
effects, but also for the ways in which they can embody specific forms of 
power and authority.” It should in this sense once more be emphasized that an 
STS perspective runs fundamentally counter to statements about the alleged 
“neutrality” or “objectivity” of technological tools. The existence of predic-
tive policing – its algorithm, its data input, and the ways in which it becomes 
implemented and used – must be understood as the result of the dense con-
struction networks through which innovations come into being.
The complexity of sociotechnical innovation is not limited, however, to the 
networks that enable development and design. It extends further into the prac-
tical contexts in which technologies are envisioned to be used. With regard to 
the “fitting” of technologies into organizational contexts and their specific user 
requirements, STS scholars have drawn particular attention to the practices of 
experimentation and field- testing that innovations usually undergo (Henke, 
2000; Gieryn, 2006; Winance, 2006). Subjecting a new technological tool to 
a trial run – either in simulated environments or in partially controlled live 
test cases – allows developers, designers, and end users to explore what works 
and how what does not work could be better aligned with organizational and 
practical needs (Pinch, 1993). The main rationale behind field testing is usu-
ally to reflexively explore challenges that could not have been anticipated at 
earlier stages of development or to assess how technologies could be config-
ured for particular application contexts or work environments. For Suchman 
et al. (2002: 175), trial runs with unfinished but already workable technologies 
should thus be understood in the sense of “a tangible, but also provisional, 
apparatus – an object that reconfigure[s] material and discursive practice in an 
accountably relevant way”.
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During our research, methods of field- testing predictive policing software 
were a prevalent theme in all the police departments we studied. In most 
departments, the development and implementation of predictive policing 
would be conceived in terms of a “research project”, a “trial run”, or a “pilot 
study” (I02; I14; I36; I43; I44; D142). Independent of the label, the aims of the 
project would be to determine the best ways of fitting new analytical capacities 
and the production of spatiotemporal risk as a guiding principle for patrol-
ling into larger trajectories of organizational structure and work practices. The 
emergence of predictive policing technology was in this sense not predefined 
by the form of an externally developed tool; it was kept deliberately open and 
characterized by a notion of “learning by doing” that software developers and 
police departments would go through together in a mutually responsive way 
(I02). This process would usually start with a simulation in order to determine 
whether available data could be used for algorithmic crime forecasts in the first 
place, and this simulation would then make its way into an actual everyday 
police environment and be turned into a hands- on practical experiment (I76; 
I79). As one of our respondents told us, this would be done with the option of 
later widening the operational scope if it turned out that experimentation with 
predictive policing software was yielding promising results:
Eventually, we decided to do a simulation. So in a back office, we tried to 
simulate what [predictive policing] would look like with historical data. 
And then we decided to invest some money in a pilot study, got the right 
people on board, and started to test it locally over a period of six months. 
And the results were encouraging, so we decided to expand city- wide. 
And again the results were good, so we decided to implement it on a 
regular basis.
(I76)
Framing a phase of six months or longer as research, police departments would 
be able to take advantage of possibilities to tinker with the software and its 
requirements, adjust established forms of crime analysis, internal communi-
cation, and operational measures, and generally figure out in practical ways 
what predictive policing could mean for them and how they might be able 
to accommodate it. What one officer framed as “open- heart surgery” (I57) 
enabled police departments to incorporate predictive policing processes as part 
of their regular work routines and thereby to encounter potential bugs, absent 
functionalities, or usability issues in everyday practice (I44). Such a hands- on 
approach, although likely to cause some operational friction in the beginning, 
was, by our respondents, described as beneficial for both software developers 
and police departments:
I’m not always a big fan of everything that the Americans do, but they really 
do one thing well: they put things into practice much faster. In [own country] 
The police and technology 59
we have to think about an issue for 20,000 years, and then it needs to be 
perfect before we decide to use it. But systems are developed best in prac-
tice. Think of PRECOBS: PRECOBS is not a perfect system – no system 
is perfect. But when I  remember what PRECOBS looked like when it 
started, and how it advanced through the ongoing exchange between prac-
titioners and developers. . . . I think that’s a great advantage.
(I77)
You just start doing things. In that case, we followed a very pragmatic 
approach. We didn’t sit down for six months to develop a concept and a 
project design. Instead we just started doing it. . . . You need to grapple 
with stuff, and you need to try things that will fail. Things where you 
thought “This could work, this should work”, and then you realize that 
you were wrong.
(I02)
The notion of failure must here, of course, not be understood in a final sense. 
Rather, when it comes to field trials, there is usually an implicit agreement that 
failure will be part of the process – coupled with the promise that it will upon 
discovery be tackled and eradicated (Leese, 2015). It is important to point out 
that technological tools that are subjected to pilot studies are usually not fin-
ished in the sense of market- ready products. On the contrary, when exposed 
to the challenge of live operational environments for the first time, techno-
logical tools still need to offer a certain degree of flexibility. After all, there is 
a high probability that they will need to be (at least partially) reconfigured in 
accordance with the practical findings of the trial. New functions might need 
to be added or unusable ones removed, user interfaces might be adapted to the 
requirements of those people working with the tool, or interfaces with other 
technological systems might need to be fixed.
What Suchman et  al. (2002: 166) call “prototyping” must in this sense be 
understood as a “strategy for ‘uncovering’ user needs, taken as already existing 
but somehow latent, unarticulated or even unrecognized by practitioners them-
selves”. Framing a technology as a “beta version” or “prototype” allows develop-
ers to react flexibly to results from practical tests and accommodate them within 
future stages of product development, and friction is an integral part of any 
field experiment (Schulz- Schaeffer and Meister, 2017). As trials are designed to 
uncover potential misalignments in order to provide the opportunity to readjust, 
they might also undercut larger sociotechnical imaginaries or particular expecta-
tions of how the capacities of a certain tool will translate into particular work 
environments. One of our respondents gave the following example of a serious 
misalignment between sociotechnical imaginaries and police practices:
Some things will work out, and other things  .  .  . take for example the 
“mobile office”: an insurance agent comes to your apartment, puts his 
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laptop on the table, and this works perfectly. In our environment, where 
I might have to defend myself against an attacker and at the same time look 
after the laptop so it won’t fall down or something . . . it’s not always as easy 
as you would imagine from behind a desk.
(I46)
In the end, as Suchman et al. (2002: 164) argue, “making technologies is . . . 
a practice of configuring new alignments between the social and the material 
that are both localized and able to travel, stable and reconfigurable, intelligibly 
familiar, and recognizably new”. Predictive policing tools, in this sense, need 
to speak to larger political priorities and policing strategies, but they must just 
as well take into account specific national, regional, and local cultures and 
operational requirements. Highlighting the importance of local implementa-
tion foregrounds the possibly wide variations between ways in which the same 
technology comes to matter within different organizations.
Latour (1990) has similarly argued that in order to get traction within the 
world, technologies need to be able to move between different contexts. This 
means they need to be adjustable to specific needs and processes, they need 
to be able to transcend cultural boundaries, and they need to be easy to under-
stand and to handle. During our research, particularly more senior police 
officers, even though they used a slightly different vocabulary, demonstrated an 
understanding of technology within organizations that was in fact very close to 
STS conceptualizations of the emergence of sociotechnical systems:
You can’t just build a system, or an organizational model, and then try to 
implement that and expect that it will work right away. That’s not the way 
to do it. You need to think about how everything works together, and 
about all the implications that you need to consider. Often people only 
consider certain parts, and then things go wrong.
(I77)
Predictive policing did not emerge out of the blue, nor was it simply imposed 
on the police from the outside. On the contrary, police departments played (and 
continue to play) an active role in the formation of local sociotechnical systems 
that integrate and align a variety of cultural, organizational, technical, legal, 
economic, and ethical elements. Predictive policing, if it is to succeed, must be 
able to relate to and correspond with its environment. This means that variation 
between the organizational structures and technical infrastructures in different 
police departments will also extend to the ways in which predictive policing 
becomes part of local practices. It needs to connect to databases as much as it 
needs to relate to police officers, communication channels, and operational 
resources. This also means that in order to understand the potentially trans-
formative effects predictive policing could have on police work, it needs to 
be studied empirically within these localized sociotechnical environments. In 
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order to do so, we will build on the notion of translation to trace the produc-
tion and mobilization of knowledge and power within sociotechnical systems.
Predictive policing as a chain of translation
As we outlined earlier, proponents of new technologies tend to emphasize the 
argument that technological tools can perform tasks quicker, with more preci-
sion, endurance, and reliability than humans – and even do things that humans 
are just not cognitively capable of. While this is certainly true, in itself it tells 
us little about how such technological tools come to matter in the everyday 
practices of those who work with them. The more important question is how 
technological tools, as part of the sociotechnical systems that they form with 
their surroundings, shape the behavior of other elements within the socio-
technical system. For predictive policing, this means that the analytical task 
is to investigate how an algorithm eventually makes patrol officers move into 
specific areas and renders them more attentive to potentially suspicious activi-
ties. In other words, how are knowledge and power produced and transmitted 
through the interactions between data, computer software, human analysts, 
shift briefings, maps, patrol cars, and all the other elements that play a role in 
predictive policing?
We have in Chapter 1 already illustrated how predictive policing must be 
understood as a process that needs to align numerous actors and their profes-
sional rationales (see Figure 1.1). Similarly, Perry et al. (2013: xviii) conceptual-
ize predictive policing as a “business process” that must be perpetually repeated 
because its outputs feed back into its data basis. Once one cycle of predictive 
policing comes to an end with the targeted operational measures, the altered 
criminal environment that results from crime prevention produces new empiri-
cal relationships between crime, time, and space – and the process starts again 
at square one. From an STS perspective, a processual understanding of predic-
tive policing serves well to illustrate the different domains that play a role in 
the production and prevention of criminal futures. Even though these different 
domains might be inhabited by different actors and technologies, might be 
organized by different cultures and structures, and might not intuitively corre-
spond with each other, they need to be tied together throughout the predictive 
policing process.
The important analytical parts of this model are, however, not so much the 
different domains themselves, but the gaps between them. These gaps allow 
us to study how different logics and rationales become bridged and aligned in 
predictive policing. The questions that we need to address include the likes of: 
What happens between data production and analysis? How is crime analysis 
intelligence enacted through patrolling practices? And how do targeted patrols 
impact criminal activity? STS literature draws our attention to the connections 
between previously unconnected elements and how they can be conceptual-
ized as sites of translation that enable modes of meaning- making across different 
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spheres. Studying predictive policing through the lens of translation allows us 
to follow the production of knowledge and power across different specialized 
fields of police work and to analytically foreground the active labor that needs 
to take place between them.
For Callon (1984: 224), translation is “the mechanism by which the social 
and natural worlds progressively take form. The result is a situation in which 
certain entities control others.” A  translational approach foregrounds the 
interactive moments between different actors and what happens between 
them. It foregrounds how knowledge claims come into being, how they are 
consolidated, and how they are mobilized to convince or persuade others 
to carry out specific actions. For Latour (1984: 264), similarly, the central 
mechanism of translation consists of “enrolling many actors in a given politi-
cal and social theme”. The focus of study should, in his view, therefore be 
on “the way in which people are associated together . . . and pay attention to 
the material and extrasomatic resources . . . that offer ways of linking people” 
(Latour, 1984: 264).
As we will illustrate throughout the following chapters, these resources play a 
key role in the translation processes that characterize predictive policing. What 
Latour (1984) calls “inscriptions” or “tokens” are crucial means to mobilize and 
enroll relevant elements at the subsequent stage of action into larger strategic 
aims. As he writes, “in the translation approach the initial force does not count 
for more than any other; force is never transmitted in its entirety and no mat-
ter what happened earlier, it can stop at any time depending on the action of 
the person next along the chain; again, instead of a passive medium through 
which the force is exerted, there are active members shaping and changing the 
token as it is moved” (Latour, 1984: 268). In the case of predictive policing, the 
inscriptions and tokens include the likes of reporting forms, interfaces, emails, 
and maps that facilitate communication and meaning- making between and 
within specialized police divisions. What unites them is that they are produc-
tive of knowledge about criminal futures, render them relatable across differ-
ent domains, and unfold the power to mobilize other elements for the sake of 
intervention into these futures.
Translation, in the words of Callon (1980b: 211), is fundamentally char-
acterized by “creating convergences and homologies by relating things that 
were previously different”. In predictive policing, numerous unrelated or only 
loosely related elements need to be brought together. The generation of crime 
data involves epistemic and classificatory challenges, and data must be amended 
and consolidated before they can be used for algorithmic crime analysis. The 
analytical process reconfigures the relationships between human officers and 
machines, requires specific professional skills, and is likely to produce fric-
tions between algorithmic knowledge and human expertise. Results from the 
analysis must be disseminated and communicated in ways that are both intel-
ligible and acceptable to those who are set to enact them. Resources need to be 
managed, and shifts need to be scheduled. Patrol officers must squeeze special 
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attention to risk areas into their already busy work schedule. And in the end, 
the question of whether operational measures had a measurable impact on 
criminal activity is not easily answered.
At all these translation sites, there is considerable room for failure and break-
down. In order to make predictive policing work, police departments must 
ensure that sites and modes of translation are properly configured – otherwise, 
analytical insights might not make it to the street level after all. Predictive polic-
ing, conceptualized as a chain of translation, is then about “the capacity of cer-
tain actors to get other actors – whether they be human beings, institutions or 
national entities – to comply with them [and] depends upon a complex web of 
interrelations” (Callon, 1984: 201). Different divisions, tasks, and technological 
tools within police work, in other words, need to be carefully woven together 
so that their rationales and operational capacities can function together.
Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, we have investigated the relationship between the 
police and technology. Criminological and sociological literature shows that 
the implementation of new technological tools is likely to cause friction and 
possibly even active resistance, as it has the potential to unsettle established 
routines, practices, and occupational cultures. In the long run, technological 
innovation often goes hand in hand with organizational change. Such change 
does, however, seldom unfold exclusively along the projected lines but includes 
a number of unintended side effects and other consequences. In light of these 
considerations, we have proposed to understand technology not as an isolated 
analytical variable or as a deterministic force, but as part of a larger sociotech-
nical system that is inevitably formed once a technological tool enters into 
organizational contexts and relates to other human, material, and nonmaterial 
elements. With reference to STS literature, we have retraced how sociotech-
nical systems of predictive policing have emerged and have been refined in 
practice in the form of trial runs, field experiments, and research projects. 
These setups have enabled police departments and developers to tinker with 
new analytical tools in a live environment and adjust organizational processes 
and practices as well as predictive policing applications in a mutually constitu-
tive fashion.
Eventually, we have proposed to study predictive policing through the con-
ceptual lens of translation. Translation is about the “hinges” in predictive polic-
ing. It highlights how different social, technical, and organizational elements 
are made to relate to each other and how knowledge and power are produced 
and transmitted, and thus ultimately how algorithmic crime analysis is turned 
into targeted operational crime prevention measures in the streets. Using the 
notion of translation as a theoretical frame of reference, the following chapters 
will reconstruct what it means to “do predictive policing” as a part of everyday 
police work. We will highlight how criminal futures are produced, translated, 
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and enacted through a focus on different sites, actors, and the transmission pro-
cesses that occur between them.
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This chapter analyzes the first translation process in predictive policing – the 
creation and consolidation of crime data under time pressure. A major sales 
pitch for predictive policing is speed: With predictive policing software, this 
sales pitch claims, crime analysis can be algorithmically accelerated to such an 
extent that the police will be able to dynamically intervene in criminal futures 
as they unfold. The drive for acceleration is therefore deeply engrained in the 
logics of predictive policing software packages. In order to speed up police 
work, these applications are supposed to seamlessly integrate their analytical 
capacities into police database infrastructures, run analyses in the background, 
and instantly present new insights about possible criminal futures. Manufactur-
ers such as PredPol or IfmPt accordingly advertise their products in ways that 
suggest up- to- date awareness “as new crimes come in”1 and through “current 
crime data”.2 The rationale at work here is that the quicker crime data are avail-
able for analysis, the quicker risk estimates can be computed and enable imme-
diate responsivity on the street level, which means that patrols can react flexibly 
whenever new insights about tempospatial risk estimates become available.
For Wilson (2019: 69), this imaginary of live awareness culminates in police 
ecosystems that “edge ever closer to real time” and produce “surplus value that 
is generated through temporal instantaneity”. Predictive policing is in this sense 
imagined as an uninterrupted process that continuously produces and adjusts 
the criminal futures the police act upon, while at the same time requiring as 
little human input as possible (Bratton and Malinowski, 2008). As Sheptycki 
(2017: 286) argues, “new theorists of policing and security governance have 
imagined information flows across a nodal landscape of networked gover-
nance”. What results from such an angle is the notion of an always present 
relationship with the future, creating minimum response times to whatever 
threat or risk might be identified within the ongoing stream of live data. This 
idea of seamlessness corresponds with a supposedly dynamic, contingent, and 
rapidly changing criminal environment in which police departments and other 
security agencies need to be able to react and adapt quickly, and therefore keep 
their “situational awareness” at a maximum level at any time (Krasmann and 
Hentschel, 2019).
Chapter 4
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Importantly, predictive policing is not about the future in the sense of long- 
term foresight and strategy, but about the ability to respond to and intervene 
in ongoing developments. As Aradau and Blanke (2017: 384) observe, in gen-
eral, algorithmic analytics are “not primarily about the turn to the future but 
about near- real- time decision- making”. The assumption here is that on the 
operational level, flexibility and reactive capacities rely crucially on a continu-
ous situational awareness that empowers swift and effective interventions. The 
efficiency promise behind predictive policing is predicated on the presumption 
that algorithmic predictions will seamlessly blend into the operational environ-
ment of policing and that risk- based patrolling practices will not require any 
additional analytical or organizational attention. Only then can algorithmically 
generated predictions be translated into street patrols who arrive at the crime 
scene before the criminal in order to capture the offender – or at least prevent 
the offense materializing.
Predictive policing is in fact about the “need for speed”. All these imagi-
naries must, however, be taken with a couple of grains of salt. As we will 
demonstrate throughout this chapter, considerable deceleration of predic-
tive policing practices is, in everyday police work, caused not only by the 
temporal characteristics of crime and its reporting but also by issues of data 
creation and consolidation. Crime data are characterized by a high degree 
of uncertainty that stems both from the ontological characteristics of crime 
and from epistemic questions of how to generate data from criminal events. 
In order to feed predictive policing software with data that are as accurate 
and complete as possible, police departments thus have to invest considerable 
resources in multiple layers of quality control. After all, only analyses run on 
reliable data will yield meaningful results. This in turn raises the question of 
when it is appropriate to analyze crime data. Our research shows that there is 
a trade- off between data that are available early but that have potentially bad 
quality vs. consolidated data that are more reliable but only become available 
at a later point in time.
Another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration when 
thinking about the temporalities of predictive policing is the rhythm of crime 
and policing. Most types of crime tend to occur more frequently at specific 
times of the day, and domestic burglary is a particularly pertinent example of 
such rhythmic occurrence. It is to a large extent prestructured by windows of 
opportunity that open up when residents leave their homes and close upon 
their return as well as by daylight hours and lighting conditions. Paired with 
the typical “working hours” of criminals (who also need to eat, sleep, and drive 
to their “workplaces”), this constitutes an intricate temporal interplay between 
crime, its datafication and analysis, and possible response measures.
This chapter illustrates how crime and data practices unfold under the rationale 
of acceleration that predictive policing dictates. It argues that, rather than 
blindly following the supposed need for speed, police departments need to bal-
ance accuracy and timeliness in a domain where data are generally characterized 
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by a considerable amount of uncertainty. Understanding the creation of crime 
data as a translation process of empirical phenomena into digital forms of rep-
resentation, it problematizes the ontology of residential burglary and corre-
sponding police practices and proposes that we should understand epistemic 
questions of how to produce data and knowledge in relation to the rhythmic 
interplay between crime and policing.
Detecting crime, reporting crime
Near- repeat approaches to predictive policing operate under the idea that 
burglary series take place within limited spatial areas and within limited time 
periods. The assumption is that the shorter the time frame, the more likely 
is the occurrence of follow- up offenses (Johnson, 2008: 219). In turn, this 
means that only “fresh” crime and resulting up- to- date data can yield maxi-
mum analytical and operational value. “Old” burglary cases are certainly still 
interesting when it comes to identifying crime patterns retrospectively and 
over longer periods of time, but outdated crime data do not provide the 
police with any way to intervene in events as they happen. The police are 
thus understandably keen on getting their hands on burglary data as quickly 
as possible, in the best case scenario right after the offense has been commit-
ted (I02; I07; I11).
This, however, is not so easy. First of all, a considerable period of time might 
pass between a burglary and its detection. There are obvious reasons for this: 
As criminals seek to minimize the risk of getting caught, successful cases of 
residential burglary usually target vacant premises. Residents thus only realize 
that their home has been broken into upon their return from their activities 
away from home. This might be a couple of hours later (when they return 
from work or other activities in the near vicinity), but it might equally well be 
a week later (if they were on a business trip or on holiday). Depending on the 
time period during which the dwelling was vacant, it can thus be difficult or 
even impossible to determine the exact point in time when the offense actu-
ally happened, and data from a burglary that might have happened as long as a 
week ago will only yield very limited analytical value for operational responses 
predicated upon quick reaction times (I01; I07; I26).
Another important factor is that burglary is a “reporting crime”, meaning 
that burglaries are usually not detected by the police themselves but by the 
victim, who then reports the incident to the police. This renders burglary 
fundamentally different from other types of crime, for example possession of 
illegal substances or speeding, which are in most cases only actively detected 
through police controls and otherwise largely go unnoticed and/or unre-
ported. With reporting crimes, a general concern is the reporting quota. Many 
types of crime, for example domestic violence or rape, come with a significant 
number of unreported cases that never end up as crime data (Biderman and 
Reiss, 1967), because people are ashamed or for other reasons are reluctant to 
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admit that they have been the victim of such a crime. However, there is gen-
erally a high level of reporting when it comes to burglary, as most victims are 
insured and will need a police report in order to make a claim to their insurance 
company (I44; I55). This means that burglary data usually give a fairly accurate 
picture of the actual number of burglaries that have occurred.
While reporting quotas might be generally high for residential burglary, the 
timeliness of reporting is a different issue. As our interlocutors pointed out, 
there might also be considerable delay between the detection and the report-
ing of a burglary (I19; I44; I45). This sounds rather surprising, as one would 
assume that burglary victims would want to deal with the violation of their 
private home as quickly as possible. It is, however, not unusual for people not 
to report crimes to the police immediately. There was no consensus about the 
exact reasons for such behavior, but our interlocutors were pretty clear about 
what delayed reporting of burglary incidents means for the analytical capacities 
of predictive policing software:
If, for example, people only report a burglary five days later – even though 
the approximate time of the incident is known – then the system will pro-
duce an alert nonetheless, because it considers the burglary as ‘new’ and 
within an alert zone. But of course we can’t work with that alert, because 
the trigger was already five days ago. And that actually happens a lot, that 
people don’t go to the police right away and report something. I have no 
idea what they do in the meantime.
(I19; see also I44; I45)
In summary, while residential burglary is a type of crime of which the police 
have comparably good knowledge, there is often considerable uncertainty 
regarding a key variable for near- repeat approaches to predictive policing: the 
time of the incident. Delay in detection and/or reporting further aggravates 
this problem. Lagging just a couple of days behind has the potential to eat up 
much of the acceleration potential that predictive policing so fundamentally 
relies on. These issues cannot be easily mediated or even resolved, and the 
police have little influence on them.
From the perspective of translation and the formation of a sociotechnical 
system of predictive policing, things start to get more interesting once police 
officers are called to the scene of a crime and start generating data from the 
incident. We have already discussed how crime data quickly lose their value for 
predictive policing once they are outdated. The more prevalent question, how-
ever, is how they come into being in the first place. In the next section, we will 
look into the question of how the production of crime data translates empirical 
phenomena into data points through a series of choices and interpretations and 
how these processes transform epistemic uncertainty into bureaucratic classifi-
cation categories that render crime intersubjectively relatable and intelligible as 
well as administrable and analyzable in the first place.
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Creating crime data
Data are the foundation of predictive policing. Simply speaking, there is no 
data analysis without data. And without data analysis, there is no crime risk. 
The good news is that the police have plenty of data. Police departments pro-
duce large amounts of data about crime as part of their daily activities. These 
data are needed for criminal investigations and knowledge production about 
criminal phenomena at scale as much as they are needed for administrative pur-
poses, insurance claims, court proceedings, and the production of statistics and 
reports. As Harper (1991: 294) puts it, “in sociological terms, detectives have 
the task of transforming the various features of reported crime into bureaucratic 
phenomena”, such that they can be processed and correspond to these different 
needs. As police work is generally considered an information- rich environ-
ment (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), the availability of data is in discourses of 
predictive policing often not considered a primary issue. Rather, the police 
have been concerned with how they can most effectively exploit the data they 
already have available (Beck and McCue, 2009; Perry et  al., 2013; Babuta, 
2017), how they might be able to professionalize long- standing practices of 
crime analysis (Mahnken and Rabitz- Suhr, 2019; Schneider and Leutenegger, 
2020), and how to implement operational measures based on the analysis (Wil-
lis and Mastrofski, 2018; Ratcliffe, 2019; Ratcliffe et al., 2020).
Data themselves have, apart from the fact that they are prone to notori-
ously bad quality (Maltz, 1999; Cope, 2008; Santos, 2013), been problematized 
less frequently. This comes as a bit of a surprise. If police officers, as Harper 
(1991) has argued, transform crime into bureaucratic phenomena, then such 
transformation is by no means a straightforward process. Creating crime data 
means trying to fit messy and ambiguous empirical realities into predefined 
bureaucratic classification systems, and there are many potential pitfalls here 
(Haggerty, 2001). It is thus appropriate to start thinking about how crime data 
come into being and form the foundation for algorithms and operational crime 
prevention measures at later stages of predictive policing. Critical data studies 
literature can provide valuable analytical hints here.
The widespread introduction of computer systems in the 1990s was accom-
panied by a first wave of data enthusiasm, as newfound storage capacities started 
to be filled with data, and digital networks made information more easily (and 
remotely) accessible and fueled new organizational processes and business mod-
els. Ensuing data- centered practices brought questions of the origin of these 
new quantities of data to the fore and sparked critical inquiry from social scien-
tists and philosophers who interrogated the nexus of data production and the 
entrenchment or aggravation of social, economic, and political power positions 
(Lyon, 1992; Gandy, 1993; Marx, 1995; Rip et al., 1995). As Bowker (1994: 
245) writes, “the global statement that everything is information is not a pre-
ordained fact about the world, it becomes a fact as and when we make it so”. 
The epistemic authority to decide how the world is turned into data cannot 
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in this sense be separated from questions about who gets to produce what kind 
of knowledge about the world and how such knowledge is turned into action.
These questions have arguably become even more pertinent over the past 
decade. Narratives about “Big Data” revolve around the notion that data would 
allow us to unlock hitherto unknown secrets about the world – and the only 
requirements would be to combine as much data as possible, draw different 
sources together, and use smart analytical techniques such as machine learn-
ing algorithms (Anderson, 2008; Manyika et  al., 2011; Mayer- Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013). The question of how data are created in the first place 
seldom figures prominently in such narratives. Data are today, to a large extent, 
generated automatically in the form of metadata that document transactions, 
communications, and the use of services (Lyon, 2014), or they are created 
autonomously by sensing devices (Andrejevic and Burdon, 2014). In any case, 
from a “Big Data” perspective, data are largely taken for granted, and the brave 
new data- savvy world does not care much for ontological and epistemic reflec-
tion (Wolf, 2010). Sociologists and critical data scholars have cautioned, against 
this backdrop, against an overreliance on data without understanding where 
they come from and how they have been conceived (boyd and Crawford, 2012; 
Dalton and Thatcher, 2014; Kitchin, 2014a).
Gitelman and Jackson (2013: 3) remind us that, even though the commonly 
used terminology for data includes such terms as “collecting”, “entering”, 
“compiling”, “storing”, and “mining”, all of these terms imply that data are 
already out there in the world, just waiting to be plucked. This is not the case. 
There are no data without someone translating a given empirical phenomenon 
into data points, and this translation is characterized by a number of choices 
that have wide- ranging implications for the resulting dataset: How to perceive 
or sense something? How to describe it? How to measure it? How to assign 
numbers or categories to it? Creating data means finding answers to questions 
about how to cognitively and bureaucratically grapple with the world, and 
these answers influence what kinds of stories the data will later tell about the 
world from which they were created. As Kitchin and Lauriault (2014: n.p.) 
write,
how data are conceived, measured and employed actively frames their 
nature. . . . Data do not pre- exist their generation, they do not arise from 
nowhere and their generation is not inevitable: protocols, organizational 
processes, measurement scales, categories, and standards are designed, 
negotiated and debated, and there is a certain messiness to data generation.
Data creation is, to a certain extent, a creative process. For Gitelman and Jack-
son (2013: 3), “data are imagined and enunciated against the seamlessness of 
phenomena”, and this process of imagination and enunciation closely cor-
responds with the later purpose of the data. Different cultural or professional 
predispositions in this sense inevitably shape how and what kind of data are 
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produced from a given phenomenon. Police officers create data from a crime 
scene, looking for pieces of information that will later on inform and guide 
their professional practices and speak to the organizational needs of police 
work. Other phenomena will not be considered relevant and will thus not end 
up as crime data. Data are in this sense always already imbued with sociocul-
tural assumptions that give them a specific form and information value. In the 
words of Bowker (2008: 184), there cannot in fact be any “raw data”, as such a 
notion of untainted, intersubjective information would have to be considered 
an oxymoron. On the contrary, data always need to be considered as already 
“cooked” in specific ways, as they are the result of active work, rendering them 
a selective and specific representation of the world vis- à- vis their purpose and 
their social embeddedness (Kitchin, 2014b: 3).
The fact that data are socially constructed is of course not a particularly new 
or spectacular insight. Epistemic questions of counting, measuring, quantifying, 
or standardizing have throughout history been closely entangled with questions 
of power and knowledge as well as with state- building and government and 
have been subject to detailed study (Hacking, 1990; Scott, 1998; Desrosières, 
2002). The social construction of data is, however, highly significant for pre-
dictive policing, as algorithmic crime analysis will only be as good as the data 
that go into the system. It is thus important to study the ways in which the 
police “cook” their data as they generate information about space and time and 
the criminal activities that take place within these coordinates. If the form of 
data takes shape according to their later use, then predictive policing tools have 
the capacity to preconfigure how crimes are translated into analyzable infor-
mation bits and to prestructure the behavior and epistemic practices of police 
officers who investigate the crime scene.
On the most fundamental level, what happens after a burglary has been 
detected is the following: Either the burglary victim visits the police station to 
file a complaint or, more likely, they call the police and a patrol car will be dis-
patched to the crime scene in order to register the offense and collect evidence. 
Throughout this process, both actual crime data and metadata are created. One 
of our interviewees illustrated this procedure as follows:
A burglary will first be registered at the emergency call center, and they cre-
ate a file where primary information is recorded: When was the call? What is 
the street address? Who called? And then they request operational resources, 
and our patrol officers drive to the crime scene and register the incident. 
Back in the day, they used to have a little black notebook where they wrote 
down the details. Nowadays they do that with an iPad . . . that comes with 
a simplified reporting form, and many significant details already go into that 
reporting form: What was the exact time of the crime, or the period of the 
crime? What are the characteristics of the location? What was stolen? How 
did the offender operate? And all that goes straight into the database.
(I76)
76 Data and the need for speed
What is important here is that crime data are usually created “in the field”, as 
police officers visit the crime scene and produce information from the crime 
scene and information provided by victims and/or witnesses. In the specific 
case of residential burglary, basic data usually include the location of the dwell-
ing, the (approximate) time of the offense, the modus operandi (i.e., how the 
offender gained access to the dwelling), the haul, and potential eyewitness 
reports as well as any available forensic evidence (Santos, 2013: 69). These are 
also the main variables that near- repeat- based predictive policing applications 
such as PRECOBS or PredPol use for their models (I01; I02; I07; I18). Pro-
ponents of place- based predictive policing often highlight such data sparsity 
as an advantage, as these data are usually easily available and can be quickly 
anonymized in order to comply with privacy and data protection regulations 
(Schweer, 2015a, 2015b; Balogh, 2016).
While it is true that PRECOBS processes only a limited number of data 
points, these data points are in practice characterized by a considerable degree 
of uncertainty. We have already noted that the date and time of a burglary are 
often not exactly known and can fall within a period ranging from a couple of 
hours up to a couple of weeks. This is also true for the modus operandi. Modus 
operandi is a second analytical key variable in near- repeat approaches, as the 
exact way in which a burglar gained access to a dwelling can provide hints at 
the offender profile and whether or not an offense was the work of a profes-
sional. In practice, though, the modus operandi might not be clearly identified 
or assigned – maybe there was a cracked window that anyone could have easily 
opened, maybe the back door was unlocked, or maybe even a combination 
of both. Or in case a locked window was forced open, the traces from the 
tools that were used might not be clearly assignable to a certain method – for 
instance, whether it should be considered “levering” or “drilling” (I03; I51).
Additionally, it might not immediately be clear what was actually stolen, as 
the victim might not yet be aware of all missing items. This is equally prob-
lematic, as haul is used as another key variable for the distinction between pro-
fessional burglary with a risk for near repeats on the one hand and occasional 
one- off offenses on the other. Last, but not least, the fact that burglary data are 
generated in the field also means that their production depends on the work 
of the police officer at the crime scene. There might be considerable varia-
tion between how two different persons conceive of a phenomenon and pro-
duce data from it, even if those two persons underwent the same professional 
training. In summary, both ontological uncertainty and subjectivity complicate 
the translation of criminal phenomena into crime data. A lack of coherence, 
accuracy, and reliability in how criminal phenomena are represented within 
resulting datasets, however, in turn potentially undercut the analytical viability 
of the data.
While not all of these issues might be easily resolvable, standardization is 
set to reduce variation in the creation of crime data and to provide compat-
ibility and comparability within datasets. In order to standardize the capture 
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and translation of crime into data, the police use reporting forms that serve 
both as a checklist for the officers at the crime scene and as a means of clas-
sification. Reporting forms are supposed to ensure that the data created from 
each burglary can be analytically combined, as they are in the same format and 
cover the same set of questions. During our research, there was some variation 
between police departments that were still using pen and paper forms (I26; I46; 
I78; I79; I80) and others that were already working with electronic means of 
data capture, either using laptop computers or tablets/phones (I76; P07; P70) 
There was, however, an overall tendency to move toward digital devices for 
reporting (I26; I79).
In filling out reporting forms, no matter whether on paper or on a computer 
or tablet, police officers are faced with a number of decisions concerning how 
to classify empirical phenomena under conditions of potentially limited infor-
mation. These choices are considered extremely important for later purposes 
of crime analysis, as only accurate crime data will yield meaningful analytical 
insights and so have the potential to inform operational measures. The use of 
predictive policing software thus already extends into epistemic practices of 
data production and reinforces the importance of this work in relation to the 
later analytical use of crime data (I02; I09; I24; I26; I44; I51). Police depart-
ments have intensified their efforts to train officers in data generation issues 
and raise awareness for the fact that translation processes in the field will have 
analytical repercussions and might actually come back to the field in the form 
of risk areas that need to be more intensively patrolled (I09; I24; I44; I51; P49; 
P77). One respondent talked about how their department decided to run a data 
awareness campaign even before they started to implement predictive policing:
Before we started [using PRECOBS], we organized an information event. 
We have about 1,600 officers. Additionally, we sent out information sheets, 
including our reporting manual. How do I capture domestic burglary cor-
rectly? What do I particularly need to consider? Including a reminder to 
complete the report within 24 hours after the incident was first reported.
(I44)
Despite these efforts, during our research we found evidence of a surpris-
ing disconnect between the analytical need for accuracy and the sometimes 
“sloppy” ways in which crime data were produced in the field. A major prob-
lem that our interlocutors repeatedly pointed out was the division of labor 
within police organizations and the ensuing specialized roles and tasks that 
come with specific job profiles (I07; I51). Specifically, the misfit between the 
different lifeworlds and professional rationales of analysts and patrol officers was 
considered problematic. As one senior police officer put it:
The patrol officer just doesn’t want the same thing as the analyst. The 
officer wants to get rid of that case as quickly as possible, and the analyst 
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wants good data. So we have to explain to the patrol officer why we need 
good data. And that’s not easy.
(I07)
These challenges are additionally aggravated by the overall workload and time 
pressures that patrol officers often have to operate under, incentivizing them 
to do the reporting work as quickly as possible and thus potentially rendering 
data generation more superficial and error prone (I03). But data quality – or 
more precisely, the lack thereof – can have many potential sources. It can, for 
instance, be caused by the patrol officer who simply “forgets” to fill out a spe-
cific field in the report, leading to the analyst having to consult other sources 
in order to fix the mistake and complete the data from the incident. There is 
hardly any malicious intent behind such errors, and analysts are generally quite 
understanding of the fact that human mistakes come with the job. One analyst 
framed it as follows:
I can totally understand that, I know that from my own time in the field: 
when you come into the station at three or half past three in the morning 
after an assignment, and you’re supposed to get off at four – then you do 
the reporting the next day. Or you just quickly enter the most important 
bits of information. And sometimes, at three in the morning, you forget 
something, simply because you’re so tired.
(I77)
Working conditions such as long hours and night shifts, as this quote illustrates, 
play an additional role when it comes to the accuracy and completeness of 
crime data. Analysts and senior police officers were reluctant to blame their 
colleagues for mistakes that happened under these conditions. Instead, they 
pointed to another challenge with regard to crime data production. Difficulties 
in coming up with accurate data representations of empirical phenomena not 
only are complicated by ontological uncertainty, professional rationales, and 
workload but also become further entrenched by overly complicated classifica-
tion systems in crime reporting forms. One analyst gave the following illustra-
tion of the challenges that patrol officers are confronted with when trying to 
represent what they found at the crime scene within a complex classification 
system:
We have a very complicated and exhaustive system of keys that was origi-
nally supposed to facilitate the generation of crime statistics. Proper crime 
statistics should be detailed, and you can’t do that if you only use “residen-
tial burglary” as a key value. So we have a key for “residential burglary”, 
one for “armed residential burglary,” one for “organized residential bur-
glary,” one for “grand larceny within a dwelling,” and so on. In the end we 
have 50 different keys that have something to do with residential burglary, 
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and it’s quite the art to find the right one. A grand larceny from a dwelling 
is probably a residential burglary. A grand larceny that took place within a 
dwelling is probably also a residential burglary, but maybe the patrol officer 
used the wrong key, because he couldn’t think of 436000 and he didn’t 
have the time to do his research. So he used 400000, which is just “grand 
larceny”, but the report also says that the site of the crime was an apart-
ment. Now I’ll have to look into the free text description: maybe it was 
the brother who smashed the piggy bank and took the money. Technically 
that’s grand larceny. The money was secured, and the incident took place 
within the apartment. Hence, it’s grand larceny within a dwelling. Maybe 
the door was kicked in, then all of a sudden, it’s residential burglary. And 
in the end, I have to try and sort this out.
(I50)
This example illustrates vividly how standardization can backfire when 
classification systems are too complex. Crime data need to be rather fine- 
grained, as the ability to distinguish between slightly different types of crime 
is important with regard to legal proceedings, internal management, and 
the production of crime statistics. In practice, this means, however, that 
there are almost endless possibilities for how to classify a given crime event, 
potentially producing cognitive overload. Essentially, the more fine- grained 
a system of predefined classification categories for crime reporting is, the 
more complicated it will be perceived as by patrol officers, and the more 
likely it becomes that this will lead to misclassifications of empirical phe-
nomena. This is particularly pertinent with regard to ambiguous phenomena 
that are open to interpretation and could therefore be classified in one way 
or another.
The quote also refers to the fact that in crime reporting forms, for each 
variable (e.g., haul, modus operandi), there is a list of possible “keys” (i.e., 
numerical combinations that can be used as shorthand for a specific category) 
that can be selected from a predefined list in order to specify what was found 
at the crime scene. These keys decide how an empirical phenomenon becomes 
translated into a particular data category. The use of predefined categories as a 
means of data standardization must be understood here as a way of taming the 
recalcitrance of real- world phenomena just as much as it must be understood 
as a safeguard against the effects of human interpretation. In practice, keys for 
more specialized subcategories are, however, particularly likely to be ignored 
or bypassed by patrol officers in favor of generic categories. One analyst gave 
an example of this:
Our colleagues can easily differentiate between cash and a TV set. But 
modus operandi is a different story. How did someone get access to an 
apartment? Mostly it’s levering. And even if it’s not levering, the key for 
levering is the one that our colleagues know by heart. So to be honest, it’s 
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often standard values that end up in the report. It is what it is. I have to live 
with these uncertainties.
(I80)
In this example, rather than going for a specific, possibly more accurate (sub)
category to describe the modus operandi encountered at the crime scene, the 
patrol officer simply opted for the “standard value” (levering) that occurs most 
often, and this enabled them to quickly complete the report. Patrol officers 
using generic categories in the production of crime reports, either as a strategy 
to avoid having to deal with ontological ambiguity, or simply as a shortcut 
to save time, was described as a persistent problem by our interviewees (I03; 
I31; I50). Ironically, this problem was further aggravated by the use of digital 
devices for reporting. As data generation in the field is increasingly being 
done via electronic devices such as laptops, tablets, or phones, our interlocu-
tors told us that while this would generally be a welcome development, the 
available applications for reporting were in many instances poorly designed. 
Due to a lack of semantic support in variable fields or due to cumbersome 
and unwieldy user interfaces, officers would, for example, often simply pick 
the key value at the top of the drop- down menu in order to save time (P77). 
What was originally supposed to facilitate both data generation and accelerate 
data transfer into police databases turned out to reinforce practices of bypass-
ing complex classification systems and further contributed to inaccuracy in 
crime data.
Crime reporting forms usually also contain a free text field where the officers 
can add details, clarify possible confusion, and explain why they were forced 
to squeeze an empirical phenomenon into a category that might not be a 
great fit. Free text, however, comes with its own set of issues. Our interlocu-
tors specifically pointed out how officers would use incoherent language and 
abbreviations and how even free text explanations of empirical phenomena 
could remain ambiguous (I07). Some of our interviewees even questioned the 
added value of free text fields, as these needed additional analytical attention 
before they could become computable data points (I26; I80). In the end, our 
interviewees acknowledged that there is an inherent tension between the dif-
ferent ways in which the police generate data from crime scenes, and none of 
them is seen as an ideal solution (I03; I07).
In summary, there are various “error” sources in the production of crime 
data. Some of them emanate from a lack of knowledge about the criminal 
incident itself. Others stem from the heavy workload of patrol officers, from 
overly complex classification systems, from poorly designed reporting forms 
and interfaces, or from any combination of these elements. Taken together, 
they render crime data uncertain and such uncertainty would, if unmediated, 
extend to algorithmic modes of data analysis and undermine predictive polic-
ing practices. As Cope (2008: 407) writes, crime analysts often “struggle with 
incomplete, unreliable and inaccurate information, all of which affects the 
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quality of analytical reports”, and police departments are therefore looking for 
ways to address these issues.
Quality control
In order to enhance the coherence, accuracy, and reliability of their data, police 
departments usually have a number of quality control measures in place. A seem-
ingly banal, yet important, aspect is double- checking crime reports before they go 
into the system in the first place. This can involve a number of different actors and 
extend throughout different organizational units within a department. One ana-
lyst detailed the process of double- checking data in their department as follows:
There is a workflow for quality control across different levels. The first 
level is the person who fills out the reporting form. Then the supervisor 
should have a look at it. Then we have a quality control manager at the 
station who will give it another thorough look and identify flaws or incon-
sistencies. Then we have a central unit for database management, they are 
also concerned with quality control. And in case there are any obvious 
errors, I can also ask for corrections.
(I50)
A completed report from a crime scene, as the aforementioned quote vividly 
illustrates, must not be confused with the notion that the data from the report 
would already be “complete” and ready to be analyzed. Double- checking for 
errors is, however, only a first step. Crime data are even after the initial process 
of data generation still very much in flux and subject to correction and/or 
amendments. Details are likely to change or be complemented with additional 
information during ongoing investigations, after the initial report has been cre-
ated and submitted to the central system. As additional information becomes 
available, the data in the system must thus be amended. A pertinent example of 
retrospective data correction with regard to burglary would be the actual haul, 
which is in its entirety seldom known right away and is accordingly comple-
mented later when the victim has identified all items that were stolen (I26). 
The time of the offense can be similarly difficult to determine in the begin-
ning, but additional information such as witness reports may make it possible 
to approximate a narrower time frame later on.
Amending the data produced originally by adding such new information in a 
timely fashion is important for the police in order to ensure that crime analysts 
can work with data that are as accurate as possible. Our interviewees did, how-
ever, express some frustration about the lack of awareness and follow- through 
by their colleagues. As one analyst framed it:
It’s quality control, quality control, quality control. . . . The time of the offense, 
that’s a classic example. Throughout investigations, we can often approximate 
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the time of the offense, or we can even determine an exact point in time. But 
no one changes that in the database. The file still says “weekend”. It is impor-
tant to do that, and we need to convince our people to do it. The thing is, 
they don’t get any benefit from it. So it’s hard to tell them: Listen guys, please 
make those changes as soon as you have new information.
(I51)
This statement mirrors the misalignment between the professional rationales of 
patrol officers and analysts already mentioned earlier. Again, though, our inter-
locutors showed a great deal of understanding for the working conditions of 
patrol officers and appreciated why timely amendment of initial data produced 
from a crime scene can be difficult. One senior officer referred for example 
to the seemingly banal fact that patrol work is carried out in shifts and that no 
one can reasonably be expected to come into the station on the weekend or on 
their day off just to amend a crime report:
In the beginning, we have an initial report. And then there might be an adden-
dum at some point, there might be some corrections. And because our guys 
work in shifts, it’s possible that we get that additional information only three 
days later. And then all of a sudden, burglary turns into property damage.
(I77)
Data amendments, as this quote also illustrates, might have quite far- reaching 
repercussions. New insights from ongoing investigations might even change 
the type of crime itself and therefore affect the validity of risk estimates. For 
example, a case that might at first appear as a professional burglary, and there-
fore potentially as part of a larger series of criminal activities, might a couple 
hours later, due to emerging details or additional forensics or witness state-
ments, appear more likely to be a spontaneous, emotional, or relationship- 
related deed that would not warrant an increased risk of follow- up crime (I02; 
I07; I11; I16; I44; I76).
This raises the question of when quality control should be considered finished. 
In other words, when are crime data “good enough” to actually be ready for 
analysis? The speed rationale at the core of predictive policing would logically 
require a minimal time lag between the detection of a burglary, the creation of 
data about it, and the ensuing data analysis. However, as we have shown, crime 
data are characterized by a fundamental trade- off between speed and quality. 
Police departments are thus faced with a choice: Is it preferable to analyze crime 
data at an early stage and be able to translate the full potential of the risk estimate 
produced into operational measures, while accepting the possibility that miss-
ing values and inaccurate classifications might interfere with the results from the 
analysis – or is it better to wait a bit longer, work with consolidated data, and 
run the risk that alerts may already be (partially) outdated when they arrive at 
street level? Waiting too long, as one respondent framed it, essentially means that 
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the police “get alerts that are basically already over before they started, because a 
case only made it into the system two or three days later” (I26).
This trade- off situation is also reflected in the actual data infrastructure that 
police departments use to manage and work with crime data. Although, due 
to the local and regional specificities of police departments in Germany and 
Switzerland, there was considerable variation in IT infrastructure and database 
systems, essentially all of the departments we studied had at least two different 
types of databases in place: (1) a process management database and (2) a case 
file management database.
Process management databases are systems that first and foremost serve 
administrative purposes. A process file consists of a unique identification num-
ber to which metadata about the process as well as primary information about 
the incident are linked. Usually, entries in the process management database 
are created automatically once a citizen gets in touch with the police in order 
to report a crime, file a complaint, or otherwise create a working process that 
needs to be administered. The primary rationale of process files is to quickly 
produce rudimentary knowledge that enables the police to manage work pro-
cesses internally. For example, police departments use process management 
databases to keep track of responsible persons and relevant communications. 
One interviewee described it as follows:
You have to imagine it like this: Every time I make a service call to the 
police, a file is automatically created. And if my call concerns something 
that will produce a report, then this report will eventually be forward to 
the central database, and the report will be linked to the file.
(I07)
Case file management databases, on the other hand, are geared toward knowl-
edge production in a criminal investigation. They are structured in a similar 
way – that is, they consist of a unique case file number to which information, 
reports, documents, and other media files can be linked. Case files are less 
formalized, but the data they contain are generally considered more reliable 
(I07; I09; I26). They are, however, also considerably slower, as new data might 
only be added during the investigation, and after some time has passed since 
the original reporting of a crime. From a predictive policing perspective, case 
file management databases are therefore not a good fit, as they overstretch the 
trade- off between speed and quality too much toward quality. When starting 
to work with predictive policing software, police departments therefore needed 
to decide which data source to use as input for algorithmic crime analysis. As 
our respondents framed it, this decision was pretty much contingent on experi-
menting with what kind of data quality could be considered “good enough”:
In the case file management system we have good quality in terms of verified 
data on the time and location, as well as haul. This is information that tends 
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to be very volatile at the beginning of an investigation: what was the exact 
time of the offense, what exactly was stolen, and so on. So for us it was clear 
that when we start using [predictive policing software], we would have to 
deal with these issues. Because in theory we have little time to react: if there’s 
a burglary today, then we’ll have to be in that risk area tomorrow. And not 
in a week, because it will be over by then. That was the main challenge: to 
really find out if it works with weak data, with [process management] data, 
with the data that the emergency call center records, and with the data that 
our patrol units collect at the crime scene with their tablets.
(I07)
The idea of a process management database is to capture what you see: you 
go to the crime scene, you speak to the victim, and you get an idea of the 
crime. . . . Whatever you know or think you know at this point. It needs 
to be quick, and it gets transferred to the central system immediately. . . . 
The purpose here is not investigation, it’s process management, and it’s 
not good data. Our crime analysis division basically uses these completely 
invalidated data half an hour later and tries to generate situational insights 
from them. There’s a lot of uncertainty. Things are wrongly classified, 
wrong key values are used, generic categories are used even though there 
are specific sub- categories, free text explanations are off because there was 
a misunderstanding at four in the morning or because the victim was not 
exactly sure what had happened. And then we must try to validate as many 
data points as possible as quickly as possible.
(I50)
As these quotes illustrate, the police departments we investigated eventually 
came to the conclusion that the data provided by process management data-
bases could in fact be used as input for predictive policing software, despite 
their obvious shortcomings (I07; I09; I18; I45; I50; I51; I78). This means they 
opted for the repurposing of data that were never meant to provide the basis 
for crime analysis. This happened because the need for timely data in predictive 
policing had rendered the more logical analytical source – that is, the case file 
management database, useless for operational response. As one analyst sum-
marized the situation:
[The process management database] is always a bit blurry. . . . It is supposed 
to administer internal information: who is responsible for a case, when did 
they distribute what kind of information to whom. The fact that we use 
that for analytical purposes is more like a by- product.
(I46)
Notably, as process management databases provide the primary data input for 
predictive policing software, police departments put the knowledge that is 
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produced in crime analysis on shaky epistemic foundations. Process manage-
ment databases have a deliberately provisional and volatile character that speaks 
to the uncertainties that can hardly be avoided in police work and the produc-
tion of crime data. The choice to work with potentially unreliable data, how-
ever, was largely preconfigured by the near- repeat rationale and the assumption 
that the likelihood of follow- up crime decreases rapidly after the first 72 hours 
following a trigger incident. At the same time, police departments are fully 
aware that the potentially precarious data foundation of predictive policing 
means they must pay even more attention to quality control and that the ana-
lyst has to act as an additional fail- safe and double- check every algorithmically 
created alert for the consistency of its database. We will deal with the role of 
human analysts in predictive policing in more depth in Chapter 5.
The rhythm of crime and policing
Issues with data quality in predictive policing might, however, in the end not 
turn out to be as problematic as one might think. Even though analysts are 
understandably keen on getting their hands on good quality data as quickly 
as possible in order to be able to generate meaningful and timely recommen-
dations for operational measures, the need for speed becomes considerably 
mediated when risk estimates are translated into street- level policing. As the 
eventual rationale of predictive policing is to have targeted patrols in risk areas 
to potentially deter offenders from committing near- repeat burglaries, the pro-
duction of risk estimates must from an operational point of view not be geared 
toward maximum acceleration but rather be synchronized with the occurrence 
of crime and corresponding patrols and other prevention measures.
Environmental criminology has long foregrounded the importance of 
opportunities for the occurrence of crime, and it has in turn highlighted how 
through a modification of such opportunities crime might effectively be pre-
vented. Opportunities can, for instance, be caused by architecture or design 
that facilitates criminal activities, they can be caused by poor lighting, or they 
can be caused by a lack of access protection or the availability of unguarded 
objects (Clarke, 1980; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Wortley and 
Townsley, 2017). Starting from the assumption that opportunities for crime are, 
equally, dynamically caused by the movement of people and goods throughout 
the day, Felson (2006: 6) has conceptualized crime as a fluid process that “has a 
metabolism, a rhythm of life responding to other rhythms”. His analysis is per-
tinent for predictive policing and burglary prevention, as it foregrounds how 
windows of opportunity open and close rather regularly as people go about 
their daily business. As he argues, “residential burglars depend on the rhythmic 
shift of residents away from home in the morning, and they better watch out 
for their return later” (Felson, 2006: 7).
Such considerations closely correspond with routine activity theory (Cohen 
and Felson, 1979) and assumptions of rational offender behavior (Becker, 
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1968), and render residential burglary a type of crime that is widely considered 
to occur rhythmically, with regular intervals of offender activity and inactivity. 
A professional burglar is not expected to operate 24/7, but only during specific 
hours of the day when premises are vacant and/or lighting conditions provide 
additional cover (I09; I26; I62). The classic example of such rhythmic offender 
behavior caused by environmental factors is the dusk period during fall and 
winter, when the sun sets early and creates a “window of darkness” between 
early afternoon and the time when residents return to their homes by early 
evening. During this window of opportunity, burglars are able to operate more 
comfortably, as they are less likely to be seen and/or identified. Additionally, 
unoccupied dwellings can be easily identified when no lights are showing.
The police are well aware of these rhythms. For them, targeting professional 
residential burglars with intensified patrols in risk areas thus only makes sense 
during the assumed “working hours” of offenders, which depend on the pre-
ferred method of the burglar as much as they depend on environmental factors 
that open and close windows of opportunity (I02; I03; I06; I07; I11; I43; I45; 
I50). Assuming a daily rhythm during which residents pursue their routine activi-
ties thus means that a burglar will once per day be able to seize the opportunity to 
enter vacant premises with comparably little risk – which in turn means that the 
police have almost a full day to produce data from the offender’s activities, analyze 
the data, devise operational measures, and implement these measures in the iden-
tified risk area during the assumed active hours of the offender on the next day. 
For a series of residential burglaries that occurs during a winter dusk window of 
approximately three to four hours, this means that the police have about 20 hours 
to prepare for the next cycle – including quality control processes to ensure that 
predictive policing is operating on the best data basis possible.
At the same time, such a rhythmic interplay of crime and policing implies that 
the risk estimates produced by predictive policing software can in the best case 
be narrowed down considerably in accordance with the temporal characteris-
tics of the presumed burglary series that is to be operationally targeted. Police 
departments do this by compartmentalizing algorithmically produced risk time 
into segments that correspond with the assumed operational hours of a specific 
burglary “profile”. In this way, they are able to rule out certain periods of the 
day and deploy patrols in an even more targeted fashion (I20; I26). The overall 
temporal reach of risk estimates (usually five to seven days) remains untouched 
by this practice, but throughout the active period of an alert, patrols will only 
actively cover the predicted risk area during those hours when near repeats can 
reasonably be expected (P01). One analyst detailed their ways of narrowing 
down operational hours in accordance with the rhythm of crime as follows:
We use time stamps. . .: “Giorno” for daytime burglaries, “Sera” for dawn, 
and “Notte” for nighttime. And sure, we are still dealing with an overall time 
period of seven days [for an active alert], but within these seven days we do 
not need to cover all 24 hours of the day. Instead, we limit ourselves to the 
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time stamps. “Sera,” in this case, is a twilight burglary . . . and that means that 
our patrols over the next seven days will only have to cover this time of day.
(I26)
The criminal futures that predictive policing engenders are thus very much 
focused on the rather narrow operational task at hand, which is to prevent resi-
dential burglary as a specific type of crime. Crime and policing must in this sense 
be understood as alternating cycles that supersede each other at regular daily 
intervals (Leese, 2020). Further acceleration, while technically possible, is con-
sidered to create no additional value for operational crime prevention measures. 
As one respondent explained, from an operational perspective, the police “need 
to get ahead of the next cycle. That is when the offender might return. And 
that’s 24 hours” (I78). The particular interval that emerges through the relation 
of the temporal characteristics of crime and the process of data collection, con-
solidation, and analysis is in fact a rather static one that has little in common with 
imaginaries of predictive policing as a responsive, flexible, and dynamic method. 
There is little, if any, “real- time” data flow and no “live” situational awareness.
The daily rhythm of predictive policing practices becomes further entrenched 
through the ways in which crime risk needs to be made relatable to wider 
organizational practices. In order to bring predictive policing to the streets 
and make crime forecasts amenable to the practices of patrol forces, analyses 
need to be readily available for shift briefings where patrol forces are instructed 
about current risk areas and preferred patrolling strategies. This means that 
analysts will need to stick to fixed “delivery times” that are predefined by the 
work schedule of the department. The life cycles of crime data, crime analysis, 
and larger organizational trajectories must thus be aligned and synchronized, 
in such a way that internal communication is facilitated and risk alerts can be 
translated into operational measures at the right moment. We will engage with 
dissemination and communication in more depth in Chapter 6. Our interview-
ees illustrated the challenge of matching different temporal logics as follows:
The day shift starts at 07:00, and most burglary cases are reported and cap-
tured between 16:00 and 02:00, when there are only few officers on duty 
at the station. There is a supervisor who has the lead and who is also in 
charge of quality control. But there’s usually a lot going on at our station, 
so he won’t really get around to that. So the actual quality control will start 
in the morning, when the day shift starts at 07:00. And then we have the 
morning meeting at 08:00, and quality control is usually finished by 09:00, 
09:30, and we want to wait for that.
(I03)
We extract [burglary] data on a running basis from our process manage-
ment database.  .  .  . That is usually possible. By the next morning these 
cases are consolidated and have a certain quality, and then we verify the 
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information once more and amend it if need be. Once this re- examination, 
this quality control process, is finished, the data become part of the dataset 
to be analyzed.
(I18)
In all the departments we studied, the modes of temporal alignment would be 
similar, meaning that crime analysis with predictive policing software would 
usually start at some point between 10:00 and 11:00 in the morning, when 
crime data would be seen as robust and reliable enough for analysis and the 
results from the analysis could still be distributed in time for the start of the next 
patrol shifts (I07; I26; I45; I76; I78).
Due to the automation of the actual analytical process, crime analysis with 
predictive policing software does not in fact take up a great deal of time, and 
this is where the advantages of algorithmic means of analysis can be witnessed. 
Depending on the amount of criminal activity to be analyzed, reports will 
usually be ready for distribution about 15–30 minutes later (I26; I39; I44; P75; 
P76). When software companies advertise the speed advantage of their prod-
uct compared to manual crime analysis, they may be making a justified claim 
if one looks exclusively at the time that passes between data import and the 
distribution of alert memos. When we look at the wider sociotechnical prac-
tices of predictive policing, however, it becomes clear that acceleration cannot 
be something that is produced through an algorithm in relation to data alone. 
Rather, speed can only emerge through a diverse set of sociotechnical relations 
(I07; I18; I26; I31). In the end, predictive policing entrenches what one of our 
respondents aptly summarized as a “daily rhythm” of crime and policing:
At the moment we have a daily rhythm. . . . We realized that once per day 
is enough for situational analysis. In the morning, you have to determine 
which new burglaries came in, because what happened overnight is usually 
noticed in the morning and then reported. That means you wait until you 
can include these and run the analysis once for the daily situational analysis, 
and that’s enough.
(I76)
Some of the departments we investigated did experiment with more frequent 
iterations of data analysis, hoping in this way to enhance the quality of their 
forecasts. One department chose to run predictive policing software twice per 
day, as they reasoned that crime risk should be updated before the start of the 
early evening patrol shifts (I80). Another department even chose to add another 
iteration of analysis in the evening, but it quickly became clear that this was of 
little use as usually no residential burglary cases would be expected to occur 
during the night, which meant crime analysis in the morning sufficed (I44).
Work organization within police departments, in close correspondence with 
the criminal phenomenon to be dealt with, thus predefines the rhythm of 
Data and the need for speed 89
crime analysis in very clear- cut ways. Technoscientific imaginaries of maxi-
mum acceleration, live data feeds, and real- time awareness might sound great 
on paper, but they would offer limited additional value for everyday police 
practice. Criminal futures, from the perspective of the police, do not need to be 
about the production of ultimately precise renderings of risk throughout time 
and space, but they must present actionable means to make an overall situation 
intelligible and manageable. One officer summarized the practical stakes with 
regard to questions of timing, speed, and frequency within predictive policing 
as follows:
I think we should not forget that we are talking about a larger situational 
picture here.  .  .  . We must not overburden our people with continuous 
new alerts. You run the analysis in the morning, and that’s just like the 
weather forecast: what will the weather be like today? You don’t want to 
be constantly updated, and usually that’s not necessary either.
(I76)
The weather analogy used by our interviewee is in fact a good way to under-
stand the relevant temporal characteristics of crime risk with regard to the 
police’s organizational needs. It is good to know in the morning that there is a 
chance of rain today, so you can bring an umbrella. There might not actually be 
any rain (the weather forecast is only a statement about statistical likelihoods), 
and maybe by midday, the forecast has been adjusted and tells you that rain 
is now unlikely. Again, this is good to know, but since you set off with your 
umbrella this morning anyway, it does not actually change anything. Similarly, 
if crime risk areas were to be updated multiple times throughout the day it 
might not be easily possible for patrol forces to accommodate the updates. We 
will deal with patrolling practices and risk areas vis- à- vis other tasks of patrol 
officers in more detail in Chapter 7. For police departments, in summary, it 
turns out to be more sensible to plan operational measures based on a rather 
static, daily- rhythm notion of criminal futures, allowing for sufficient leeway 
to construct operational measures and corresponding organizational processes 
around each risk area.
Conclusion
The formation of a sociotechnical system around predictive policing has, at the 
stage of the first translation process of empirical phenomena into data, drawn 
renewed attention to the ways in which the police produce crime data, the 
challenges they face in doing so, and how data continue to be produced and 
reproduced even after their initial inception. Crime data undergo a notable 
journey throughout their life cycle, starting with their creation at the crime 
scene, continuing with their consolidation and amendment at various stages 
of police work and preliminarily ending with their incorporation in crime 
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analysis. Throughout this journey, concerted efforts to accelerate the process 
from data collection to analysis and to operational measures continue to hit 
speed bumps in the form of quality control processes. The speed of data quality 
is closely tied to and therefore limited by the speed of criminal investigations.
Police organizations are well aware that crime data will never be perfect. The 
implementation of predictive policing has once again forced them to acknowl-
edge this fact and has drawn reinforced attention to quality control measures 
that are supposed to curb incoherence, inaccuracy, and unreliability in data as 
far as possible. A sociotechnical understanding of predictive policing highlights 
the importance of data creation practices, the different professional lifeworlds 
of patrol officers and analysts, and the need to address data quality issues early 
on. Raising awareness about best practices in data production is from a police 
perspective seen as a necessary and worthwhile way of addressing the founda-
tions of predictive policing and, by extension, as valuable for other forms of 
crime analysis and data handling. This might not always be successful. But, as 
we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 10, it has reproblematized entrenched 
problems and put them on the agenda for future reform.
Data troubles are, however, to a certain extent mediated by the fact that 
crime and policing are tied together by a rhythmic interplay that limits the 
additional benefits of further acceleration and provides additional room for 
quality control and data amendments. Even though crime data will never be 
perfect, the need for speed in predictive policing prescribes to put imperfect 
data to use. Most notably, against this backdrop, police departments were care-
ful not to blindly rely on their own data. Multiple layers of quality control and 
the supervision of algorithmic production of risk estimates by a human analyst 
are testaments of a good deal of skepticism they showed towards the data basis 
of crime forecasts. This seems appropriate for a domain such as policing, where 
errors can have severe consequences.
Notes
 1 PredPol, www.predpol.com/technology (accessed 30 April 2020).
 2 PRECOBS, www.ifmpt.de (accessed 30 April 2020).
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Acceleration in predictive policing is primarily brought about by automa-
tion. As algorithms relieve humans of some of the burdens of crime analysis, 
it is worth interrogating automation and its effects on the relations between 
humans and machines in more detail. In this chapter, we investigate how pre-
dictive policing reconfigures sociotechnical practices of crime analysis and how 
police departments aspire to balance machine power and human competencies. 
In particular, we foreground how different types of perception and knowledge 
production can lead to conflicts around the redistribution of authority and 
reasoning and how such conflicts are institutionally curbed by a number of 
safeguards to “keep the machine in check”.
The chapter starts by reviewing the rationales of automation. Drawing on 
Human- Computer Interaction (HCI) literature, it explores some of the gen-
eral benefits and drawbacks of workload distribution between humans and 
machines and how different levels of automation vis- à- vis given tasks reconfig-
ure the relationships between systems and operators. The second part empiri-
cally retraces why there is a persistent need for human analysts in predictive 
policing and how automation of crime analysis transforms the job profile of 
operators. We then proceed to illustrate some of the possible conflicts that can 
emerge when humans and algorithms interact in the production of crime risk. 
We specifically engage with how operators tinker with software configurations 
in order to align system outputs with other elements of the sociotechnical sys-
tem and how police departments provide a number of support measures that are 
supposed to facilitate human arguments against algorithmic recommendations.
Automating things
In crime analysis, predictive policing software essentially promises to take care 
of tasks that are monotonous (such as executing the same analytical opera-
tion over and over again for each registered burglary case), complex (such as 
advanced analytics within large datasets), error prone, and/or surpass human 
capacities in the first place (as would, for example, be the case with machine 
learning techniques). The general assumption that underpins automation is 
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that machines are more suitable to do the heavy lifting, carry out tasks much 
quicker and do so without producing random errors or needing a break. One 
software developer summarized the advantages of automated algorithmic analy- 
sis as follows:
Particularly with types of crime that occur in large numbers, the system 
can compute the statistics in a couple of seconds. If I want to look at a 
specific neighborhood in [city], I  can ask the system: “What’s the near 
repeat quota in this area?” . . . And the system tells me: “In this area, there’s 
a near repeat quota of 45 per cent.” . . . Any analyst could do the same 
thing. What PRECOBS does could be done by any capable police officer. 
The difference is: a machine doesn’t get tired, it reduces complexity, and, 
if properly configured, it produces no errors.
(I01)
Predictive policing, in this sense, ties into a long- standing tradition of engi-
neering and design that has, since the early days of computing in the middle 
of the 20th century (Fitts, 1951), explored how to use machine capacities to 
best relieve humans of some of their workload. The practical guiding question 
for research on HCI can be summarized as follows: What tasks within a given 
domain can be automated in the first place, and to what extent should they be 
automated? Automation is thereby understood as “the full or partial replace-
ment of a function previously carried out by the human operator” (Parasura-
man et al., 2000: 287).
In order to find out how much automation would be desirable for a given 
task within a particular operational and organizational environment and how 
a specific degree of automation would restructure the relationship between 
system and operator, Sheridan and Verplank (1978) have specified ten “levels 
of automation” (LOA), ranging from no assistance offered by the system at all 
to a fully automated system that carries out all tasks by itself and completely 
ignores the human operator. This conceptual differentiation allows engineers 
and designers to specify how much workload should be delegated to automated 
processes within the system, how much and what kind of control the human 
operator should have over these processes, and what the interface between 
operator and system would need to look like in order to ensure proper coop-
eration and the desired level of human control within a given configuration of 
workload distribution.
Tinkering with different configurations of automation and control vis- à- vis 
legal, organizational, psychological, cognitive, and not least, moral aspects of 
the relations between humans and machines is seen, then, from an HCI per-
spective, as a way of moving toward the establishment of an optimal trade- off 
between relocating tasks to system functions while at the same time ensuring 
human awareness and the possibility of intervention in automated processes if 
necessary. In HCI research, the highest possible level of automation was long 
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perceived as desirable, as it was assumed that this would free up human capaci-
ties that could then be redirected to other tasks where they could be applied 
in a more meaningful fashion (de Greef, 2016: 139). Very much in line with 
such a drive toward maximum automation are narratives of automation as an 
innovative way to more effective and cost- efficient ways of doing things (Miller 
and Parasuraman, 2007: 58). As we discussed in Chapter 2, such narratives are 
strongly reflected in predictive policing and correspond closely with efforts to 
render the police more effective and efficient. It is no wonder, then, that auto-
mation is presented in crime prevention and other domains of law enforcement 
as a desirable development.
HCI scholars, however, are increasingly cautioning against the assumption 
that automation can be seen as a panacea for human shortcomings and lack 
of adequate institutional budgets. Research has demonstrated that high levels 
of automation must not necessarily be a good thing. On the contrary, it has 
been shown that high levels of automation tend to produce a set of problems, 
including negative effects on operator awareness and a decline in operator skill- 
sets (Parasuraman et al., 1993; Endsley and Kiris, 1995; Wickens et al., 1998; 
Parasuraman and Miller, 2004). In other words, the more tasks are delegated to 
a machine, the more human capacities will deteriorate – which can turn out to 
be problematic if the system fails and the operator has to take over.
These issues are aggravated when humans are no longer able to properly 
understand machine tasks in the first place. As algorithms carry out complex 
calculations or identify patterns in large amounts of data, their operations tend 
to become too complex to retrace for humans. The creation of such “black 
boxes” (Latour, 1987: 1ff ) is part of the very idea of automation, as complexity 
is supposed to be hidden from the human eye. And yet, a lack of visibility has 
potentially troublesome repercussions on the relations between humans and 
machines. Most notably, it impacts the human ability to carry out meaningful 
forms of control over machine processes, as such control should be based on 
a general understanding of the task that has been automated. In other words, 
the more processes are delegated to machinic calculations and thereby rendered 
invisible and the more complex these calculations become, the less understand-
able and retraceable do machine- produced outputs become for humans. This 
gives considerable authority to machines, as a lack of knowledge about how 
their outputs come into being renders them less challengeable by human users 
(Leese, 2014; Pasquale, 2015).
Notably, visibility and traceability play a crucial role in decision- making pro-
cesses that are, in environments where humans and machines work together, often 
underpinned by knowledge that was produced by the system and then presented 
to the human operator – usually in the form of recommendations for a specific 
course of action. While in most application domains, it is typically asserted that 
machines will not “decide” anything by themselves, looking more closely at auto-
mation and HCI reveals that decisions can in many cases not easily be attributed 
to either humans or systems. Coupled with often relatively short time frames for 
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human decision- making based on algorithmically produced recommendations, 
high levels of automation have been shown to produce “automation bias” – that 
is to say, an overreliance on automated system functions – at times even against 
one’s own judgment of a situation (Skitka et al., 1999; Cummings, 2004; Wick-
ens et al., 2015). Automation bias demonstrates that in domains where humans 
and machines work together, there is a tendency to “blindly follow” the machine 
under assumptions of alleged accuracy and impartiality.
Uncritically following automated processes creates concerns in terms of 
accountability for ensuing action (Skitka et al., 2000; Jones, 2017) – and most 
notably for “wrong” decisions, whether they are based on faulty data, inad-
equate models and/or algorithms, or other error sources. This is particularly 
pertinent for high- risk environments – that is, for domains where sociotechni-
cal systems are used for safety or security tasks. Nuclear safety, global health, 
and counterterrorism are just some examples of domains where erroneous 
assessments, decisions, and resulting actions can have severe consequences for 
those affected by them. In order to safeguard against automation bias and retain 
responsibility and accountability for decision- making within the human realm, 
Parasuraman and Wickens (2008: 514) have thus argued that “in high- risk 
settings . . . decision automation should be set at a [level of automation] that 
allows operator input into the decision- making process”.
During our research, we saw this principle strongly reflected in the practical 
implementation of predictive policing software. Algorithmically produced risk 
estimates, as we show throughout this chapter, are in everyday use subjected 
to rather strong means of human control for several reasons. For police organi-
zations, it is important to be able to understand and retrace decision- making 
processes in crime analysis, not least because they need to be able to justify and 
legitimate operational measures based on analytical insights. This is particularly 
pertinent in predictive policing and other forms of risk- based, future- oriented 
measures, as such methods can potentially extend data bias to the street level 
and have tangible repercussions in terms of discrimination and over- or under-
policing. We will engage what notions of automation and black- boxing mean 
for the accountability of police work in Chapter 9.
Practices of predictive policing thus closely resonate with research in engi-
neering and design, which highlights that humans are “still vital after all these 
years of automation” (Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008: 511) and that this funda-
mental constellation is not likely to change. Despite the technological advances 
we have witnessed over the last few decades, the need for human control speaks 
to fundamental ethical and legal concerns that are largely independent of the 
concrete processes subject to automation. Rather than a purely technical ques-
tion, automation is thus much more about the art of balancing the workload 
between humans and machines such that benefits from automation can be maxi-
mized while meaningful control can at the same time be guaranteed.
Building on this understanding of automation, HCI has over recent decades 
paid increased attention to the human factors within sociotechnical systems 
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and the ways in which communication and interfaces between operators and 
systems could be optimized. Suggestions for human- centered design involve 
concepts such as “flexible automation” (Miller and Parasuraman, 2007), “team 
play” (Klein et al., 2004), and “machine etiquette” (Parasuraman and Miller, 
2004). In order to realize modes of workload distribution that speak to the 
need for human control, medium LOAs have been foregrounded as the most 
important area of study. As Miller and Parasuraman (2007: 58) argue, the design 
of a sociotechnical system then “requires that neither human nor automation 
be exclusively in charge of most tasks but, rather, uses intermediate levels of 
automation and flexibility in the role of automation during system operations 
and places control of that flexibility firmly in the human operator’s hands”.
The need for an operator
The fact that predictive policing software requires an operator does not come as 
a surprise against the backdrop of insights from HCI research. From a technical 
perspective, high levels of automation could in crime analysis unquestionably be 
realized and indeed bring predictive policing closer to the imaginary of an unin-
terrupted, steady process that runs in the background and produces analytical 
insights without any unnecessary delay. The empirical reality, however, differs 
quite a bit from this scenario. Police departments as much as software developers 
themselves have come to the realization that in predictive policing, automation 
must be handled with care and curbed by the software itself and/or organiza-
tional constraints that ensure meaningful human control. In all the departments 
we studied, predictive policing software was implemented in ways that made 
sure that, in the military jargon of decision- making under the use of assistance 
systems (Endsley and Kiris, 1995), a human operator was not only “on the loop” 
(i.e., supervising the process without necessarily getting actively involved in it), 
but properly “in the loop” (i.e., automated processes would at some point come 
to a halt and only continue upon approval by the human operator)(P01; P49; 
P67; P77). One interviewee summarized this rationale as follows:
We deliberately set it up this way. You could have it fully automated, but 
we chose not to. The human makes the final decision. It could be fully 
automated, no problem at all. The technology is ready for that. The system 
can process any kind of data: personal data, different sources, not a prob-
lem from a technical point of view. But it makes no sense to have a fully 
automated system.
(I77)
The main reason to opt against high levels of automation in predictive polic-
ing was at times quite bluntly formulated as a lack of trust: “I would never 
trust a machine 100%. I would always double- check whether I come to the 
same conclusion” (I03). Such a generalized stance of suspicion might appear 
Humans and machines 99
intuitive in the first place, particularly, as we discussed in Chapter 3, in the light 
of the skepticism police organizations have historically shown when confronted 
with the implementation of new technological tools. Equally, it speaks to HCI 
research that has pointed to lack of trust in the system as one potential effect of 
high levels of automation (Parasuraman and Miller, 2004).
In predictive policing, however, a lack of trust in algorithmically produced 
crime risk estimates does also speak to concerns about the reliability of crime 
data. Data quality, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, is generally seen 
as a critical issue in crime analysis – even with multiple layers of quality con-
trol in place. In predictive policing, time pressure additionally aggravates the 
problem of potentially unreliable data. The amendment and consolidation of 
crime data usually takes some time and thus potentially compromises police 
capabilities to intervene in presumed ongoing crime series. The data that feed 
predictive policing software must thus be understood as a major reason why 
police departments tend to distrust complete automation and seek to subject 
algorithmically produced recommendations to dedicated human oversight.
It should be noted at this point that the perceived lack of data quality is of 
course a homemade problem. Concerns about predictive policing should thus 
first and foremost be understood as concerns about the police’s own practices 
of data production and consolidation. This constellation tells us quite a lot 
about police perceptions of predictive policing software. In simple terms, what 
the police do not trust is the ability of the algorithm to make sense of poten-
tially faulty data. As algorithms are “context blind” (i.e., their “cognition” is 
limited to the data that they are presented with), everything that they know and 
tell us about the world hinges on that data input.
The potentially shaky nature of crime data then renders the safeguard of a 
human operator an intuitive choice to contextualize algorithmically produced 
knowledge with a different perspective. One interviewee described the prob-
lems at the intersection of the fluidity of crime data and internal quality con-
trol processes as follows: “PRECOBS would process the data right away. And 
that’s why you need an operator who is able to dig a little deeper if necessary, 
and is able to evaluate a crime on the basis of his criminological knowledge” 
(I77). The human operator is in this sense not only supposed to act as a last 
instance of quality control by double- checking the data on which the analysis is 
predicated for completeness and reliability, but more importantly, supposed to 
make sure that the machine output can be trusted. The operator in predictive 
policing is accordingly conceptualized as a corrective who does the research, 
fills the blanks, and checks whether there might be hitherto unknown hints at 
anti- triggers (I02; I03; I07; I19; D001).
This ties in with a second concern about predictive policing. Algorithms 
are generally considered at their best when it comes to looking for patterns in 
data at scale, but they are seen as less reliable and trustworthy when it comes to 
evaluating idiosyncratic cases. In other words, when a decision has to be made 
about whether the details of a burglary case within a larger situational context 
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really indicate an increased crime risk and therefore warrant operational pre-
vention measures, an algorithm might not be trustworthy after all. Our inter-
locutors framed this potential shortcoming of predictive policing applications 
in terms of the different skill- sets that machines and human analysts bring to 
the table, insinuating that the system was lacking the human capacity of sensi-
tivity and instinct. As one analyst framed it: “The system itself does nothing but 
search list values for patterns. But the thing is, these list values never give you 
the entire story that you need to really evaluate a risk area” (I76).
It appears rather obvious that software is not able to produce “a story” – and 
yet the capability to situate a crime within a narrative was seen as key when 
it came to proper evaluation of the risk of follow- up incidents (I02; I07; I76; 
I79). This demonstrates a certain mismatch between what the police consider 
sensemaking and machine evaluations of data. Different modes of seeing and 
interpreting the world and the potentially troublesome relationship between 
humans and machines that results from these modes are, first and foremost, 
reflected in the ways in which police departments position human oversight 
vis- à- vis predictive policing software.
This problematization can also partially be encountered in the ways in 
which software manufacturers conceptualize how their products are to be used. 
PRECOBS vendor IfmPt, for example, actively draws attention to the poten-
tial mismatches between machinic evaluations and human evaluations of the 
same criminal environment (D001). In order to facilitate human oversight, 
the PRECOBS interface is thus designed in a way that actively assists human 
contextualization and evaluation of alert areas through a color- coded system 
that guides the operator through potential issues with the underlying data. For 
every alert that is produced by the system, the software marks missing values in 
the data in yellow. If the alert involves dedicated trigger criteria for near- repeat 
alerts, these are marked in blue. And if the analysis of crime data involves dedi-
cated anti- trigger criteria that formally prevent the creation of an alert, these 
are marked in magenta (I03; D001). Using these color codes, the operator is 
then supposed to be able to more easily investigate whether the system’s assess-
ment of the data can be confirmed or whether it needs to be corrected.
The distribution of labor in predictive policing is thus essentially one where 
the system carries out the crime analysis and the human clears up the potential 
mess – or, in the more courteous words of one of our respondents: “evaluates 
the results” (I10). In its core, predictive policing then fundamentally transforms 
the job profile of the crime analyst. Whereas analysts used to be the experts 
carrying out the actual analysis, their role vis- à- vis automation has turned into 
that of a supervisor/researcher/quality control manager. One respondent framed 
the new focus for the human in predictive policing as one of weighing pros 
and cons vis- à- vis machine recommendations: “Generating an alert is not com-
plicated. But the evaluation? Should we distribute that alert or not? Are there 
criteria in favor or against it?” (I79) Grappling with these criteria has become 
the main task for the operator as the machine computes risk estimates, and the 
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human is supposed to suppress “wrong” risk estimates (P28) and bring the back-
ground to the table in order to produce the story around the alert. Several of 
our respondents gave examples of what such “narrativization” entails in every-
day practice:
So the system produces an alert for an apartment, but you know that 
this apartment has been vacant for four weeks. Maybe someone broke in 
because they needed a place to sleep – that is not burglary. But the system 
does not know that. The system does not know that background, the 
empty apartment. Or maybe there was an actual burglary, but the only 
thing that was stolen was a PlayStation. In that case there’s a high prob-
ability that it was a relationship issue or drug related. I don’t need an alert 
for that, there’s no risk for a near repeat.
(I02)
We had burglaries where the only stolen item was a TV that was retrieved 
after a break- up. In situations like that you just need to do the math.
(I76)
Think about basements, for example. Technically, the basement is a part of 
the apartment, but if someone breaks into a basement and steals bicycles, we 
rule near repeats out. Those are not the professionals that we want to target.
(I79)
In all these cases, the larger picture and the corresponding narrative of the 
crime instantly became clear to the human operator, and they were certain that 
the computed risk area should be discarded because there would be no actual 
risk of follow- up burglaries. The system, however, was not capable of creating 
a reasonable story around the data, because evaluation criteria in favor of or 
against an algorithmically produced risk estimate usually require the consulta-
tion of additional information that is not accessible for the software. For the 
operators, in the examples given earlier, the disconnect between the human 
interpretation of a burglary context and the algorithmic analysis of the available 
crime data in fact seemed to be quite obvious. They understood how machinic 
“misinterpretations” can occur, for example, due to inadequate data quality or 
the incorrect classification of empirical phenomena during data generation and 
why a human operator must act as a corrective in such cases.
Human evaluation activities, framed as finding the fault lines between the 
narrative and the “naked” data, raise the question of what the job profile for a 
software operator should look like. Normally, crime analysis is conducted by 
specially trained analysts – either police officers or civilians with the specific 
professional skill- set needed to analyze crime data, identify patterns, derive 
tactical or strategic intelligence from these patterns, and give recommenda-
tions for operational measures. Debates about the particular job profile of a 
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traditional crime analyst have always been somewhat controversial, specifically 
with regard to the question of whether a good analyst should first and foremost 
be familiar with the intricacies of the police profession or rather have a profes-
sional background in advanced statistics (Santos, 2013: 12). Predictive policing 
software, however, fundamentally questions the necessity to have specialized 
experts as operators in the first place. If all that it takes to come up with action-
able analytical results is to press a button and then double- check the results 
vis- à- vis their underlying data, then this task could in principle be executed by 
a layperson with no particular analytical or police skill- set. And such facilita-
tion would of course also speak to shrinking police budgets and the need for 
efficiency. Yet, the ability to create a story around algorithmically produced risk 
estimates and interpret that story would at the same time require a certain level 
of professional expertise and experience.
Police departments in fact struggle with the job profile of the operator 
in predictive policing. During our research, we found little unanimity as to 
who could be considered for the job and what skill- set they should have. The 
majority of our respondents tended to agree that an operator ought to have 
at least some experience in crime analysis, should have proper command of 
IT and software (particularly spreadsheet software and other statistics applica-
tions), and should have had positive evaluation reports throughout their career 
(P03). In those departments working with PRECOBS, operators were typi-
cally recruited from existing police staff and underwent a dedicated two- day 
training program provided by IfmPt (I18; I44; I76; I77; I78; I79; I80). In addi-
tion to in- house recruiting, there was a parallel tendency to professionalize 
crime analysis in general – not only with regard to predictive policing but also 
with regard to other analytical tasks. In order to do so, some police depart-
ments additionally chose to recruit new analysts straight from university (I78; 
I79). Most departments retained a small pool of staff who could act as software 
operators, usually between three (I19; I31; P03), four (I07; P75) and six (I26; 
I79), depending on the size of the department and the crime analysis division.
From our research, the job profile for an operator in predictive policing could 
be described as follows: He or she requires a certain understanding of crime analy-
sis (i.e., of what has been automated by the software); how algorithmic analy sis 
relates to the underlying crime data; and what the strengths, weaknesses, and 
limitations of these data are. The operator is thus conceptualized as someone who 
has a certain domain knowledge and is capable of supervising logically structured, 
but to a certain extent “contextually ignorant” algorithmic calculations.
The workload redistribution between humans and machines in predictive polic-
ing can in this sense be understood as an only half- hearted attempt to mobilize the 
opportunities of digitization for crime analysis and prevention measures. While 
the algorithm does in fact do the heavy lifting, it cannot be trusted to produce 
the correct results and thus needs to be closely supervised. Human operators are 
considered capable of doing things that cannot easily be translated into code (con-
textualizing data and placing them within a crime narrative), and these capacities 
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are seen as crucial so that the department can avoid allocating scarce resources to 
the “wrong” places for preventive measures that would miss the target.
As mistrust toward predictive policing software centrally revolves around 
data, the specific practical configuration between algorithmic crime analysis 
software and human oversight can in large part be attributed to the ontologi-
cal and epistemic challenges of crime data production that we discussed in the 
previous chapter. As both criminal incidents and their classification are infused 
with uncertainty, crime data are considered generally unreliable and volatile 
and need to be subjected to ongoing practices of quality control and correc-
tion. The need to stay in control of decision- making processes arguably also 
speaks to institutional concerns about accountability in a domain where erro-
neous decisions could have potentially far- reaching consequences.
Tinkering with the machine
Decision- making remains a sensitive issue in predictive policing. Even as the 
workload distribution between system and operator is implemented in a way 
that allegedly plays to the strengths of each, we should not assume that this 
cooperation will by default be a consensual and friendly one. In the end, 
any form of crime analysis – independent of whether it was carried out by a 
human, a machine, or some combination of the two – requires a decision as to 
whether and how analytical insights should be put into practice. At times, there 
is no straightforward answer to that. Even in cases where the operator generally 
agrees with the software output, there might be other factors that could prevent 
the dissemination of alerts and their implementation on the street.
In this section we will engage cases where operators actively contradicted 
risk estimates  – not because they thought they would not be accurate, but 
because they were aware of the fact that the production of multiple parallel 
criminal futures would put too much of a strain on their colleagues in the 
field. In order to avoid an overload of work tasks for patrols, analysts would 
thus actively tinker with the evaluation criteria in the software configuration in 
order to bring the number of alerts down. To understand this practice, we must 
first briefly relate back to the question we discussed in the previous chapter: 
What kind of futures does predictive policing actually produce and engender?
Criminal futures, as we noted, are produced at regular intervals, usually once 
per day. Each new iteration of crime analysis with predictive policing software 
thereby brings into being a new layer of risk with a life span of five to seven 
days. Predictive policing thus forms numerous overlapping cycles of short- term 
futures that regularly supersede each other by means of fresh crime data. That 
is to say, each iteration of crime analysis, executed after a previously defined 
interval of new data production and quality control, will yield slightly updated 
criminal futures, which in turn tend to modify or complement the previously 
created set of futures and accordingly adjust statements about possible modes of 
intervention (i.e., where and when to patrol, run prevention campaigns, etc.).
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The cyclical creation of new criminal futures does, however, not mean that 
the previously constructed ones would no longer be relevant. On the contrary, 
as a risk area remains active throughout its entire life span, the risk estimates 
that the police are supposed to react to are continually being added to by new 
alerts, and at the same time, old alerts are fading out of the picture, as they reach 
their expiry date. In concrete terms, as one particular risk area may on a given 
day already have been active for two days (and will remain active for five more 
days), a new, distinct risk area may begin a new life cycle of seven days and 
thus will supersede the first one by two days. During an overlap of five days, 
they will however be considered as simultaneously active criminal futures that 
may or may not be related but must be acted upon, nonetheless (I03; I19; I50).
The multiplicity of simultaneous criminal futures speaks to the fact that, 
within a given space that is being monitored with predictive policing software, 
there may be more than one offender and more than one potential series of 
burglaries to be detected and intervened in. The larger the area and the higher 
the population density of that area, the more likely it is that there will in fact 
be a multiplicity of parallel criminal activities – and crime prevention measures 
must of course not stop at only one of them, but take into account all possible 
opportunities to prevent multiple possible undesired futures from unfolding at 
the same time. The cyclical futures that each instance of data analysis creates 
will thus be aggravated by the multiplicity of criminal phenomena across space 
and add another layer of risk to the criminal horizon.
At least in theory, this means that there could be an infinite number of parallel 
criminal futures to be considered. And in fact, one of the promises of predictive 
policing is that algorithmic crime analysis will help to identify them all. Doing 
things that humans cannot do, such as running analyses on large datasets in very 
short time, is one of the main perks of automation – and predictive policing soft-
ware is likely to not only identify ongoing burglary series faster than a human 
analyst but also detect patterns that a human analyst might have overlooked or 
would not have noted due to time and resource constraints. In summary, a pecu-
liar side effect in predictive policing is that it tends to “multiply” crime risk. Not 
because there will be more criminal activity, of course, but simply by detecting 
things that would otherwise not have been detected. Particularly in urban areas, 
predictive policing tends to actively foster the multiplication of risk and in doing 
so to overstrain the resources police departments have in place for operational 
measures. In other words, now there might be risk where there would have 
been none without the algorithm – and it cannot be ignored.
This puts additional pressure on the human operator. All of a sudden, their 
task is no longer to simply ensure the plausibility of risk estimates. Just as well, 
they have to weigh different risk estimates against each other and decide which 
ones would potentially yield better outcomes in terms of crime prevention 
measures in the streets (I02; I18; I26; I78). As one analyst framed this situation:
At one point, we had twenty simultaneously active alerts. . . . It’s just not 
possible to implement all of them. And then you have to go back and 
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manually prioritize which alerts have a high quality, and which ones to 
discard – although I have no criteria for how to make such a decision. So 
I make a choice at random and say: “Maybe we go with number eight 
or number ten, and let’s just postpone the rest and see how it goes.” And 
maybe I realize at some point that my selection wasn’t optimal and that 
I should have prioritized differently.
(I02)
What this statement illustrates is a friction between the notion of responsiveness- 
through- data and the organizational capacities of the police. Whereas software 
companies, politicians, and police managers tend to echo the claims that pre-
dictive policing would present an elegant way to “do more with less” (Beck 
and McCue, 2009: 18), this does not necessarily hold true in everyday police 
practices. Crime analysis, if properly understood as a sociotechnical system, 
as Tilley (2008: 384) points out, “requires staffing, procedures and structures 
to elicit information, interpret it and act on it promptly and systematically”. 
This becomes a problem when we consider the general workload that patrol 
forces have to carry out during a regular shift. As most of the departments we 
studied did not have specific patrol units for crime prevention in risk areas at 
their disposal, risk area patrols would be carried out by regular patrol forces – in 
addition to a multiplicity of other tasks:
One thing that became crystal- clear was that our stations, especially those 
in areas close to the city center . . . on a regularly busy day between Thurs-
day and Saturday, [our patrol units] have no additional capacities for actual 
patrolling. They go from assignment to assignment. They handle a traffic 
accident, and then they drive to a burglary site. And when they are finished 
there, they move on to deal with a robbery. They have no time to patrol 
a risk area in between. So for us it became clear that [predictive policing] 
will have absolutely no effect as long as we don’t provide our stations with 
additional manpower. Basically, you need additional forces for every alert, 
no matter where they come from.
(I02)
Such “fire brigade policing” (Gordon, 1984) as illustrated here was highly per-
tinent during our research (I06; I09; I17; I20; I21; I22; I23; I24; I26; I29; I42; 
I43; I46; I76; I78; I80). Our respondents would refer to the fact that, with regard 
to new tasks brought about by predictive policing, they felt understaffed and 
would not be able to adequately respond to risk areas. Predictive policing thus 
demonstrates a tendency to aggravate already existing resource tensions within 
police forces. It presupposes, even in the form of a rather slow daily rhythm of 
producing futures, enhanced organizational flexibility and responsiveness, and 
these prerequisites are closely tied to the availability of sufficient staff.
If the managerial aspiration of predictive policing is to resolve the quandary 
of shrinking budgets and decreasing numbers of available personnel on the 
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ground through a flexible and target- oriented reallocation of resources, then 
what tends to be forgotten is that sufficient resources will still be required to 
enable police departments to be responsive to their newly acquired flexibility 
(Ratcliffe, 2019: 349f). Predictive policing practices, rather than putting police 
departments in a position to do more with less, more often than not make 
the police “do more with more” (Leese, 2020) – more futures, more risk, and 
more frequent crime analysis are all likely to aggravate the basic budgetary and 
resource problems that were supposed to be resolved with the help of algorith-
mic crime analysis tools.
Some departments tried to counter the overload of criminal futures in crea-
tive ways. Faced with the dilemma that they were producing too many alerts 
to properly incorporate within daily operations, they started tinkering with the 
analytical parameters that the software used to calculate risk areas in order to 
artificially bring down the number of actionable futures (I03; I46; I79). As one 
operator told us:
If I get too many alerts, I adjust the criteria a bit. Then there will be fewer 
alerts with better quality. And if I have only a few alerts and there is little 
activity, I can again adjust and work with lesser quality alerts. The thing is 
that I have to know what I’m doing.
(I03)
Through this kind of manual prioritization, operators opted to deliberately 
and systematically shut down some criminal futures they felt could not be 
acted upon and modulated anyway. The selection process that underpins this 
practice, as the aforementioned quote illustrates, is rather idiosyncratic and sub-
jective. During our research, we found that only experienced, senior analysts 
would “dare” to tinker with predictive policing in such a way. Arguably, it takes 
considerable confidence to prioritize some alerts over others, and this includes 
the willingness to be held accountable for the consequences if the “wrong” risk 
estimate was picked and follow- up burglaries occurred in a nonselected risk 
area. The same is true for the adjustment of computation criteria. It might be 
the case that by tinkering with software preferences, potentially valuable risk 
estimates are suppressed. However, as our respondents also made quite clear, 
crime prediction software does not operate in a vacuum. As part of a larger 
sociotechnical system, predictive policing needs to relate to a number of ele-
ments, and the resources available for patrolling are a decisive factor with regard 
to which criminal futures can be acted upon.
Practices of tinkering with the machine also draw attention to the fact that 
there may be disagreements between algorithmic recommendations and human 
rationales. These disagreements might not necessarily be caused by the evalu-
ation of the recommendation itself but might take the shape of reverse effects 
from future stages of predictive policing (i.e., the enactment of risk on the 
street). Senior analysts were able to resolve such disagreements in a particular 
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way that simply ignores or overrides machine outputs. Other, less senior 
operators reported significantly less assertiveness in conflict situations between 
human and machine.
Arguing against the machine
Research on automation bias, as argued earlier, has shown that algorithmically 
produced recommendations for action are often regarded as highly authori-
tative and that humans tend to accept machine outputs even against better 
knowledge or common sense. The reasons for this are well known: Machines 
are widely believed to be objective and impartial, and a properly programmed 
algorithm is assumed to produce no errors in processing data. These assump-
tions are problematic for various reasons, and we will discuss the implications of 
blind faith in technological innovations in more depth in Chapter 9.
During our research, police departments were in fact careful to curb pos-
sible beliefs that machine knowledge would be somehow superior to human 
knowledge and to ensure that human operators would be able to come to 
unbiased decisions even when assisted by algorithmic analysis tools. Relations 
between humans and crime prediction software thus would need to be config-
ured in a way that allowed contestation and decisions that contradict machine 
output. As we have shown in the preceding sections, police departments in 
fact actively sought to deconstruct presupposed algorithmic authority and the 
potential for automation bias by carefully subjecting predictive policing soft-
ware to formalized oversight, as human operators were put in place as a safe-
guard against anticipated shortcomings of crime data and resulting erroneous 
crime risk estimates.
Acting as a safeguard and final decision- making instance formally gives con-
siderable discretionary power to the operator. To be sure, such discretionary 
power has historically speaking always been ascribed to human analysts in crime 
analysis. The analyst used to be the domain expert who produced knowledge 
and decided upon its dissemination. However, with the implementation of 
predictive policing software, this domain expertise now has to be shared with 
an algorithm. It is in this sense noteworthy that the discretionary power of the 
human operator still persists in a new era of (black- boxed) algorithmic crime 
analysis and automation. In addition to being suspicious of algorithmic crime 
analysis tools and the data that feed them, police departments put considerable 
trust in the operator’s overall assessment of a situation and their eventual judg-
ment that includes information and criteria that are not formalized in the ana-
lytical model of the software. One interviewee gave an example of how human 
interpretation can trump an algorithmically produced risk alert:
Personally, if there’s for example a description of the offender, I would not 
communicate that alert. If someone saw the offender, then it’s likely that 
the offender noticed that. And if I was the offender, in that case I would 
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not return to that neighborhood. The risk that someone will recognize me 
and call the police is too high.
(I44)
Senior officers in fact encouraged arguments like the one above by reassuring 
operators that they could trust in their own judgment and would not have to 
worry about the potential ramifications of “wrong” decisions. They would at 
times even actively seek to prevent potential automation bias and insist on the 
possibility of contradicting algorithmic recommendations (I77; I80). After all, 
operators should be aware of the fact that any algorithm works on the basis of 
statistical principles and not on the basis of common sense:
It is a matter of probabilities. And the software uses a certain probability 
threshold. I have to be aware of that. And if the software has produced an 
alert, I can go ahead and ask myself whether I have additional information. 
Can I substantiate the alert? What does that additional information tell me? 
And there’s always the possibility of rejecting the alert. That’s ok.
(I80)
As this quote vividly illustrates, discretionary power explicitly includes the 
option to decide otherwise. In fact, the operator is even actively expected to 
challenge the suggestions made by the system, as they might collide with pro-
fessional experience and expertise or contradict the larger situational picture. 
Moreover, analysts as well as senior police officers highlighted the fact that 
predictive policing should be seen as only one element of the police’s analytical 
toolbox and that its influence should not be overstated:
It’s an overall assessment of the situation. What is going on around the 
alert area? What other burglary series do we know about? And so on. 
PRECOBS is a part of that, but it’s not like everything revolves around 
PRECOBS. PRECOBS supports our situational analysis, but PRECOBS 
doesn’t decide. It helps, but time and again we get alerts that we reject, 
because we feel like they are not accurate or they won’t amount to any-
thing. PRECOBS is a part of crime analysis. It’s a valuable part, an impor-
tant part, but it’s not authoritative or decisive.
(I79)
This statement creates an impression that predictive policing software would be 
treated as nothing more than an assistant and that algorithmically produced risk 
estimates would be regarded as recommendations rather than instructions. In 
everyday predictive policing practices, we did, however, experience substantial 
uncertainty among operators in terms of how to deal with algorithmically 
computed recommendations (P49). One question that came up repeatedly 
was whether operators actually dared to reject alerts even though they were 
formally reassured that it was completely fine to do so. Some departments 
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reported an acceptance rate of about 50% (I07; I46; I76), while others reported 
an acceptance rate of up to 80% (I18; I26; I45).
Particular uncertainty prevailed about the question of whether operators 
could be blamed for rejecting accurate alerts and so missing an opportunity to 
prevent near- repeat burglaries. The operators we spoke with about this more 
than once hinted that it would be safer to accept even doubtful alerts rather 
than having to justify a “wrong” rejection ex post facto (I03; I19). Such a stance 
was to a certain extent reinforced by official documentation that explicitly 
specifies that operators should only reject alerts in cases where their additional 
contextual knowledge would clearly contradict the system’s evaluation – for 
example, when an arrest has been made, but this arrest has not yet been entered 
into the database (D001).
Machine authority was additionally reinforced by the operators’ inability to 
formulate reservations about algorithmically produced risk estimates in a formal 
sense. The operator’s duties of contextualization and eventual acceptance or 
rejection of an algorithmically produced alert must be understood as a ration-
alized process that is supposed to take into account criteria such as hitherto 
unknown anti- triggers that would contradict the result of the analysis. Surpris-
ingly, however, our interviewees would frequently frame their arguments against 
machine recommendations not in the expected rational, formal fashion (I19; 
I46; I50; I79). On the contrary, they would refer to subjective and hard- to- 
explain criteria such as “gut feelings” when looking for reasons to reject an alert:
I don’t consider PRECOBS a system that can work on its own. As opera-
tor, you need to actively get involved, actively think, and sometimes you 
need to overrule the machine – even if it’s just based on a gut feeling. Most 
of the time, the gut feeling is not that far off. If the system and I come to 
the same conclusion, the alert is a good one.
(I46)
Calling it a gut feeling might be a bit exaggerated, but it is experience. If 
I have a neighborhood, a classical burglary neighborhood such as [name]. 
Wealthy, old houses, text- book burglary territory. If we don’t have a single 
burglary there throughout the summer, and then we get two or three con-
secutive ones, then I don’t care whether this is formally classified as near 
repeat. I know that there will be more burglaries over the next two to five 
days. I don’t need near repeat for that.
(I50)
Among other things it’s a gut feeling. Sure, the system specifies that when 
a perpetrator is interrupted and seen by someone, the probability of near 
repeats decreases. But in case we know of a series in that municipality or 
in the surroundings, we work with the alert, nonetheless. We don’t have 
formal criteria for that, we decide ad hoc. . . . It’s based on a gut feeling.
(I79)
110 Humans and machines
These quotes illustrate how operators at times struggled to put their con-
cerns into words. This inability to articulate concrete reasons why an alert 
should be rejected or crime prevention measures should be undertaken even 
in the absence of an alert is problematic against the backdrop of human- 
machine relations and decision- making processes. The gut feelings that our 
interlocutors referred to might be justified. In fact, given the data uncertain-
ties we outlined in the previous chapter, their nonrationalized assessment of 
the situation might even be more accurate than the result of crime analysis 
software. And yet, the inability to express concerns in concrete terms argu-
ably puts human operators at an argumentative disadvantage vis- à- vis the 
rational calculations performed by the software. Winning an argument based 
on a gut feeling is not an easy thing to do, and it becomes an even bigger 
challenge when analysts are expected to give reasons for rejected risk alerts 
(I19; P42).
The fundamentally different forms of knowledge and reasoning that 
humans and machines employ are in fact not easily bridged. Police depart-
ments did, however, seek to come up with institutional and bureaucratic 
means of strengthening human arguments against machinic reasoning. One 
of these strategies was to simply outnumber the machine. Rather than hav-
ing one human operator challenge the algorithmic decision in a “one vs. 
one” situation, upping the number of human reviewers is an easy way to 
create a quantitative advantage. Discussing interpretations, doubts, or larger 
operational concerns vis- à- vis algorithmically produced risk estimates either 
with another colleague or even with the entire team during a meeting was 
considered an intuitive yet effective way of challenging machine authority. In 
this way human operators could reassert and support each other, thus gaining 
argumentative ground:
We established a four- eyes- principle. That means the system generates an 
alert . . . and the verdict whether to accept or to reject the alert must be 
discussed with another team member. No matter what. And the operator 
needs to explain to the other person why they think “yes” or “no”. And 
only then there will be a decision.
(I78)
We discuss that every morning: we have a PRECOBS alert for this or that 
area, should we accept it, should we disseminate it?
(I79)
Another strategy to strengthen human reasoning was to support human opera-
tors with means of formalization. In one department, analysts were provided 
for this purpose with a checklist they could refer to in order to make sure 
that they were considering all relevant issues when evaluating risk estimates. 
Figure 5.1 shows the operator checklist for automatically generated alerts used 
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Figure 5.1 Operator checklist
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by this particular police department. The list specifies, among other questions, 
spatial issues (Did the burglary actually target a living area, or did it target a 
basement/garage that is formally part of the dwelling but could be considered 
as an anti- trigger?) and temporal ones (How recent was the burglary? Can a 
particular time period during the day be approximated?) that are important for 
the contextualization of the alert. Further questions are directed at the char-
acteristics of the crime itself: Could it have been an inside job? Did someone 
see and/or identify the offender? Are there indicators that the offender might 
already have been arrested in the meantime? The highly formalized structure 
provided by the checklist can in fact guide the human operator with a pre-
defined and easy- to- use set of arguments that facilitate the contestation of an 
algorithmically produced verdict.
The overarching rationale at work here is to put the operator(s) in a posi-
tion from which they can reasonably challenge and/or override alerts pro-
duced by the system and, in the best case scenario, improve the overall quality 
of the algorithmic risk calculations that become translated into operational 
crime prevention measures. Putting the human operator firmly in the driv-
ing seat and protecting their position with additional safeguards arguably 
also speaks to the institutional need for accountability and (at least internal) 
transparency. Particularly, vis- à- vis potential problems in terms of discrimina-
tion and over- /underpolicing that the police could run into with predictive 
policing methods, staying in full control of automated processes and having 
an operator making volitional, deliberate decisions rather than just following 
predefined paths can be seen as an attempt to preemptively keep algorith-
mic software packages in check. We will pick up these questions again in 
Chapter 9.
Conclusion
As we have shown throughout this chapter, making humans and machines 
work together is not easy. Automation, while often presented as a driving 
force for innovation and efficiency, can backfire when it conceals complexity 
and puts human arguments at a disadvantage vis- à- vis the authority of tech-
nological tools. HCI literature helps us to understand these challenges and to 
conceptualize the ways in which humans and machines enter into complex 
relationships of workload distribution. The position of the human is in these 
constellations often characterized by a struggle to remain in control. Human 
operators are – especially in critical domains such as security – supposed to 
stay in the loop and be able to challenge technologically produced recom-
mendations and contrast them with human forms of sensemaking. In order 
to do so, police departments seek to contextualize the outputs from predic-
tive policing software within wider trajectories of police work and an overall 
situational picture. Some of them even attempt to strengthen human reason-
ing through numbers (i.e., discussing alerts with colleagues) and bureaucratic 
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tools that are supposed to assist human operators in formalizing their doubts 
and concerns.
Taken together, these strategies reveal a good deal about organizational chal-
lenges with regard to sociotechnical security tools. Understanding algorithmic 
crime analysis through the lens of human- computer interaction draws attention 
to the ways in which knowledge and interaction between human operators and 
predictive policing software is structured. Our analysis has foregrounded how 
power relations enter crime analysis and create concerns about a diminished 
role and possible helplessness of the human vis- à- vis the machine. The police 
departments we studied were thus bent on curbing the agency of crime predic-
tion software and to constrain its power through different protocols that pre-
scribe the precise ways in which human- computer interaction was supposed to 
be executed (manually, with maximum levels of oversight, using bureaucratic 
aids, considering contextual factors).
The emergence of such rigid layers of control can, to a certain extent, be 
attributed to public and organizational unease with regard to algorithmic 
analysis tools, not least, sparked by dystopian media representations of pre-
dictive policing (e.g., referencing fictional works such as Minority Report). It 
also speaks to the relative helplessness that humans experience when operat-
ing complex and possibly black- boxed algorithmic security tools. Place- based 
predictive policing methods must thereby be understood as a rather low- level 
case of algorithmic crime analysis, where the supporting theoretical model is 
based on criminological theory and the algorithm itself is not self- learning but 
deterministic. However, the disadvantages in terms of cognition and processing 
power that humans face even vis- à- vis such a comparably simple algorithmic 
tool stand emblematically for the challenges that automation and black- boxing 
in knowledge production and decision- making bring about.
There is an apparent drive toward further automation in predictive policing, 
and this drive includes additional tasks (e.g., data production, data transfer, 
data consolidation) as much as it includes more complex models and algo-
rithms, new types of crime, and new operational measures (I78; I79). Ques-
tions of how to safeguard these processes and how to properly configure the 
relationship between humans and machines will in this sense persist, and the 
role of the operator will be even more important when future systems increase 
complexity and decrease transparency. We will deal with questions of how 
future versions of predictive policing might aggravate already existing troubles 
in Chapter 10.
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If predictive policing is supposed to prevent crime, risk must move out of the 
back office where it was brought into being and into the streets where it can 
guide the actions of patrol officers. In this chapter, we analyze how crime risk 
is visualized and disseminated within police departments and how the memos 
and maps that are generated for this purpose are modulated so that they can 
speak to the requirements of local staff and shift planning as well as to the 
informational needs of patrol officers. As we discussed earlier, police organiza-
tions are complex constructs that consist of various specialized units. Patrols 
are usually organized and carried out by local police stations that are granted a 
considerable degree of discretion in their decisions about where to send their 
patrol forces (Santos and Taylor, 2014). Likewise, patrol officers themselves 
traditionally decide how to best carry out their tasks in the field (Brown, 1981; 
Ericson, 1982; Worden and McLean, 2014). Predictive policing contradicts this 
structure, as it identifies presumably risky areas that need to be given particular 
attention in order for analytical insights to have potential effects and is therefore 
likely to interfere with local practices.
This renders knowledge dissemination and communication processes, while 
generally considered an important part of crime analysis (Cope, 2004; Cordner 
and Biebel, 2005), particularly pertinent for predictive policing. This impor-
tance is not only due to the spatial distance between centralized crime analysis 
units and local police stations, but it is additionally aggravated by the different 
“lifeworlds” of analysts, managers, and patrol forces. Crime analysts, as we have 
seen, must not necessarily be police officers who are on a traditional police 
career track (i.e., starting on the street level and then eventually moving up and, 
in doing so, passing through several subfields of police work) but can have an 
academic background and/or be civilian employees. Moreover, crime analysts 
tend to work in a secluded back office environment with little direct interac-
tion with other divisions, and their work with data and computers is perceived 
to be quite far removed from “real police work” – that is, fighting crime and 
catching criminals.
From a practical perspective, analysts must disseminate insights in ways that 
are intelligible and tangible for different audiences within the police (Chan 
Chapter 6
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et al., 2001: 116; Santos, 2013: 59). Proper communication, in other words, 
must create connections between different police units and align them behind 
the rationales of predictive policing so that risk estimates can effectively find 
their way into the streets. In predictive policing, this translation work is to a 
large extent done through visual representations that draw together risk and 
space in the form of maps. Maps, as we will show throughout this chapter, are 
used as a primary means to guide patrol officers with regard to presumably risky 
spaces and must therefore be considered as central for the translation of knowl-
edge and power from crime analysis to operational crime prevention. “Good” 
visual representation, from a practical perspective, guides street- level patrols in 
intuitive ways and compels them to implement recommendations from crime 
analysis into their work, whereas “bad” representation could possibly under-
mine the effects of predictive policing, as it might not be able to “convince” 
patrol officers of the existence of crime risk and the need to act upon it (Taylor 
et al., 2007; Cope, 2008).
In the following, we trace how operators craft visual representations from 
their analyses with predictive policing software and follow these representations 
as they make their way through different parts of police departments before 
they eventually end up informing the work of patrol officers. We will pay 
special attention to how memos and maps are designed in order to render ana-
lytical insights intelligible and actionable across professional boundaries within 
different units. We show how visual representation makes predictive policing 
actionable, while at the same time establishing credibility for the existence of 
crime risk in the first place. Building on literature that engages practices of rep-
resentation (Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1990; Burri and Dumit, 2008; 
Latour, 2014), we retrace how through a cascade of translations, the credibility 
conveyed by crime maps becomes stabilized and is made relatable to different 
police actors and their professional requirements and rationales.
The power of maps
An image says more than a thousand words, as the proverb tells us. And a 
crime map says more than a thousand data points we could add with regard 
to predictive policing. Crime maps direct attention to specific geographical 
spaces, and additional graphical elements on these maps highlight how certain 
neighborhoods or streets might be especially dangerous or vulnerable. Visuali-
zation makes crime tangible, and putting it into the coordinates of a map makes 
it relatable within space. As one interviewee framed it: “a red area inside the 
blue circle, those are clearly the hottest spots” (I02) – and, by extension, this is 
where more crime is clearly bound to happen unless prevented (I03; I19; I20). 
Even a lay person can easily decipher that message. No expert knowledge or 
additional contextual information is needed to understand a crime map. And 
there are countless ways of designing crime maps. Figure 6.1 shows four dif-
ferent examples of crime maps produced from predictive policing software. 
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Even though they use different visual indicators, it appears immediately clear 
where there is crime risk and where corresponding countermeasures need to 
be taken.
Crime maps are in fact powerful tools, and they have attracted much schol-
arly attention. Criminologists have explored the role of crime maps in policing 
from various angles. Historical perspectives have highlighted both change and 
consistency in crime mapping over time (Chamard, 2006; Kindynis, 2014). 
Practice- oriented approaches have foregrounded strategies for turning crime 
data most effectively into compelling and intuitively understandable visuals, 
particularly in conjunction with the ongoing digitization and the rise of GIS 
tagging (Weisburd and McEwen, 1998; Harries, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2000; Chainey 
and Ratcliffe, 2005; Eck et al., 2005; Santos, 2013; Bowers and Johnson, 2014). 
Others have engaged the cognitive effects of crime maps both on police officers 
and citizens (Rengert and Pelfrey, 1998; Paulsen, 2004; Zurawski and Czer-
winski, 2008). Not least, scholars have pointed to the considerable political 
power that comes with the visual, as it could be used to deliberately instill 
suspicion or spark fear of crime and to legitimize surveillance and other crime 
control measures (Manning, 2008; Wallace, 2009; Jefferson, 2018).
Figure 6.1 Different risk maps
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Against the backdrop of such power, critical criminologists have called for 
closer investigation of the construction of crime maps and their visual features. 
Importantly, scholars have argued strongly that crime, understood as a dynamic 
and socially embedded phenomenon, by definition, can never be fully repre-
sented through maps (Kindynis, 2014; Belina and Germes, 2016). Crime maps, 
as Kindynis (2014: 230) argues, “inevitably fail to capture the spatial dynamics 
of crime, as they reduce complex phenomena to dots or shadings on a two- 
dimensional surface”. Maps should thus be considered as abstractions that fore-
ground certain phenomena (while leaving others out) and notably as a means 
of suggesting a causal connection between the depicted space and criminal 
phenomena (Belina, 2016: 93).
Moreover, as crime maps usually rely almost exclusively on data produced 
by the police, they inevitably draw a picture of crime and space that represents 
police knowledge – which does not necessarily correspond with the actually 
existing amount of criminal activity and its spatial distribution (Kindynis, 2014: 
229). Finally, due to their persuasive character, crime maps can easily entrench 
or aggravate stereotypes about neighborhoods and their inhabitants and thereby 
reinforce problematic practices such as racial profiling (Jefferson, 2018). As 
Farrell (2009: 78) argues, maps mobilize the “persuasive aesthetic of author-
ity” that “provide[s] an assuring sense of precision and order”. Crime maps 
thus might easily be mistaken as “proof” that crime exists within the depicted 
coordinates (Wallace, 2009: 19).
These problematizations correspond closely with works from critical cartog-
raphy. Critical cartographers have pointed out how maps must not be mistaken 
for true representations of the world as it is and have highlighted their contin-
gent and relational nature as well as their capacities for affecting our ideas about 
the spatial constitution of the world and the ways in which we think and act 
within it (Harley, 1989; Crampton and Krygier, 2005; Crampton, 2010). If we 
start from the assumption of the social constructedness of maps, the analytical 
task will then be to deconstruct their seemingly smooth surface and reveal the 
power relations and strategic rationales that underpin their composition (Mon-
monier, 1991; Wood, 1992; Crampton, 2001).
Questions of maps and power also tie in closely with STS literature that 
engages the role of the visual in the representation and consolidation of scien-
tific findings (Lynch and Woolgar, 1990; Coopmans et al., 2014). STS research 
is particularly helpful for an analysis of crime maps in predictive policing, as it 
explicitly draws attention to the translation functions of visual artifacts. Starting 
from the assumption that representation should not be understood as a fixed 
or preset process but rather as the socially and culturally mediated construction 
of “visually flexible phenomena whose boundaries, extension and identifying 
details are themselves at stake” (Amann and Knorr Cetina, 1988: 135), STS 
research draws attention to the epistemic characteristics of what becomes visual-
ized. Risk, as we discussed earlier, is a contingent phenomenon, and its existence 
and form crucially depend on the data, models, and calculative operations 
120 Putting risk on the map
that are mobilized to bring it into being. Crime risk, in other words, is not 
self- evident, and crime maps must not merely communicate its location within 
space but at the same time persuade the beholder of its existence in the first 
place.
The question of how representations are crafted in order to such establish 
credibility has perhaps been most explicitly discussed by Latour, who argues 
that in order to be successful, they need to be “mobile but also immutable, 
presentable, readable and combinable with one another” (Latour, 1990: 26). In 
other words, crime maps need to be shareable and easily intelligible and should 
have the capacity to “draw together” (Latour, 1987) different audiences and 
discourses. For Latour, the creation of representation as a relay for the produc-
tion and transformation of knowledge and power then needs to speak to the 
principles of resemblance, symbolic reference, abstraction, and exemplification. 
Together, they facilitate the production of particular “inscriptions” (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1986: 45ff) in the forms of tables, graphs, images, diagrams, photo-
graphs, or maps. These inscriptions should not be mistaken for a replication of 
“objective” natural order or scientific findings but are the end result of choices, 
negotiations, and controversy.
For Latour, the crucial point is that the more instances of representation a 
thing or a phenomenon is subjected to, the more credible truth claims about 
the accuracy and reliability of the representation become. With each additional 
layer of inscription, he argues, representation moves further away from the 
thing or finding that it is representing and thereby conceals the “interpretive 
flexibility” (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) of the original object or data, thus mak-
ing it harder to contest the “evidence” suggested by the representation (Latour, 
2014). A crime map, after having passed through several professional and local 
layers of police work, in this sense becomes validated and actionable, and the 
contingency of crime risk itself becomes obscured.
For Latour (1990: 40), analyses should thus not question “inscription per 
se, but the cascade of ever simplified inscriptions that allow harder facts to be 
produced”. His only seemingly ironic statement “the more manipulations, the 
better” (Latour, 2014) has a double significance. On the one hand, homing in 
on processes of transformation opens up the analytic possibility of foreground-
ing the differences between each iteration of representation, thereby provid-
ing us with a perspective on the workings of representation as a mechanism 
of hardening facts. And on the other hand, it draws attention to the fact that 
a longer chain of representation makes “success” (i.e., establishing credibility) 
more likely for the actors who craft these representations.
In predictive policing, such success implies that risk estimates successfully 
travel through different layers of police work. Insights from algorithmic crime 
analysis need to become intelligible and relatable for bureaucratic planners as 
much as for local supervisors and patrol units. Maybe most importantly, they 
need to convince patrol officers to enact crime prevention measures within 
designated risk areas. As we will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, for 
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different reasons, the movement of patrols is hard to track or monitor, which 
makes it necessary to get patrol officers “on board” if predictive policing is to 
successfully cover allegedly risky space. Risk representations thus need to speak 
to different actor rationalities within the police and must succeed in aligning 
these actors in order to intervene in unfolding criminal events.
Against this backdrop, Burri and Dumit (2008: 299) suggest that we should 
pay analytical attention to “the trajectories of scientific images from their pro-
duction and reading through their diffusion, deployment, and adoption in 
different social worlds to their incorporation into the lives and identities of 
individuals, groups, and institutions”. They argue that analyses of representa-
tion should not stop short of investigating the meaning that representations 
unfold when they are perceived and acted upon by different audiences. They 
thus propose to study representation practices through the distinct sites of “pro-
duction”, “engagement”, and “deployment” (Burri and Dumit, 2008: 300). 
Taken together, Burri and Dumit argue, these sites provide a perspective on 
the full life cycle of representations, while at the same time accounting for spe-
cific functions and requirements that representations need to fulfill during each 
stage of their life cycle. In particular, they draw attention to the links between 
the sites of production, engagement, and deployment, where representations 
undergo transformations as “the result of a series of hand- offs among individu-
als” (Burri and Dumit, 2008: 301).
Taken together, Latour’s emphasis on cascades of translation and Burri and 
Dumit’s notion of the institutional embeddedness of representations provide 
two key pointers for our analysis of risk maps in predictive policing. We will 
highlight how, on their journey from crime analysis units to streel- level patrol-
ling, risk representations undergo a series of modulations that stabilize the 
credibility of the statement that crime is bound to happen at a specific point 
in time in a specific neighborhood. At the same time, we will pay attention to 
how each version of a representation speaks to distinct organizational needs at 
the respective stage of police work.
The chain of communication
We will take the institutional embeddedness of predictive policing as a start-
ing point here. The organizational complexity and functional differentiation 
within police organizations foreground the importance of communication 
practices. This is particularly pertinent for the “scientific” part of police work, 
which is often spatially and topically separated from the operational parts. In 
our research, we found that crime analysis with predictive policing software 
was either a task of specialized crime analysis units (D252; D282; D284) or 
directly subordinated to the command branch (D153). In one case, predictive 
policing was housed in a specialized department that ran crime analyses for a 
number of smaller local police departments, using pooled data from a central-
ized database (D372).
122 Putting risk on the map
Moreover, due to the fact that police competencies in Germany and Swit-
zerland are mostly aligned with the territorial organization of the federal state, 
most of the departments we studied covered not one city or municipality but 
a rather large territory (usually the entire Bundesland or Kanton). Analytical 
insights from predictive policing thus needed to be communicated from the 
center to the periphery (i.e., the local police stations that would be responsible 
for the implementation of prevention measures based on the analysis).
Generally, the dissemination of crime risk would be done in a rather straight-
forward fashion. The software operator would create a memo from the analysis 
and then send this memo to the central planning and operations unit via email. 
From there, the memo would be further distributed to local police stations, 
where supervisors would pass the information on risk areas on to patrol forces 
(I04; I09; I18; I19; I24; I25; I26; I79; D142). Some of our interviewees illus-
trated this chain of communication within their respective departments and 
with regard to regional and local specificities:
[At the station], we have a briefing every morning where we discuss the 
current situation. The supervisor, the group leaders, and so on. And if we 
have information on risk areas, we discuss that information. . . . Everybody 
gets the email from the headquarters, and we forward it to the group lead-
ers. And they forward it to their staff and tell them: “Here, we have a new 
PRECOBS alert, please have a look at it.” So it basically goes from central 
planning to the group leaders, and from there to the patrol forces.
(I06)
Our chief has a look at incoming risk alerts and evaluates them. And then 
he forwards the information to the relevant local stations, where it will be 
dealt with by the staff division. So he will be like: “Here’s what we have, 
including the visualization. My evaluation is this or that.” And then he can 
either recommend operational measures, or he can tell them to act at their 
own discretion. In that case it’s up to the local supervisors.
(I17)
The operator sends out a pdf document from the analysis as an email 
attachment. So in [city] all of our stations receive that email every morn-
ing. And the email details how many new burglaries have been reported 
since the day before, and where they took place. Then it says how many of 
them were considered trigger incidents, and specifies any new alerts. Then 
it lists the new alerts and gives details on their status, so our stations can 
get a good overview of what is currently going on. And for each alert the 
email determines which station is responsible for implementation.
(I44)
These statements vividly illustrate the various stages that risk estimates have 
to pass through before they end up in the hands of those whose task it is to 
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carry out preventive patrols or other operational measures. They also hint 
at the variance in organizational structure and corresponding ways of com-
munication between the different departments. What unites all of them, 
however, is the fact that communication is directly targeted at those local 
stations and individuals who will be affected by identified risk areas. While 
such custom- tailored communication procedures are the standard form of 
dissemination in predictive policing, some police departments also com-
plemented them with forms of untargeted, more generalized forms of dis-
semination. This would first and foremost be done by uploading predictive 
policing memos to the internal police intranet, where they could in prin-
ciple be accessed by every member of staff (I19; I22; I29; I42; I43; I45). In 
this way, as one interviewee framed it, patrol officers could “just have a look 
and see if there’s anything you should take into account” (I22) before or even 
during their shift.
While such availability of information was, in general, considered a viable 
strategy to supplement the awareness of predictive policing and risk areas, the 
patrol officers among our interlocutors admitted that in their everyday work 
practices they paid little or no attention to any additional information that 
they would need to actively seek on the intranet (I23; I25). And even in those 
cases where patrol officers were put on a mailing list and automatically received 
predictive policing memos via email, information about risk areas tended to 
be overlooked among the many other bits of work- related information that 
police officers receive on a daily basis. As one respondent told us: “I mean the 
thing with emails is that everyone wants to disseminate their stuff, and in the 
end, you get so many emails that [the predictive policing memo] easily gets 
overlooked” (I25).
Police departments would therefore make sure that risk estimates were 
curated throughout their dissemination, particularly with regard to the final 
step from local supervisors to patrol officers. Such curation would mostly take 
place during the briefings that patrol forces attend before they start their shift. 
During these briefings, risk areas within their patrol territory would be actively 
communicated by supervisors and patrol forces would receive custom- tailored 
crime map handouts (I21; I22; I23; I24; I25; I29; P49). As one patrol officer 
put it, “the supervisors are the ones who are responsible for ensuring that our 
analytical products really get traction on the street” (I21).
Apart from supervisors at local police stations, central planning and opera-
tions units also take on a key role in the chain of communication. As the 
decision on whether and how to implement alerts in practice usually lies with 
planning and operations units, they are the ones who determine how crime 
analysis is translated into concrete patrolling practices and/or other operational 
prevention measures (I20; I21; I78; P75). As one senior officer described this 
pivotal role:
Planning and operations decide how an alert will be implemented. They 
take stock of available staff and decide when and where to deploy them. 
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And this decision is then forwarded to the local supervisors, and they are 
the ones who are responsible for the implementation.
(I78)
The role of operators within the dissemination of crime risk is limited. 
Although they are the ones who create maps and predictive policing memos 
in the first place, they have little actual control over their analytical products 
once they attach them to an email and hit the “send” button. What is left for 
them is to use informal communication channels to additionally point out the 
existence of risk estimates to their colleagues, particularly in those cases where 
alert memos are passively available on the intranet. As one analyst put it:
I can only be the guilty conscience, the guy who tells people: “Look, 
there’s something for you. Check it out!” Quite often I call, or send an 
email. And sometimes they tell me that they had seen the alert already. 
But at other times they are surprised because they had not yet realized that 
there was a new one. I think generally what we need is better “internal 
PR.” The way this should be done is that our colleagues should regularly 
check and be aware of risk areas without someone calling them.
(I42)
Apart from such informal awareness practices where analysts still try to actively 
intervene in the fate of crime risk, we could also observe a change of profes-
sional context in predictive policing during the dissemination phase. As crime 
risk starts to travel out of the analyst’s office, its destiny will be decided by 
people whose primary concern is not necessarily crime prevention. Rather, 
it becomes part of wider considerations for everyday police work. It enters a 
struggle for operational prioritization and allocation of resources, and its oppo-
nents are powerful ones: traffic accidents, other crimes, calls for service, major 
events – and the general availability and capacities of a sufficient number of 
patrol forces. This shift of context illustrates one of the potential fault lines in 
predictive policing: When insights from crime analysis are not disseminated in a 
convincing fashion, they might not get any traction beyond the analyst’s desk – 
and the potential effects of foresight and prevention might prove ineffective.
In the words of Latour, if inscriptions do not travel well, translation processes 
might come to a halt, and the production of power that makes people do things 
will stop. Crime maps and predictive policing memos must thus be carefully 
crafted in order to enroll such different actors as regional chiefs, local super-
visors, staff planners, and not least, patrol officers in a joint cause. As Santos 
(2013: 13) summarizes this task, “to be successful, an analyst must be able to 
explain complex ideas clearly to many different types of individuals (e.g., police 
officers, managers, city officials, citizens) in a way that is not condescending”. 
A condescending tone might not even be the biggest issue here – rather, as we 
will show throughout the rest of this chapter, crime risk must be visualized and 
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communicated in ways that make it tangible, intelligible, and actionable for 
different audiences.
The creation of a suitable representation of crime risk is thus considered 
crucial in predictive policing. Once crime risk leaves the analyst’s desk, it must 
basically be able to speak for itself. In order to successfully gain traction within 
operations and planning units as well as local police stations, and eventually 
serve as an intuitive guidance tool for patrol activities, it must convincingly 
relate to the organizational and practical requirements of various professional 
environments and their rationales. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, 
we will follow the journey of risk representation from the analyst’s desk to 
the street level. We pay special attention to how representations are crafted 
and modulated with specific audiences in mind and how these audiences per-
ceive and act upon the visually represented information. At the same time, we 
examine how each additional layer of transformation of crime risk must also 
be understood as a further instance of concealing the interpretive flexibility of 
the original calculations, thus “hardening” the credibility of the connection 
between space and future crime that is being represented.
Crafting a risk memo
In predictive policing software, the creation of a map is usually the default 
and most important way of depicting crime risk. Crime mapping has a long 
history in police work, and predictive policing software ties into this tradition 
by taking up established practices of depicting the spatial distribution of crime 
and enhancing its visualization with the capacities of digital technologies. One 
senior officer remembered how the implementation of digital technologies 
continued but at the same time transformed established practices of making 
criminal activity throughout the city visible and thereby identifying patterns 
and/or clusters of crime:
Back in 1998 we got these new computer screens that could do graph-
ics, Microsoft applications that gave us the possibility to look into new 
stuff,  .  .  . to visualize in a meaningful way.  .  .  . In our situation center 
during these days we still had a map of the city on the wall, city and sur-
roundings, and our colleagues . . . came up there at 04:00 in the morning 
to put pins in that map.
(I02)
Needless to say, pins are no longer being put in maps. Patterns are identified by 
predictive policing software directly in the data, and the possibilities that digi-
tal technologies provide to visually represent these patterns are unprecedented 
(Coopmans et al., 2014; Carusi et al., 2015). The map on the wall has now 
been replaced by a digital map that can be scaled, amended, and enhanced in 
almost any conceivable way. There are many different ways in which crime 
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risk can be visually represented. Some of them might be more intuitive than 
others, some of them might convey more contextual information than others, 
and some might be more colorful or aesthetic than others. Figure 6.1 already 
provided some examples of how risk can be put on a map. None of these are 
given or set in stone. They all use different techniques in order to highlight 
specific aspects of the presumed connection between risk and space, and they 
all shape the perception of crime within the world in a particular way. In the 
following paragraphs, we retrace how a crime risk memo is crafted by operators 
using PRECOBS.
Figure 6.2 shows the PRECOBS software interface as presented to the oper-
ator. As becomes apparent from the breakdown of the screen, PRECOBS is 
already in the analytical phase strongly geared toward the visual representation 
of crime risk in the form of a map. In order to depict both actual crime and 
estimated risk areas, it uses street- level map material amended by several graph-
ical layers. The burglary that triggered the currently selected alert is represented 
by the dot at the center of the map section. Around this dot, crime risk is 
visualized by two distinct graphical elements. First of all, the close vicinity 
around the trigger burglary is demarcated by a line. This is where – according 
to calculations based on the near- repeat victimization model – the highest like-
lihood of follow- up incidents is expected. Moreover, color- coded tiles provide 
additional information on the general vulnerability of the wider space around 
the risk area. The tiles, each covering areas of 250 × 250 meters, are derived 
Figure 6.2 PRECOBS operator interface
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from historic burglary distributions within the neighborhood. Red indicates 
the highest burglary activity in the past, whereas green indicates the lowest fre-
quency of past incidents. The tiles are supposed to provide additional assistance 
for the route planning and attentiveness of patrol forces (I01; I02; I19; D001).
Operators have several options if they want to adjust the visual representa-
tion of crime and crime risk on the map. First of all, the baseline layer of the 
map itself can be changed to a satellite view of the area or other map types. 
This might make sense in order to get a better feeling for the topography of the 
area, including natural barriers such as walls, hedges, or creeks. Understanding 
the topography of an area is in fact helpful for the operator in order to deter-
mine the specific local characteristics of risk spaces. By default, PRECOBS 
indicates an “operational circle” of 400 meters around the trigger burglary 
where, based on the near- repeat prediction pattern, the highest likelihood for 
follow- up incidents is expected (see Figure 6.3). This model- based “logical” 
circle, however, seldom corresponds with the actual topographical character-
istics of the area and thus needs to be adjusted. The operator has the option 
to manually draw a more intuitive risk area around the trigger – for instance, 
using larger streets (see Figure 6.2) or train tracks as natural demarcations of 
a small- scale neighborhood within which the offender is expected to operate 
(for a more detailed view, see also Figure 6.1). The eventual design of the map 
Figure 6.3 Two PRECOBS memos
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largely depends on the preferences of the operator. As one analyst described 
this process:
I choose the map section that I want to show. I can zoom in a bit more if 
I decide that I do not want them to look at this other stuff, the motorway 
for example. . . . It’s up to me how the map looks in the end, and then 
I create the memo.
(I03)
As this quote illustrates, it is the operator who has a fundamental role in guid-
ing vision and directing attention via the creation of crime maps. However, the 
specific characteristics of the maps that the operator produces with PRECOBS 
must not only speak to the preferences of the analyst but also already corre-
spond with the requirements of later stages of police work. The color- coded 
tiles are a pertinent example of this. During our research, we found that some 
police departments would use them in order to further facilitate the intuitive 
intelligibility of crime maps and the depicted connection between space and 
risk. Others, though, concluded that the tiles affected the behavior of patrol 
forces too strongly. They told us that patrol officers would almost exclusively 
pay attention to the red areas and neglect the yellow and green ones (I44; 
I45; I80). Thus, when crafting the initial risk representation, ensuing stages of 
police work and their operational requirements must always already be present 
at the analyst’s desk, and they affect the choices that bring into being a specific 
form of visual representation.
In line with such considerations, operators and senior officers told us repeat-
edly that visual representation of analytical insights was considered one of the 
most important tasks in predictive policing, as crime maps would preconfigure 
to a large extent how crime risk information would be understood by their col-
leagues (I12; I19; I76; I77; I79; I80). This puts a rather large degree of respon-
sibility on the operator, particularly given that “bad” visuals would, apart from 
potentially disrupting the predictive policing process, also cause mockery. One 
operator gave an example of how the visualization choices for maps impact the 
ways in which patrol officers see the connection of risk and space:
Visualization is really the key. It needs to be sophisticated and precise. . . . 
The more precise the visualization, the better the acceptance will be in my 
opinion. In [neighborhood] we had an example where the river and the 
sluice gate were part of the map, and our guys were like: “Great, now we 
have to police fish.”
(I17)
Quite obviously, no patrol officer would seriously consider patrolling under 
water. And yet, this anecdote about misguided visual representation illus-
trates how important maps are for patrol work. The construction of risk maps 
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translates epistemic practices of algorithmic data analysis into intelligible and 
immediately actionable instructions for police work in the form of street- level 
patrols. Regardless of the exact type of graphics used, visual representation 
allows the police to make the future, while not yet here, tangible and relatable. 
Criminal futures, once depicted, must no longer unfold in reality before they 
come into being in the imagination of the beholder. At the same time, they 
render the need for crime prevention measures rather obvious and intuitive.
In a next step, operators would then go on to craft a risk memo based on 
the results of the analysis with PRECOBS. This memo would usually consist 
of a single- page summary document that would be converted into a shareable 
pdf document and then distributed via email. Figure 6.3 shows two distinct 
versions of a PRECOBS memo as used by two different police departments. 
The general layout, based on the standard template provided by the software, is 
very similar. Both memos are dominated by the map and specific visual repre-
sentations of risk (on the left: an operational circle and a manually drawn target 
neighborhood superimposed on the topography of the estimated risk area; on 
the right: an operational circle and color- coded tiles). 
The crime map is in the context of the memo supported by a number of 
contextual details. In the top section (above the map), it specifies the alert 
number and the risk area as well as the validity period of the alert. The bottom 
half of the memo then lists further details about the alert itself as well as avail-
able information about the trigger burglary that it refers to. It therefore usually 
links the memo to file numbers, database references, and other internal remarks 
(I79). Moreover, the memo provides information on the street address of the 
trigger incident, the time (or presumed time period) of the crime, the modus 
operandi, and the haul – which are essentially the data points based on which 
the risk estimate was calculated in the first place.
Maybe most importantly, predictive policing memos would usually outline 
recommended forms of intervention and specific operational hours based on 
the characteristics of the trigger incident and a broader assessment of the situ-
ation (I03). For example, a report could recommend that patrols in uniform 
should be favored over plainclothes patrols, that vehicles should be checked 
within the demarcated risk rea, or that patrols should be intensified during 
a particular time of day. These contextual details are key, as they instruct the 
planning and operations units to assess which resources would be necessary to 
put the recommended measures into action, to accommodate those activities 
vis- à- vis other tasks, and to adjust shift scheduling or vehicle management. 
Other additional information that could be added to the memo would, for 
example, be knowledge on already registered follow- up incidents of the pre-
supposed burglary series or on other reported crimes outside the identified risk 
area. One analyst described the composition of a memo as follows:
It’s more or less the output from the system. . . . In addition, we provide 
some tips, like for example: “This is a sera [i.e. dusk] alert, no staff needs to 
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be scheduled for the morning shift.” Or we remind them of general things, 
for instance: during this “sera” alert, no action is required on Sundays. 
We don’t get any burglaries on Sundays, because people are at home on 
Sunday evening.
(I78)
There was a good deal of variation between different police departments in 
the amount and depth of contextual information provided. As Figure 6.3 illus-
trates, the memo on the left contains no additional information on recom-
mended operational measures and times, nor does it provide additional hints 
or tips. The memo on the right, on the other hand, includes a list of detailed 
recommendations, including the use of uniformed and plainclothes patrols at 
specific times. Decisions about whether and what kind of operational advice to 
provide as part of the memo might be due to the specific organizational struc-
tures of the department and the competencies and responsibilities as distributed 
between different divisions.
We have seen that there is a considerable degree of freedom and creativity in 
the ways in which crime risk becomes visualized and communicated in predic-
tive policing. The eventual shape and informational content of both map and 
memo must speak not only to the question of how to make algorithmically pro-
duced crime risk tangible and actionable in the first place but also to the ques-
tion of how to “best” visualize crime risk for different audiences at later stages of 
the predictive policing process. Notably, by means of the creation of an inscrip-
tion in the form of a memo, crime risk has been enabled to travel across different 
contexts and cross police- internal boundaries between specialized units.
At this point, crime risk is no longer an issue of data, algorithms, and the 
collaboration of humans and machines. Epistemic questions concerning data 
quality and the plausibility of risk alerts within larger narratives of crime have 
been settled. Rather, crime risk now turns into a managerial task. Planning 
and operations units need to decide whether and how to implement risk alerts 
based on the general availability of resources and the particular requirements 
of a specific alert. Predictive policing, in other words, has now turned into a 
question of resource management, and knowledge dissemination has to take 
the informational needs of the more bureaucratic and managerial side of police 
work into account (I17; I45). As one respondent framed this shift of context 
and their task within predictive policing:
What we do is essentially patrol management, and this relates to predictive 
policing as we receive the reports from the analysts, and we have to turn 
them into concrete patrols.
(I20)
The design of the risk memo must, as argued earlier, in this sense be understood 
against the backdrop of the organizational structure of police organizations. As 
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Burri and Dumit (2008: 300) put it, “visual representations cannot be under-
stood in isolation from the pragmatic situations in which they are used”. In 
this case, the representation of risk now speaks to the practical requirements 
of coordinating patrols and other police activities rather than to the logic of 
reviewing alerts issued by software algorithms.
Equally importantly, however, the turn away from questions of knowledge 
production and toward suitable ways of visualization and dissemination at the 
same time hardens the “truth claim” of crime risk. Through its inscription in 
the form of a map and its incorporation within the predictive policing memo, 
crime risk is translated from a possibility into a quasi fact. The visual repre-
sentation, precisely because it is intuitively intelligible, brings the connection 
between the depicted space, crime, and more future crime into being. An 
image might indeed say more than a thousand words, but it also says a lot less 
by leaving out explanations in favor of the self- evidence of the visual. Notably, 
it says nothing about the quality and reliability of the underlying data, it says 
nothing about the model, the algorithm, and the criminological theories that 
risk estimates are predicated upon, and it says nothing about the confidence of 
the operator in the likelihood of follow- up crime.
The power of visualization lies, of course, precisely in the capacity to break 
down complexity and to make information easily accessible. At the same 
time, however, it conceals possible doubt and makes the existence of crime 
risk less contestable. Crime maps have been both praised and criticized for 
their persuasiveness – what they most certainly do is to reduce interpretive 
flexibility. As Latour (1990: 42) reminds us, “although in principle any inter-
pretation can be opposed to any text and image, in practice this is far from 
being the case”. In this case, the transformation of data, theories, and algo-
rithms into a one- page document that is dominated by a crime map makes it 
hard to argue for a future without crime in the indicated area. The credibility 
claim conveyed by risk representation is furthermore backed up by specific 
recommendations on how to act upon the future in order to prevent it from 
becoming a criminal one.
Guiding street patrols
Crime risk has now entered the managerial realm of operations and plan-
ning, and it has traveled from mostly centralized crime analysis units to local 
police stations. It has already undergone considerable transformation along this 
journey. It must, however, still travel across another professional boundary. As 
outlined earlier, alerts must be communicated to patrol officers in order to get 
to the street level. One might expect that for this purpose police departments 
would simply further distribute the memo, but we found that most depart-
ments chose to further modify them. Modification here primarily means strip-
ping the memo of most contextual information, expanding the risk map, and 
only supplementing it with basic details on the validity period of the alert, the 
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characteristics of the trigger incident, and the preferred mode of prevention 
measures. One interviewee described this process as follows:
We adjust [the memo] a bit more. Based on our prognosis, we create 
another map with an indication of how our forces are supposed to operate: 
either static controls, officers in the neighborhood, plain- clothes or in uni-
form, or whatever is relevant. That defines the operational measures. The 
area itself . . . they receive the period of the alert and the map, and that’s it. 
That’s the access that the operational forces have.
(I79)
Figure  6.4 shows an example of the predictive policing handout that street 
patrol officers would be presented with by most of the police departments we 
studied. As can be seen, the handout comes more or less exclusively in the form 
of a risk map. In Figure 6.4, the map includes landscape features such as parks 
and woodlands that facilitate an intuitive understanding of the neighborhood’s 
topography. The operational radius around the trigger burglary has been kept 
here, but since the circle would cut across larger streets and a park, it has been 
supplemented with a manual demarcation of a more practical risk area where 
follow- up burglaries could presumably be expected. Patrol officers would thus, 
in their predictive policing–related work practices, almost exclusively refer to a 
visual representation in the form of a map with risk indicators.
Figure 6.4 PRECOBS patrol handout
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Once more, the simplicity of the risk map closely speaks to organizational 
requirements of police work. We found that intuitive intelligibility and immedi-
ate actionability were seen as the main goals of risk representation at this stage. 
One interviewee described the rationale of the design of the predictive policing 
handout for street patrol officers in their respective departments as follows:
It needs to be intuitive. [Patrol officers] need to feel comfortable. . . . It 
needs to be quickly accessible, so that they can immediately put it to prac-
tice, and it needs to function effectively and without any difficulty. It must 
be suitable for everyday operations, and therefore no frills.
(I77)
From an organizational perspective, immediate cognitive accessibility certainly 
makes a lot of sense. Patrol officers’ primary professional skills are to observe 
and interact in the streets. They need to be able to engage the population, carry 
out controls, and demonstrate that the police are actively fighting crime and 
protecting the population (Ericson, 1982). In order to successfully fulfill these 
tasks, they do not necessarily have to understand the intricate details of how 
risk areas came into being or even the characteristics of the specific trigger that 
sparked the emergence of risk in the first place. Rather, they need to receive 
the necessary information to locate presumably risky areas within their patrol 
space in a tangible and intelligible way.
From a patrol officer’s point of view, the straightforward visual clarity of the 
predictive policing handout was in fact described as a welcome element that 
facilitated their daily work routines. Patrol officers that we spoke with told us 
that they found the visual representation of crime risk as conveyed by the hand-
out helpful in several regards. It was framed as intuitive (I06) and as supportive, 
especially for younger officers who lacked experience and in- depth knowledge 
of the city (I09). Mostly, however, the handout was described as helpful in 
terms of structuring patrol routes, as it was considered easily readable and as 
providing clear anchor points that could be accommodated within their work 
practices (I18; I21; I22; I23; I24; I27; I29). As one patrol officer framed it, “if 
I can look at a graphic, . . . then I can immediately picture the area, I know 
where we are, and what’s up. . . . That really helps us, the visualization” (I06).
The information conveyed by the visual representation of the memo in this 
sense is very instructive in terms of how police patrols structure their relation-
ship with their spatial surroundings. It enables them to place indicated risk areas 
in context within the topographical characteristics of the larger neighborhood 
or district, looking for natural demarcations that will enable them to stay in – 
or at least in the near vicinity of – the indicated patrol areas (I06; I09; I17; I20; 
I26; I27; I76; I77). One respondent gave us an example of such spatializing 
practices with regard to a specific predictive policing memo:
Ok, so I have this area between [street A], and east of [street B], that’s my 
core area. And the train tracks are a border here, and [street C] here. And 
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entry points are [street D] here and [street E] here. So for me this means: 
I enter the area here, and then work my way through towards this end. 
For me, the area will not be exactly the blue circle or the colored squares. 
I would rather say: okay, maybe up until [street F], and if I drive into [street 
G], this won’t do any harm. But I have a rough area in mind where I will 
do my rounds, carry out controls, be especially attentive.
(I06)
As this quote aptly illustrates, the predictive policing handout – which is at 
this stage essentially congruent with the risk map that was created by the soft-
ware operator – almost seamlessly translates crime risk to the street levels and 
ties in with the practical requirements of patrol practices, which are already 
geared toward a heavily spatialized understanding of police work. The fur-
ther simplification of visual representation in the handout strongly resonates 
with earlier arguments about both the capacity of inscriptions to travel across 
boundaries and the hardening of credibility that is sparked by a series of trans-
formations. The predictive policing handout, from the perspective of its audi-
ence (i.e., patrol officers), unfolds powerful epistemic authority that virtually 
brings criminal futures into being and that is hard to challenge or contest. At 
the same time, its instructive character facilitates the enactment of crime pre-
vention measures throughout space.
From an epistemic perspective, interpretive flexibility has been almost com-
pletely removed at this point. The crime- map- as- handout, as the end result 
of risk representation, in the words of Latour (1990: 42), can be understood 
as “the staging of a scenography in which attention is focused on one set of 
dramatized inscriptions”. Even though from a practical perspective, it makes 
sense to gear the handout toward maximum intelligibility and actionability, 
such a reduction inevitably fosters a partial and biased way of perceiving the 
world and the alleged criminal activities happening in it. Risk representation, 
through a series of transformations, has turned the interpretive flexibility of the 
statement that “in this area there might or might not be a higher likelihood for 
certain types of crime during a specified period of time” into definite evidence 
that “there will be crime here”. It now appears intuitive that the indicated areas 
must be preferentially patrolled in order to stop criminal futures from material-
izing. Effectively, even though the materialization of crime is not a given but 
rather a literal risk, its eventual existence has been brought into being as an 
indisputable fact that guides action within the world.
Risk and the public
A related, yet slightly more complicated aspect of dissemination concerns 
communication with the public. Larger crime prevention strategies are often 
geared toward the incorporation of the general public, particularly with regard 
to property offenses such as residential burglary, pickpocketing, or robbery. 
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Residential burglary is in fact one of the most pertinent domains for the active 
involvement of citizens in crime prevention measures (Hackemack, 2014; 
Merschbacher, 2018). The police encourage citizens to better protect their 
homes by making sure that doors are locked and windows are not cracked, by 
installing reinforced locks and alarm systems, or simply by being vigilant and 
reporting allegedly suspicious persons or behavior to the police (D032; D255; 
D377; D378). While such forms of private crime prevention have been criti-
cized for shifting the responsibility for security away from the police and onto 
the population (Garland, 2001), they also take on an important role in com-
munity engagement and in improving relations between the police and citizens 
(Schreiber, 2011; Mols and Pridmore, 2019).
Traditionally, the police have sought to foster citizen incorporation in crime 
prevention through awareness campaigns on billboards, newspaper ads, flyers, 
or through specialized seminars and trainings at community centers. During 
the period of our research, all police departments that we studied were actively 
using different means of public communication for situational crime preven-
tion. Most employed traditional outlets in the form of billboards, flyers (I17; 
I26; I46; I79; P16), and the news media (I18; I78). As one of our interviewees 
detailed the scope of general prevention campaigns:
We did a lot: at events, in communities, consultations with homeowners – 
how can I protect myself? We did a lot. Also in the media, on public trans-
port. . . . We even gave away automatic timers, so that people can leave the 
light on during dusk or at night.
(I79)
While not connected to predictive policing activities per se, such general 
awareness campaigns were also supported by the practices of street patrols or 
dedicated community officers. When interacting with citizens, they would 
more or less casually point to burglary risk and provide tips on how to guard 
one’s own and others’ homes (I12; I17; I27; I80). One interviewee described 
this activity as follows:
You talk to people. You say: “Look, over there, there was a burglary.” And 
you remind people to close their windows and lock their doors when they 
are not at home. . . . Look out for their neighbors. Usually, people in the 
neighborhood know each other, and if I know that my neighbor went on 
a skiing trip over the weekend, and I notice light in his house on Saturday 
night, then I’ll know: “Ok, he’s not home. So I’ll call the police.” . . . Our 
goal is to raise awareness.
(I06)
More recently, police departments have also discovered the internet as a com-
munication channel toward the public, and they have started using social media 
136 Putting risk on the map
platforms for PR strategies (Spiller and L’Hoiry, 2019; Walsh and O’Connor, 
2019) and to render their activities more effective and efficient (de Graaf and 
Meijer, 2019). Although research suggests that PR and social media work are 
often organizationally separated from operational parts within police depart-
ments and are thus more political than issue driven (Crump, 2011), social media 
enables police departments to communicate with their target audience directly 
and disseminate information that can include such things as missing person 
reports, a search for witnesses, or traffic disruptions. Many police departments 
also offer custom apps that citizens can install on their devices to receive up- to- 
date information and even push notifications on crime alerts (I20; I46; P49). 
Figure 6.5 shows two separate screenshots taken from the official app of the 
Cantonal Police of Aargau.
The screenshot on left appeared in the “Crime Stop” category, where the 
department publishes general advice on crime prevention. Under the head-
ing “Together for more security”, the message highlights burglary activities 
and foregrounds the discomfort caused by the experience of being a burglary 
victim. It then details how citizens can actively support the police in their fight 
against residential burglary: by remaining vigilant, by looking out for neigh-
bors, and by reporting suspicious activities to the police immediately. Such 
a form of communication is in fact pretty common, particularly with regard 
Figure 6.5 Screenshots from the Cantonal Police of Aargau app
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to burglary prevention. Getting the population involved in crime prevention 
efforts is seen as key to effectively discouraging crime, and police departments 
more often than not have specific awareness- raising programs in place that are 
supposed to inform and enable residents to actively contribute to reducing 
criminal opportunities and to making things more difficult and increasing the 
perceived risk for offenders (I79; P49).
The screenshot on the right side of Figure 6.5, however, tells a slightly dif-
ferent story. Taken from the “News” category of the app, it specifically details 
an increase in burglary activity during the past 14 days within a specific area. It 
then goes on to, once more, outline how citizens can assist the police in their 
crime prevention activities. Sure enough, the message does not specify the 
precise neighborhood(s) in which increased burglary risk could be expected – 
and yet there are some similarities to the predictive policing memos and hand-
outs that are produced and disseminated internally by the police. In fact, it is 
not completely unknown for police departments to make the results of crime 
analyses available to the general public. As Santos (2013: 209) writes specifically 
with regard to the US, when they do this, police departments usually revise the 
content of the message: “When citizens are provided with information about 
patterns, they receive ‘watered- down’ or sanitized versions of the bulletins cre-
ated for police agencies.”
An example of such a sanitized version is illustrated by Figure 6.6. The image 
shows the official Facebook page of the Cantonal Police of Aargau with a post 
Figure 6.6 Screenshot from the Cantonal Police of Aargau Facebook page
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that, based on “up- to- date analyses”, informs the public about an increased 
residential burglary risk in the small town of Muri. Although not a crime map 
in the strict sense, the image that goes with the post shows a map of the town 
overlaid with a large red dot and the message: “Muri: Beware of burglars!” 
A click on the post redirects the user to Cantonal Police’s website, where more 
information on ongoing nighttime burglary activities is given, including the 
specification that likely targets include single- family homes and ground- floor 
apartments. The Cantonal Police thus urge the population to be vigilant and 
to report suspicious activity (D374).
Such practices raise the question of whether or not concrete risk estimates 
from crime prediction software should be communicated to the public. If pre-
dictive policing transforms the crime prevention measures carried out by the 
police from generic ones to targeted ones, could and/or should the incorpo-
ration of citizen support for these activities also be turned from generic into 
targeted? In theory, predictive policing provides an opportunity for awareness 
campaigns to be directed to limited subpopulations of residents within those 
areas that are, for a short time period, identified as more vulnerable to burglary 
activity than others. In simple terms, the message communicated could be 
changed from “There was increased burglary activity in town X – remember 
to keep your doors locked and your eyes open” to “Your home is located in a 
risk area where we reasonably expect further burglary activities over the com-
ing days”.
Such targeted communication could then arguably facilitate increased 
response and compliance from residents and thereby render situational crime 
prevention more effective overall. During our research, this was in fact a ques-
tion that came up rather frequently, and police departments had at the very 
least discussed whether this should be done – and if so, how it could be done 
in a reasonable fashion. However, almost all departments came to the conclu-
sion that the potential drawbacks of targeted public risk communication would 
outweigh the benefits.
A major reason for this decision was that police departments wanted to 
avoid potential fearmongering. The literature on risk communication has 
long stressed that providing information about threats can induce unease, 
even if it is done properly (Sjöberg, 1998; Renn, 2006; de Vocht et  al., 
2016). Moreover, the implementation of (situational) crime prevention 
measures themselves can, although geared toward the reduction of fear, have 
adverse effects. As Ekblom (1998: 28) argues, “where design or implementa-
tion are carried out insensitively, this could increase fear; limit the freedom 
of legitimate users (of products, environments or services), foster an attitude 
of victim- blaming; and introduce an unpleasant, fortified and beleaguered 
environment”. Such subjective insecurity must also be understood in con-
junction with general attitudes toward security, the police, and the state. 
For some, increased police presence will mean more perceived protection 
and therefore more subjectively felt security. For others, increased police 
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presence will mean that they will feel threatened by an overpowering pres-
ence of the state and an institution that they feel should not be trusted 
(Shapiro, 2019: 469).
During our research, the most widespread argument against targeted pub-
lic risk communication from predictive policing was in fact what could be 
described as a “fear of fearmongering”. Our interviewees were concerned 
about the subjective perception of threat in combination with the poten-
tial spatial branding of certain areas or neighborhoods as burglary hot spots 
(I18; I20; I26; I27; I76; I79). This is somewhat ironic, as the general idea of 
predictive policing is to move away from the analytical production of stable 
hot spots and toward a more dynamic understanding of space and crime. In 
public perception, as one respondent put it, burglary risk could, however, 
quickly turn from a temporary phenomenon into a solidified fact – and thus 
potentially put a strain on the relationship between the citizens affected and 
the police:
Just imagine you live in a neighborhood where there’s an alert every month, 
or every three weeks. You wouldn’t be thrilled. Or you’d get the feeling 
that the police need to be more active. I believe that’s quite difficult.
(I79)
However, as we will discuss in more depth in the following chapter, a feeling 
of unease can also be caused by the mere presence of police patrols in a neigh-
borhood. Significantly increased police presence would thus leave inhabitants 
wondering about the possible threats that were seen to warrant special police 
attention. Unintended side effects of predictive policing must also be put in the 
context of the political prioritization of the fight against residential burglary 
that played a key role in the procurement and implementation of algorithmic 
crime analysis software. Predictive policing, as we discuss in more detail in 
Chapters 2 and 8, was in Germany and Switzerland seen as an appropriate way 
of addressing concerns about high crime levels. Police departments were in this 
context careful not to replace concerns about burglary numbers with concerns 
about overpolicing and discrimination.
Police departments were, however, not exclusively worried about the reac-
tions of citizens. They also referred to possible negative repercussions of risk 
communication for a number of other interest groups. Some of our interlocu-
tors mentioned the real estate market and insurance companies as cases where 
publicly available knowledge about spatial distributions of crime and crime 
risk could have repercussions beyond crime prevention itself. They were afraid 
that insurance companies might use available crime risk data in their calcula-
tions of premiums, potentially rendering homeowners’ insurance policies more 
expensive for clients who reside in areas that are frequently identified as being 
at risk. Likewise, real estate owners might fear that the value of their property 
could decline if it was located in what could become publicly known as an 
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area with increased burglary risk. The following two quotes illustrate these 
concerns vividly:
The market, the real estate market, but also society . . . I mean that’s simply 
way too sensitive. If you went ahead and said: “In this street this and that is 
happening.” . . . For internal purposes, that’s necessary and it makes sense. 
But we won’t make that publicly accessible for everyone.
(I02)
Real estate agents might go ahead and analyze the data and be like: “Right, 
so how many alerts did we have here over the past three years?” . . . Or 
insurance companies.
(I45)
A different concern revolved around the distribution of crime risk across larger 
rural areas. In some early cases when police departments publicly communi-
cated risk estimates from crime prediction software, affected municipalities felt 
actively discriminated against by the publication of the alert. As they consid-
ered themselves to be in competition for taxpayers with other local municipali-
ties, they felt that knowledge about burglary activity and ensuing crime risk 
would reduce their attractiveness as a place of residence. As one interviewee 
told us: “We made alerts public and then we got pushback from the municipali-
ties. Something like: ‘Our community is safe, don’t scare off potential taxpay-
ers!’ ” (I18).
In light of these challenges, the departments that in the beginning opted to 
actively communicate risk estimates made efforts to counter potential discrimi-
natory effects by manually selecting which alerts to publish, thereby seeking 
to balance the spatial distribution of communicated alerts (I18; I78; P49). But 
even such manual curation would at times backfire, as communities would feel 
misrepresented and/or stigmatized. As one officer gave an example of this:
We might publish an alert concerning a rural area, where there are in fact 
not so many burglaries. Which then immediately triggers the local com-
munity council to say: “We have so few burglaries, why did you publish 
that?”
(I78)
Last, but not least, there were some doubts about public risk communication 
from an operational perspective. Some of our respondents expressed concerns 
that making information about predictive policing and operational risk areas 
publicly available would give criminals access to knowledge about policing 
strategies and thus enable them to “game the system” and counter situational 
crime prevention measures (I25; I46). These concerns reflect broader consid-
erations about the trade- off between transparency and trust- building in police 
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work on the one hand and the prerequisite of secrecy that underpins intel-
ligence and ensuing operational and tactical decisions on the other (I02). It is 
likely that this tension will be reinforced in the future, as police departments 
increasingly turn to data and automated forms of analysis.
In the end, while our interviewees generally agreed that raising public aware-
ness is an important aspect of crime prevention and that this aspect is of course 
relevant for predictive policing, they also agreed that police departments need 
to proceed with care. Risk communication is a sensitive issue in police work, 
and its intricacies are aggravated by the potential impact of crime risk estimates 
that can go way beyond actual crime prevention activities. We found that due 
to numerous concerns, police departments overwhelmingly refrained from 
involving the populations within risk areas actively in crime prevention activi-
ties. Rather, they stuck to established communication strategies that depict 
burglary as a generic and unspecific risk that citizens should prepare against 
independent of current patterns. As one interviewee plainly put it: “We don’t 
publish maps. We simply say: ‘There were burglaries, we believe that there is 
increased risk.’ We keep that deliberately vague” (I18).
Conclusion
Communication, as we have shown throughout this chapter, is an important 
aspect of predictive policing – and it draws attention to the ways in which 
knowledge is visually represented and disseminated across different professional 
contexts. In police work, maps are a primary means of making actual and 
potential criminal activity intelligible and actionable. However, representations 
of crime risk change shape as they make their way through different stages of 
predictive policing (from crime analysis to operational planning, and eventually 
to local police stations and to the street level). The series of transformations 
that can be witnessed throughout this journey is important with regard to two 
main functions. First of all, it speaks to different organizational and knowledge 
requirements vis- à- vis different tasks of police work. Second, it also establishes 
credibility for the claim that there is in fact crime risk, as it visually materializes 
this risk and thus reinforces the notion that the near future will indeed be a 
criminal one unless crime prevention measures intervene into it.
Crime risk is not a natural “thing” or even a fixed phenomenon but can be 
conceptualized and calculated in various different ways. Questions about the 
robustness and meaning of a specific risk estimate must therefore always be kept 
in mind when assessing whether it should or should not be acted upon. More-
over, any form of risk statement is of course not a statement about whether the 
predicted event will actually occur or not, but rather a statement about prob-
abilities that are contingent on available data and applied theories and models. 
In the case of predictive policing, this means that the predicted criminal event 
may or may not occur, and it may or may not do so within the spatial and 
temporal boundaries indicated.
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Patrol officers, though, are usually not concerned with such questions. They 
must in a sense trust their colleagues (and/or the software) to have made the 
right judgment call, as they have neither the expertise nor the resources to 
unpack active alerts and check their actual plausibility. In other words, at the 
analyst’s desk, crime risk is still very much contestable, but this contestability 
will not carry over to other stages of the predictive policing process. The inter-
pretive flexibility of data, theories, and models used for the calculation of risk, 
as well as the epistemic status of risk itself, gives way to an already hardened 
version of a criminal future.
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Crime risk has at this point already been on a remarkable journey. Its under-
lying data have been created, amended, and algorithmically processed. Out-
comes from the analytical process have been discussed, double- checked, and 
confirmed. Visualization has located risk within space and time and made it 
tangible and relatable for different audiences. Operational measures have been 
recommended and communicated to local police stations. In a final step, crime 
risk has been disseminated to the patrol officers whose task it is to bring it into 
being through their actions in the streets. It makes little sense to estimate risk 
if it is not followed up by operational measures that have the capacity to affect 
criminal activity in one way or another. And patrol officers are the key actors 
in this final translation step.
One might expect that the translation of crime risk into patrol practices 
would be a relatively straightforward operation. After all, it is widely believed 
that police organizations are characterized by hierarchical structures and a clear- 
cut chain of command (Bordua and Reiss, 1966; Manning, 1992b). In other 
words, patrol officers will do as their supervisors tell them to. A closer look 
at the structures and occupational cultures of police work, however, reveals a 
slightly different picture. Although police organizations might, in general, favor 
hierarchy and orders, the patrol must be considered a special case. Throughout 
their historical evolution, patrol activities have always been characterized by a 
considerable degree of discretion (Brown, 1981; Ericson, 1982; Worden and 
McLean, 2014). Patrol officers, within certain limits, are free to carry out their 
tasks as they see fit, based on their individual and professional evaluations. This 
includes decisions about where to patrol and whether and how to apply rules 
in interaction with citizens.
Predictive policing contradicts this freedom, as it binds the work of patrol 
officers to clearly defined spatiotemporal parameters. As we will show through-
out this chapter, it thus potentially interferes with a central element of the 
occupational culture of patrol officers. When additionally read against the 
backdrop of the police’s historical reluctance to embrace new technologies and 
reform that we discussed in Chapter 3, there is reasonable concern at the level 




policing could turn out to be particularly difficult. In other words, in order to 
make sure that crime risk will not simply be ignored by patrol officers in their 
daily work practices, police departments need to make sure that they get their 
personnel “on board”. In Germany and Switzerland, the need to convince 
officers of the meaningfulness of predictive policing is especially pertinent, as 
tracking of patrol cars is not allowed  – due to privacy and data protection 
legislation, but also due to the resistance to workplace surveillance by police 
unions. There is thus virtually no way to check on the implementation of risk 
areas into actual patrol work.
This chapter first looks at the historical evolution of the patrol, highlight-
ing the conflict between patrol officers’ discretionary power on the one hand 
and tendencies toward surveillance, measurement, and quantification of patrol 
activities on the other hand. Based on our empirical research, it then retraces 
the difficulties that police departments faced in convincing their staff of the 
meaningfulness of predictive policing. Finally, it engages the question of 
whether predictive policing changes the relations that patrol officers form with 
their environment. Does the notion of criminal futures increase suspicion? Are 
risk areas policed differently? And if so, what do patrols look for in order to 
potentially prevent crime? As will become apparent, these questions are not 
easily answered – if it is possible to answer them at all. Apart from the subjective 
and idiosyncratic views and actions of individual officers, in everyday practice, 
predictive policing is not clearly distinguishable from “normal” patrol work, 
and attention to risk areas competes with numerous other tasks that might at 
times have priority over burglary prevention measures. It does, however, add 
an element of extra attentiveness and might thus aggravate existing modes of 
producing deviance and suspicion in relation to space.
Patrolling as a fundamental police technique
In order to understand the role and status of patrol work within police organiza-
tions, it is helpful to place it within larger historical trajectories of policing. The 
patrol is in fact one of the oldest and arguably most fundamental techniques 
of modern police work (Read, 1987; Emsley, 1991). Kelling et al. (1974) have 
famously framed it as the “backbone of police work”. It can broadly be defined as
making uniformed police as visible as possible (e.g., using uniforms and 
marked vehicles on “random” patrol) on the streets and in other pub-
lic areas to create a sense of police presence sufficient to deter poten-
tial wrongdoers from committing offenses and disturbances and to enable 
police to respond quickly to developing problems and crimes in progress.
(Mastrofski and Willis, 2010: 81)
As this definition illustrates, the patrol serves several key functions. First of all, 
it makes police work broadly visible to the public. It is the part of police work 
Patrolling risk 147
that citizens get to see in their everyday lives, and for many of them, seeing 
police patrols will also be the only form of relation they will have to the police. 
Directed at the population, the effect of police presence is thereby considered 
as reassurance that the police are actively maintaining public order. At the same 
time, the presence of patrol officers also creates an informal interface for inter-
actions between the police and citizens.
Of course, police presence is anything but a straightforwardly positive mat-
ter that will be welcomed by everyone. Rather, depending on the image and 
perception of the police within the population, police presence must be under-
stood as an ambivalent practice likely to spark different reactions that depend 
on trust and confidence in the police (Jackson and Bradford, 2010; Tyler, 2011; 
Cao, 2015). These factors tend to vary considerably across communities and 
individuals. In other words, whereas for those who have trust in the police as 
an institution and its practices, a patrol car or uniformed officers will be a wel-
come sight, others might be less pleased by police presence in their neighbor-
hood (Tyler, 2005; Macdonald and Stokes, 2006; Miles- Johnson and Pickering, 
2018). Particularly minority communities have historically expressed (and con-
tinue to do so) mistrust in the police as an institution, their representatives, and 
the work they do (Hagan et al., 2005; MacDonald et al., 2007; Zack, 2015). 
Questions of trust must also be understood in close connection with overpo-
licing and underpolicing. While some might see a strong police presence in a 
neighborhood as evidence that the police care, others might feel threatened by 
it. Particularly in countries or cities with homogeneous yet segregated neigh-
borhoods, such issues are inextricably entangled with the question of whether 
different social groups are policed differently (Crowther, 2004; Perry, 2006; 
Weitzer, 2017).
The second function of police presence through patrolling is directed at 
(potential) offenders. The patrol is considered “the most elemental crime 
prevention technology” (Shapiro, 2019: 458), and this elemental character is 
strongly reflected in predictive policing and other crime analysis techniques 
that seek to direct patrols to spaces where deterrence might be more necessary 
and potentially more successful than in other areas. As we discussed in Chap-
ter 2, the idea that a visible police presence on the streets can prevent crime is 
grounded in assumptions about rational offender behavior. “Target hardening” 
in the form of police patrols is considered to increase the risk of detection and 
arrest, thus making crime less rewarding for potential offenders. If patrolling in 
this sense can – at least partially and potentially – be understood as a protec-
tive measure against crime, then this protective measure should in principle 
be equally distributed across space (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010: 85). Where 
to patrol is thus a question of justice as much as it is a question of effectiveness 
and efficiency. We will return to questions of distribution and fairness again in 
Chapter 9.
Not least, police presence has an effect on the detection of crime. Since, as 
Manning (1972: 234) has put it, “crime is, above all, a function of the resources 
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available to know it”, in areas with a strong police presence, disproportionately 
more crime tends to be detected by patrols. More detection means, however, 
that the overall numbers will paint overpoliced neighborhoods as more “dan-
gerous” or “vulnerable” than might actually be the case. Overrepresentation of 
a certain area in police data might in turn lead to a subjective and/or analyti-
cal perception of that area as a crime “hot spot” and trigger even more police 
presence in response. We will also take up these questions in more detail in 
Chapter 9.
The patrol not only is a technique of creating and leveraging visibility for 
different purposes but must also be understood as an internal managerial tech-
nique that the police use in order to compartmentalize space for the distribu-
tion of resources. It enables them to relate to the world and act within it in a 
planned and structured fashion. The patrol as a managerial technique speaks 
directly to how the police perceive the world in terms of differentiated spatial 
fragments that are characterized by their own threats and vulnerabilities. The 
patrol is for the police constitutive of the world insofar as it continuously trans-
forms the world through interaction with it. In the words of Shapiro (2019: 
457), the patrol can be understood as “an assemblage of sociotechnological 
mediations that enact urban geographies of authority and legitimacy, risk and 
danger”.
Throughout its evolution, the spatializing and managerial techniques of the 
patrol have undergone significant transformations, and these transformations 
closely correspond with the ways in which the police have created knowl-
edge about space and crime (de Lint, 2000). The original form of patrolling 
employed by modern police departments was the fixed- point system (Mastrof-
ski and Willis, 2010: 81; Wain and Ariel, 2014: 276). On their patrol, officers 
would walk through a neighborhood and, in doing so, pass through a number 
of predefined checkpoints. By setting up these checkpoints, police departments 
were able to ensure efficient coverage of the space to be patrolled. At the same 
time, as the checkpoints were also linked to time stamps, they were able to 
monitor their patrol officers and intervene if an officer missed their waypoint 
for some reason – be it because of noncompliance or because they were in 
danger. The type of patrol resulting from the fixed- point model, although the 
order of the checkpoints would be varied regularly in order to not be predict-
able for criminals, was rather static and inflexible.
This changed radically with the widespread introduction of patrol cars and 
two- way radio in the 1960s (Wain and Ariel, 2014: 276; Wilson, 2018: 110). 
Using patrol cars, police patrols were able to cover much larger areas and move 
much quicker between different locations. At the same time, the ability to 
communicate with the station while on patrol enabled them to move through 
space rather freely and still be responsive to specific calls for service received by 
the emergency call center. As a consequence, patrols were much more inde-
pendent and able to roam space in a randomized way. Random movement 
through space was seen as a way of distributing police presence in a more 
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fine- grained fashion, making it possible to detect criminal activity that poten-
tially would have gone unnoticed with static patrol routes (Mastrofski and Wil-
lis, 2010: 81f).
The evolution of patrolling did have some major repercussions for the work 
practices and occupational culture of patrol officers. Most notably, although 
patrolling had always been characterized by a large degree of autonomy of 
individual officers, randomized car patrol “leaves low- ranking officers the dis-
cretion to patrol where and how they choose when they are not otherwise 
assigned to respond to calls for service or administrative duties” (Mastrofski and 
Willis, 2010: 80). In police work, discretion primarily refers to the autonomy 
of decision- making that an officer has within certain parameters, including 
whether to apply the rules and which ones to apply (Brown, 1981; Ericson, 
1982; Worden and McLean, 2014). While this was always true in “negoti-
ated” interactions between police officers and citizens, discretionary power in 
combination with patrol cars and two- way radio meant that this new form 
of patrolling “both lessened control over patrol officers and increased their 
autonomy” (Wain and Ariel, 2014: 276).
A factor that had a major impact on the randomized patrol model was the 
increasing number of calls for service over time. What Gordon (1984) has 
described as “fire brigade policing” essentially means that patrols would be in 
constant communication with central dispatch and often more or less rush from 
one “fire” (i.e., emergency call) to the next in order to reactively put them 
out. Preventive work in the sense of simply demonstrating police presence in 
the streets was therefore often placed lower down the list of priorities, if not 
rendered impossible at all (Mastrofski and Willis, 2010: 81). This imbalance still 
persists today and is, as we will see, an important consideration when it comes 
to whether and how crime predictions can be incorporated into the work 
practices of patrol officers.
However, the evolution of police patrolling did not come to an end with 
cars and modern means of communication. Whereas randomized patrols were 
for a few decades considered the gold standard in patrolling and “preventive 
patrol in police cars was the main staple of police crime prevention efforts at 
the beginning of the decade of the 1970s” (Weisburd and Braga, 2006: 6), 
the model came under increasing pressure when several studies showed that 
random patrols were largely ineffective in terms of crime prevention (Kelling 
et al., 1974; Wilson, 1976: 96f). Against the backdrop of rising overall levels 
of crime, the patrol thus once more became subject to multiple reform pro-
grams, including new models such as disorder policing, community policing, 
problem- oriented policing, intelligence- led policing, and hot- spot policing 
(Mastrofski and Willis, 2010: 82; Newburn and Reiner, 2012: 818ff). As we 
discussed in Chapter 2, efforts to restructure crime prevention and patrol tech-
niques increasingly gained momentum throughout the 1990s and were driven 
by budgetary restraints on police organizations and pressure on managerial 
regimes to increase effectiveness and efficiency as well as by new scientifically 
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inspired methods designed to improve the understanding of the distribution of 
crime across space and time.
Despite concerted efforts to move toward more directed and targeted forms 
of police presence distribution across space, randomized patrolling remains 
today the most widespread method by means of which the police demonstrate 
presence and seek to deter crime. Crime analysis and the increasing trans-
formation of space into differentiated segments of risk might have had some 
impact on how the police relate to the world and act within it, but they have 
not yet managed to fundamentally transform the patrol. In the words of Mas-
trofski and Willis (2010: 57), “the core police patrol technology has remained 
essentially unchanged for decades, and early police adaptions to the informa-
tion technology revolution have not yet profoundly altered policing structures 
and processes in easily observable ways”.
Craft and science
This might be changing with predictive policing. As we discussed earlier, pre-
dictive policing in principle allows for a much more fine- grained partitioning 
of the relationship between space, time, and crime  – and it enables police 
departments to trace this relationship in a more dynamic fashion. This means 
that predictive policing enables much more flexible and timely responses to 
changing criminal environments. However, such responses must by their very 
nature be centrally coordinated. They are therefore likely to interfere with the 
discretionary powers of patrol officers, both in terms of where they police and 
how they police. A fundamental question for predictive policing is thus how 
it relates to entrenched working cultures of patrol officers. Wilson (2018: 117) 
has in this sense called for an investigation of the “impacts [of predictive polic-
ing] upon policing practice and autonomy at street- level”, and Shapiro (2019: 
459) has similarly hinted at the potentially fundamental transformations that 
risk estimates could bring to the patrol.
The central conflict is thereby usually framed as one between “craft” and 
“science” (Willis and Mastrofski, 2018; Wilson, 2018; Ratcliffe et al., 2020). 
As Willis and Mastrofski (2018: 27) have argued, “the police science move-
ment expends more effort elevating science’s virtues than considering how 
craft – that is the knowledge, skill, and judgment patrol officers acquire through 
their daily experiences – may contribute to advancing street- level patrol work”. 
Whereas crime analysis draws its authority from data, theories, models, and 
algorithms, patrol officers relate to their experience, their expertise, and not 
least to their intuition as the necessary and irreplaceable tools for good police 
work. The more precise analytical prescriptions for patrols are, the stronger the 
devaluation of discretion and the stronger the potential clash between craft and 
science will be.
The idea of hot spots, broadly defining a relatively stable space with alleg-
edly higher crime risk, still left some room for discretionary decision- making 
Patrolling risk 151
by patrol officers within these parameters, but predictive policing tips the scale 
decisively toward science as it produces fine- grained segments of space that are 
to be patrolled within equally fine- grained temporal parameters, thus strictly 
regulating how the patrol is to be carried out (Shapiro, 2019: 468). Deviance 
from such regulation would undermine the algorithmic production of risk and 
its scientific authority. As Benbouzid (2019: 11) argues, “predictive platform 
developers seek to solve the problem of proactivity in policing: optimizing the 
daily vigilance of patrols in space and time and minimizing the amount of stop 
and frisk in the population”.
Taken seriously, predictive policing leaves little room for any spatial discre-
tion and is therefore likely to reinforce already existing conflicts between the 
intangibles of human experience and intuition on the one hand and the pre-
cision of risk calculus on the other. Indeed, Ratcliffe et  al. (2020: 640), in 
their study on police officer attitudes to predictive policing, foreground how 
“adopting computer algorithms is complicated by police cultures that often 
emphasise traditional patrol and response functions” and point out how algo-
rithmically produced crime risk might “intrude on officers’ areas of ‘craft’ ” by 
favoring scientific forms of knowledge over individual expertise and discre-
tionary decision- making. Likewise, Shapiro (2019: 460) argues that “predic-
tive policing coopts the patrol’s established surveillance mechanisms (e.g., the 
beat, the uniform, the prominently placed marked vehicle) while algorithmi-
cally remediating its geographies: data analytics determines optimal locales and 
routes for patrol circulations”. Inevitably, in doing so it reorders the relationship 
of patrol officers to their surroundings based on data.
Predictive policing, in this sense, crucially relates to the question of how 
much autonomy and discretion patrol officers should be allowed and how 
much surveillance capacity supervisors should have in order to ensure that 
insights from crime analysis really become implemented at the street level. Dis-
cretion in police work has already before the advent of predictive policing been 
under pressure from managerial rationales and scientification tendencies, both 
of which prescribe the tracking and monitoring of patrol officers’ activities in 
order to deliver on their promise of more effectiveness and efficiency. While 
managerial tools such as COMPSTAT as well as virtually all crime analysis 
approaches are predicated upon the assumption that they will help to effi-
ciently redirect resources for police work, many police departments lack precise 
knowledge about the activities and whereabouts of their patrol officers in the 
first place. As Wain and Ariel (2014: 274f) write:
How much time is spent by police on “every” street? Where “exactly” are 
officers patrolling during their shifts? What “exactly” are they doing when 
they are out there? To what extent do police officers follow their directed 
patrol routes? What is the necessary dosage for special or routine police 
operations? Most police leaders worldwide are not in a position to answer 
these questions, despite technological advancements.
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Such lack of knowledge can, to a large extent, be traced to fierce resistance to 
location tracking and activity monitoring within the police. Police managers 
have praised tracking and monitoring as viable ways to improve both efficiency 
and accountability, but workplace surveillance is generally opposed by police 
officers. Research has shown that police officers more or less openly resist any 
kind of managerial infiltration (Marx, 2003) or micromanagement (Ericson 
and Haggerty, 1997) – and this is particularly true for the occupational culture 
of street patrols (Terrill et al., 2003; Wain and Ariel, 2014).
During our research, we found that conflicts surrounding workplace surveil-
lance were in fact pertinent during the implementation of predictive policing 
software. The tracking of patrols is virtually impossible in both Germany and 
Switzerland, as it is strongly opposed by police unions that frame the use of 
GPS data as “spying” on employees (I23; I44; I46; I50; I79; I80). Moreover, it 
is additionally impeded by strict privacy and data protection legislation (I44; 
P67). As we will discuss in more detail in the following chapter, these strong 
safeguards against tracking and monitoring have turned out to be particularly 
problematic with regard to evaluation studies seeking to analyze how patrol 
units move throughout space with regard to predictive policing and specific 
risk alerts (e.g., evaluating how quickly patrols will be able to arrive at a risk 
area and how long they will remain there).
Getting people on board
Against the backdrop of these conflicts, we found that police departments 
struggled with a straightforward answer to the question whether risk areas 
would be effectively patrolled after all. Essentially, the lack of possible tracking 
of patrol activities meant that police managers, analysts, and planners needed 
to trust their colleagues in the streets to translate crime risk into operational 
measures (I09; I23; I24; I27; I78). This was particularly pertinent vis- à- vis 
possible internal resistance. As we discussed in Chapter 3, predictive polic-
ing is not much different from the introduction of any other technology that 
potentially meddles with how police officers do their job and might thus not 
sit well with patrol officers. There was, after all, a chance that patrol units 
would choose to simply ignore risk areas and continue with their regular 
patrol activities instead.
During our research, the conflict between institutional surveillance and 
micromanagement of police practices on the one hand and the discretion of 
police craft on the other hand was in this sense a pertinent topic. As Man-
ning (1992a: 364) has pointed out, “as long as the power and authority to 
make decisions remains with the patrol officer, the most significant organiza-
tional questions lie in examining the use and response of patrol officers to this 
technology”. In light of this situation, senior officers and analysts expressed a 
certain feeling of powerlessness. They had a new, potentially powerful tool at 
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hand, and yet they had no proper control over its practical implementation 
(I02; I09; I11; I51; I46). One interviewee framed this problem as follows:
There are some people in the force who are like: “PRECOBS alert order, 
great, sure, I’ll take care of it.” And then they put the handout in their 
back- pocket and forget about it. I can’t reach these guys. We would like to 
track our patrol forces, we have wanted that for a long time, but we don’t 
get the permission.
(I46)
Police departments thus needed to find ways to reconcile craft and science and 
to strengthen support for predictive policing among their staff. As Willis and 
Mastrofski (2018: 39) have argued, when it comes to the question of how to 
integrate the potential opposites of occupational culture and statistics, “officers 
need to be convinced that the practices for which there is strong supporting 
scientific evidence do actually work”. The most intuitive and straightforward 
way to convince police officers of the meaningfulness of a new tool or method 
would be to demonstrate how it contributes to the successful fulfillment of their 
work tasks. This is, however, not easy when it comes to crime prevention, as 
prevention work seldom yields concrete results. As one respondent described it:
We send our officers into risk areas with patrol cars. Blue and silver cars, 
good visibility. You will understand that we won’t catch a criminal by 
doing that. But that is deliberate.
(I42)
Prevention is usually considered successful if no event materializes. A  non- 
event, however, is not only precisely that – literally nothing – but it also does 
not correspond particularly well with a police culture that is largely geared 
toward action (i.e., arresting criminals). As our respondents framed it, police 
work is often perceived, especially by patrol officers, as “hunting” (I77), and 
“the desire to catch criminals is engrained in police DNA” (I11). Crime pre-
vention through police presence, though, is essentially the opposite of hunt-
ing. There is no “prey” to be tracked down and slain. Quite on the contrary, 
prevention is successful when no prey ever comes into sight. As such, it is a 
“tedious activity” (I18). One senior officer put it as follows:
Basically, our officers would rather arrest the offender. And they need to 
accept the fact that they are part of a system that reduces the overall bur-
glary numbers at the end of the year. Even if they never got to see a 
burglar. Just because of their presence. To understand that, and to accept 
that – that takes some time.
(I76)
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The cultural misfit of prevention work with what police work should be about 
from the perspective of officers is obviously not an issue that is exclusive to 
predictive policing. A non- event remains a non- event, independent of whether 
the lack of its occurrence is related to risk space or to “regular” space. With 
the algorithmic production of crime risk, however, the boredom of prevention 
work and the lack of tangible action can now be ascribed to a machine – and 
this machine can potentially be more easily ignored in the field (P29).
Cultural aspects are additionally aggravated by assessment criteria and career 
paths that are largely predicated upon measurable and countable success (I02; 
I18; I50; I77; I80). One senior officer vividly illustrated how crime analysis 
and prevention work create tensions with the need for quantification that is 
prevalent in police organizations:
I can’t really count prevention, I don’t have a way to measure it. So if 
I  spend three hours in a residential area and nothing happens, what do 
I tell my supervisor back at the station? That I prevented burglaries? He 
will ask me for proof. My colleagues have that proof. They have confis-
cated three driving licenses during that time. So instead of doing preven-
tion work, our guys prefer to conduct traffic controls. Where they can 
check a Mercedes Benz limousine on a main road at ten at night on a 
Friday, and there’s a good chance that they catch a business guy who has 
been drinking. In fact, every other driver has probably had a bit too much 
to drink. Compare that to checking two Romanians sitting in a car in a 
residential area. Of course these two are burglars, but it takes two hours 
to properly search their car, to get an interpreter to be able to speak with 
them, and so on. And then after three hours I have to let them go. In 
the meantime, my colleagues recorded three instances of drunk driving, 
confiscated three driving licenses, and produced three blood tests. They 
have been busy. And what did I do? I prevented burglaries? It’s a structural 
problem.
(I50)
Another problem with prevention work based on predictive policing is that any 
potential success – whether tangible or intangible – can in principle no longer 
exclusively be considered a human achievement. A decrease in burglary num-
bers without predictive policing could be attributed to good individual police 
work, whereas a decrease in burglary numbers with predictive policing is now 
largely credited to the algorithm (I04). Predictive policing thus diminishes the 
recognition of the human work involved in translating crime risk into crime 
prevention. This problem bears some resemblance to the reconfiguration of 
workload between predictive policing software and operator that we explored 
in Chapter 5 – only that in the case of operational measures, the patrol officer 
does not even directly interact with the software that takes some (or all) of the 
credit for the non- materialization of crime.
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As we discussed in the previous chapter, visualization is considered a viable 
means of convincing patrol officers of crime risk and the need for action. The 
production of a handout with a map is considered a crucial way of establishing 
the existence of crime risk and of rendering its location within space easily 
intelligible and actionable. Understood as a relay of knowledge and power, 
visu alization thus plays a key role in aligning street patrols and predictive 
policing, as it is considered a viable means to compel street patrol officers to 
restructure their patrol routes in accordance with the predicted risk areas. Our 
respondents pointed out that visual communication can, however, only really 
unfold its benefits if there is a general acceptance of algorithmic crime analysis 
(I02; I07; I11; I48). As one senior officer put it:
There is little sense in creating colorful images and telling our people: 
“OK, now you do that!” If I want to create an effect, my colleagues out 
there need to accept these premises, and they need to go to these areas. 
And our colleagues want to know why they should be doing that. There is 
no blind faith in technology.
(I80)
Predictive policing, as we argued earlier, is largely marketed as a tool that 
reduces the complexity of crime analysis, as it black- boxes the actual analytical 
process and removes the knowledge and labor that go into the production of 
crime risk from sight. But as the aforementioned quote illustrates, such black- 
boxing can have adverse effects. Patrol officers did express the desire to at least 
in principle understand how predictive policing software functions in order to 
be able to assess its benefits for their work (I02; I11; I16; I31; I44). We found 
that police departments therefore put considerable emphasis on educating their 
patrol officers, making substantial efforts in “internal public relations” (I02) in 
order to foster acceptance for predictive policing among patrol officers. Some, 
for instance, ran internal campaigns or convened information events for their 
staff (I42; I44; I48; I80). Clearly, street patrols do not need the same level of 
detailed knowledge about data, theory, models, and algorithms that analysts 
need. And yet, our respondents told us that there were considerable benefits 
in incorporating the entirety of a department’s staff into algorithmically driven 
crime prevention programs. One senior officer detailed how explaining things 
was considered in their department as a way of fostering acceptance for predic-
tive policing:
Police officers are generally skeptical people. And when the manufac-
turer advertised the product, one of the main messages was: you don’t 
need additional training for that, crime maps are intuitive. That is true, of 
course. But I believe that you need to understand the rationale, you need 
to understand the reason why you should patrol that area. Because other-
wise you don’t do it. A skeptical person wonders: What is the basis for this? 
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Why is that one area riskier than the other? . . . We need to get people 
on board, we need to trigger their curiosity, we need to show them the 
method, and we need to demonstrate the meaning.
(I76)
As these considerations illustrate, there is much uncertainty around the last trans-
lation instance in predictive policing. In practice, risk- based patrolling is funda-
mentally reliant on trust relationships between crime analysis divisions, planners, 
supervisors, and patrol officers. All things considered, police departments were, 
however, fairly certain that their patrol forces would in fact incorporate risk 
alerts into their daily work (I18; I20; P27). Our respondents also pointed to the 
fact that the discretionary power of patrols would not imply that they were com-
pletely free in how they did their job, but that their discrete decision- making 
took place within defined parameters. As one shift supervisor framed it:
I mean sure, they are free to choose where they want to patrol, to a certain 
extent. But daily orders are clearly defined, and every single patrol unit 
knows that. . . . If planning and operations defines a certain area as to be 
patrolled, then this order stands.
(I79)
The patrol officers that we spoke with largely backed the assessment that risk 
areas would in fact be actively patrolled. All of them more or less unanimously 
confirmed that they tried to incorporate risk alerts into their daily schedule 
if possible (I20; I21; I22; I23; I24; I25; I26; I27; I29). However, this pos-
sibility would not always be a given. Crime prevention is by no means the 
only task patrol officers have to perform during their time in the streets. The 
“fire brigade” approach to patrol work in practice means that patrol officers – 
particularly vis- à- vis limited resources and increasing numbers of calls for ser-
vice  – often need to rush from one incident to another. This complicates 
matters for predictive policing quite a bit. Police departments usually differenti-
ate between situations that require immediate action and situations that can be 
dealt with at a later point in time. If there is an emergency situation, for exam-
ple a robbery or an accident with injuries, patrol forces will not be able to take 
a detour through a risk area on their way to the incident and deter potential 
burglars through their presence (P42). As one patrol officer framed problems of 
workload and their consequences for predictive policing:
In principle, we can integrate [risk areas] easily. It’s just possible that, 
depending on the overall situation during the shift, nobody manages to go 
there. . . . When you are out there in the patrol car, you can’t just decide to 
drive into an alert area. We continuously get orders from central dispatch. 
And in case of doubt, PRECOBS has a lower priority.
(I29)
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Predictive policing, contrary to regularly reiterated claims about efficiency 
that are grounded in the assumption that in order to more effectively pre-
vent crime one simply needs to spatially rearrange existing capabilities, in fact 
needs a lot of street- level resources if it is to be implemented in the daily activ-
ities of patrol officers. The availability of residential burglary risk predictions 
does not cause the rest of police work to grind to a halt. Additionally, tasking 
already overworked patrol officers with the intense coverage of risk areas is in 
fact unlikely to yield the crime prevention practices that predictive policing 
prescribes. On the contrary, the availability of algorithmically produced risk 
estimates might actually prescribe an additional provision of resources (i.e., 
patrol staff) to make sure that officers will have enough free capacity to actively 
show increased police presence in those areas that are supposed to be more 
vulnerable (Leese, 2020).
Policing risky spaces
If we assume that crime risk is in principle successfully translated to the street 
level and gets traction within the work practices of patrol officers, the ensu-
ing question is whether police work changes within these risk areas. In other 
words, do officers behave differently when there is an allegedly higher risk 
level? Do they perceive their environment as more “dangerous”, do they act 
upon things that they would have otherwise ignored, and how does potentially 
increased suspicion play out in concrete actions? These questions are not easily 
answered, as they largely hinge on individual and idiosyncratic behavior and 
preferences. Moreover, they might not easily be attributed to predictive polic-
ing in the first place. Crime prevention in risk areas is not necessarily different 
from crime prevention in nonrisk areas – and risk areas might already have been 
covered by patrols independent of their being designated as risk areas by crime 
prediction software. In fact, as one senior officer admitted, police departments 
have little knowledge about how risk estimates influence the spatial behavior 
of patrols:
The question is whether [the behavior of patrol officers] changes in the 
first place.  .  .  . Because it might be the case that patrol officers already 
intuitively react to burglaries. Our patrol officers get a briefing before each 
shift, they get a report on what has been going on in the previous days. 
They are the ones who “live” in that environment. And when they get the 
information that there has been a burglary or two, they might intuitively 
have an increased focus on that area.
(I44)
Most patrol officers we spoke with agreed that predictive policing did not 
fundamentally change their everyday work practices. Rather, they highlighted 
that they would largely still be doing “regular” patrolling – admittedly, with a 
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little extra attention to details, but without engaging in extraordinary activities 
(I24; I29; I53). This does not come as much of a surprise when we consider the 
job description of a patrol officer. Patrolling is to a significant extent about the 
perception of, and interaction with, the environment, and police officers, as 
Ericson (1982: 8) puts it, by default “patrol with a suspicious eye for the wrong 
people in the wrong places at the wrong times, reproducing a ‘social penality 
of time and place’ ”.
Our respondents largely echoed this description. They often described sus-
picion as defined by some kind of deviance, mostly in terms of a mismatch of 
a person with their surroundings, thus rendering them as a “misfit” (I24; I29; 
I53) and therefore allegedly up to no good. As one officer framed it, patrol-
ling means “check[ing] everyone who does not really fit into the structure of 
a residential neighborhood” (I42). As such, patrol work always fundamentally 
involves a matching process of space and its inhabitants for the sake of a subjec-
tive production of threat and vulnerability. Predictive policing does not uproot 
these entrenched practices. As patrol officers are trained to pay attention to 
“environmental misfits”, most of our respondents did not explicitly differenti-
ate between patrolling risk areas and patrolling randomly. As one patrol officer 
told us:
I can only speak for myself, but we generally keep our eyes open. In case 
we notice a suspicious person, we control them. And to be honest: I don’t 
think that has changed. We have always done that. When we get an alert, 
these things are put on the agenda, and we pay particular attention to 
them. But otherwise we do that automatically.
(I29)
Even though construction criteria of misfit and suspicion must always be under-
stood and evaluated against the backdrop of (social) space, our respondents also 
regularly referred to specific ethnic groups or nationalities – mostly Eastern 
European – that from their perspective could be considered as “suspicious by 
default” (I09; P23; P24). By referring to these groups as the usual suspects for 
residential burglary, patrol officers made it implicitly clear that, based on their 
own professional experience as well as crime statistics, they already “knew” 
who to look for – and that they would be able to identify these persons as 
potential offenders even if they did not stick out so clearly from their surround-
ings. For our interlocutors, it was in this sense obvious that “if you see specific 
vehicles with Eastern European license plates, you want to have a closer look 
at these vehicles, check the people sitting in that car” (I24) and that “vehicles 
with foreign license plates – France, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia – stick out, and 
then you have a closer look” (I29).
Against the backdrop of such arguably racialized and/or ethnically coded 
practices of suspicion and control in predictive patrolling (Egbert, 2018), there 
were also some pertinent legal debates around what it means to declare an 
Patrolling risk 159
area more risky than other areas. For instance, police departments discussed 
whether it would be legal to check people and vehicles without probable cause 
for suspicion, as the existence of risk estimates themselves would render space 
the defining criteria for threat and vulnerability (P28). Following a logic of 
“ecological contamination” (Smith, 1986: 316), residing within a risk area 
would then already spatially constitute a person as “risky” – independent of 
their activities, looks, or the license plates on their car. In the German context, 
such considerations must arguably be understood against the backdrop of polit-
ical and legal debates around the declaration of “danger zones” with increased 
police competencies (Ernst, 2014; Keller and Leifker, 2017; Keitzel, 2020). 
We will pick up questions of space, racism, and discrimination again in more 
depth in Chapter 9. In the end, however, our respondents made it rather clear 
that predictive policing should not be put in the same category as emergency 
legislation and extraordinary executive powers:
We do not declare a state of emergency for a risk area. We are not allowed 
to check anyone and everything.
(I44)
And yet, patrol officers admitted that their behavior in the streets potentially 
would in one way or another be affected by the knowledge that a specific 
neighborhood had been classified as potentially more vulnerable than other 
areas to burglaries. Most of them did not refer to specific behavioral changes (as 
in concrete actions), but rather to a sense of more attentiveness and attention 
to detail (I09; I22; I23; I24; I25; I27; I44). As one patrol officer framed it with 
regard to the information conveyed by the handout and the crime map that 
they received during their shift briefing: “The thing is, you know that in this 
area something could happen. . . . And of course it makes you more attentive 
to all the little details” (I23). Other respondents told us that they would “drive 
a little slower”, or “park in the shadow or in a gateway and then just observe” 
(I24), that they would “turn down the radio in these areas and pull down the 
car window, so that you can hear what is going on outside” (I23), or that their 
“radar [would be] just a bit more fine- tuned, more focused” (I25). Apart from 
such an intensification of “regular” suspicion, patrol officers would also slightly 
modify the ways in which they moved through space within risk areas. As one 
respondent framed it:
Something that’s definitely different is that we pay specific attention to the 
small roads within the area. Drive through them, show presence. Get out 
of the car maybe, walk around for 15 minutes. . . . The important thing is 
that people see us. Which means that our target group, the burglars who 




Some police departments, during the period of our research, chose to addition-
ally supplement regular patrols in risk areas with increased community engage-
ment activities. Although community policing is formally separated from regular 
patrol work, patrol officers were encouraged to actively chat with residents, ask 
them to be vigilant, or provide them with tips on how to protect their homes 
(I09; I22; I23; I24; I27). These measures, although they were usually not prior-
itized, were considered as a viable means to further support burglary prevention 
through police presence. They must be understood, in keeping with situational 
crime prevention theory, as an additional form of “target hardening” that can 
contribute to an overall reduction in burglary numbers in a risk area. One inter-
viewee summarized their experiences with community engagement as follows:
We did a lot of community engagement – particularly in the context of 
prevention campaigns. We had postcards, for example, that you could drop 
in someone’s mailbox if you saw that a window was cracked. Just to raise 
awareness. And the interesting thing was that we saw a certain relationship 
between these activities and a decrease of near repeat offenses. Not a strong 
one, but there was an effect.
(I44)
Conclusion
As we have shown throughout this chapter, predictive policing at the level of 
street patrols cannot, from an analytical perspective, be neatly separated from 
general patrol work. Rather, from a translation angle, it must be understood as 
inextricably intertwined with larger trajectories of patrolling vis- à- vis society 
and space. Not only is the police patrol characterized by a considerable history 
and an occupational culture that comes with a large degree of officer discretion, 
but its evolution has produced a number of potential practical conflicts that 
render the translation of burglary risk from the abstract level of crime analysis 
to the concrete level of police work on the streets a challenge. Predictive polic-
ing is affected by and reflects the tensions between craft and science as well as 
clashes over the prioritization of patrol officers’ attention vis- à- vis a multiplicity 
of tasks and emergencies that need to be taken care of.
Given that police departments have few possibilities to actually track and 
monitor the activities of patrol forces, the enactment of crime risk to a large 
degree hinges on trust relationships between different police divisions. As we 
have shown, police departments invest considerable resources in order to con-
vince patrol officers of the meaningfulness of algorithmic risk production for 
the fulfilment of their daily tasks – even though there might not be a visible and 
tangible result of prevention work in the first place.
As predictive policing managerializes patrol space and thereby challenges 
the discretionary decision- making of patrol officers about where to carry out 
their work, it arguably also influences the spatial relationship that patrol officers 
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form with their environment. The perception of space as “risk space”, as we 
have seen, at least implicitly demands increased levels of attentiveness to detail. 
Predictive policing might not be fundamentally transforming the rationale of 
patrolling – after all, the work description of the patrol officer remains the pro-
duction of deviance in the form of a perceived mismatch between a person and 
the environment. The explicit assignment of risk to space can, however, unfold 
an amplification effect on suspicion. Paired with existing prejudice, targeted 
patrols could thus aggravate issues of profiling and racial/ethnic stereotypes. We 
will take up this discussion in Chapter 9.
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Throughout the preceding chapters, we have zoomed in on the sociotechni-
cal labor that is involved in the prediction and possible prevention of criminal 
futures. We have witnessed a plethora of contingencies, choices, frictions, and 
even contradictions that come to the fore once predictive policing software 
forms relations with the larger organizational and practical trajectories of police 
work. We have highlighted the constructedness of data and questions of visu-
alization and representation, the multiplicity of temporalities that emerge when 
addressing the future, and the different ways in which crime predictions can be 
communicated or muted. The question that we have largely bracketed so far is: 
Does predictive policing actually work?
There is no definite answer to this question. A number of methodological 
issues make it almost impossible to sufficiently prove causal effects of tar-
geted patrols and other prevention measures on the occurrence of crime. 
These epistemic difficulties are reflected in the existing literature. Only a 
few empirical studies have so far attempted to systematically evaluate the 
effects of predictive policing, and they have come to contradictory con-
clusions. While Mohler et al. (2015) found that patrols based on algorith-
mic crime predictions led to a reduction in crime rates when compared to 
patrols that were not based on software forecasts, the Shreveport Predictive 
Policing Experiment conducted by Hunt et al. (2014) found no evidence 
that crime was reduced in districts that were patrolled using predictive polic-
ing methods.
The evaluation study of the PRECOBS trial run in the German state 
of Baden- Württemberg hints at indicators for an effect of predictive polic-
ing patrols on residential burglary numbers but refrains from making causal 
claims (Gerstner, 2017, 2019). Similarly, evaluation studies on the SKALA 
and PreMAP software packages have come to the conclusion that an effect 
of predictive policing could not be statistically proven (Landeskriminalamt 
Niedersachsen, 2018; Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein- Westfalen, 2018b). Vis- 
à- vis such a doubtful empirical basis, Gluba (2020) even goes as far as to claim 
that predictive policing is to a large extent underpinned by a “belief ” that the 
method will work rather than by actual proof.
Chapter 8
Does it work, though?
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This chapter explores the question of whether predictive policing works 
through the perspective of police departments themselves. We retrace how 
“success” was framed as a key variable during the implementation of predic-
tive policing and how police departments struggled to provide evidence for 
such success. We then look into how, through a redefinition of success criteria, 
formal evaluation procedures were in many cases able to nevertheless present 
predictive policing as a valuable contribution to crime prevention that should 
be continued rather than prematurely dismissed due to a lack of “hard proof”. 
In fact, when faced with the decision whether to keep using predictive polic-
ing software after an initial trial phase, all the police departments we studied 
decided to stick with it in principle – independent of concrete software pack-
ages, models, or targeted types of crime.
The importance of success
There are several reasons why it is important for the police to demonstrate 
that predictive policing works – the most obvious one arguably being the 
general political salience and agenda- setting capacities of high- crime rates 
(Wilson, 1976; Pritchard and Berkowitz, 1993; Beckett, 1994). Throughout 
almost all German and Swiss federal states, a continuous increase in resi-
dential burglary rates  – with a spike in 2012  – put the fight against this 
particular type of crime high on the political agenda, and governments felt 
the need to address the issue, thus creating a link between crime numbers, 
politics, and potential police reform (Egbert, 2018). The political prioritiza-
tion of burglary prevention must additionally be understood in the context 
of news media reports and their influence on the public perception of crime 
(Schlesinger et  al., 1991; Ericson, 1995; Holbrook and Hill, 2005). With 
regard to unusually high residential burglary numbers, some media outlets 
used fear- mongering framings such as a “failing state” (Krauel, 2013; Elflein 
et al., 2014) and recommended that citizens should “protect themselves” as 
the police would not be able to protect them (Budras, 2015). Overall, the 
blame for high crime levels was largely attributed to the inactivity or inad-
equate actions of the police, and this increased the pressure on politicians 
and on police departments themselves to demonstrate that they were actively 
tackling the issue.
As we discussed in Chapter 2, the turn to predictive policing must, vis- à- 
vis the political situation at the time, be understood as an allegedly easy way 
to more effectively address residential burglary and bring the numbers down 
quickly. PRECOBS, though still in its infancy, was readily available as an off- 
the- shelf commercial product and was presented as a straightforward solution 
to a pressing problem (Gluba, 2014; Schweer, 2015b, 2015a). Moreover, many 
police departments had already been experimenting with approaches to crime 
analysis that went beyond the mere mapping of static hot spots and/or were in 
the process of modernizing their IT infrastructures and data handling processes 
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and were thus in a position to integrate predictive policing software as an addi-
tional tool for crime analysis and crime prevention right away (I02; I26; I80).
However, as we discussed in Chapter 3, the media discourse and the political 
agenda, while opening up a window of opportunity for a rapid implementation 
of predictive policing, did not necessarily provide a supportive environment for 
carefully planned and methodologically sound testing of new software tools. 
An apt example is one German state, where residential burglary numbers had 
increased by 80% between 2007 and 2012 (I38; for similar experiences in other 
German and Swiss jurisdictions, see I31; I37; I39; I40; I78) and where the 
peak level coincided with upcoming elections. Naturally, politicians felt com-
pelled to demonstrate to the electorate that they were doing something about 
the problem. In some cases, this led to rather overconfident political promises 
that predictive policing would be a quick and easy fix for burglary rates (P17). 
One police officer recounted how political tactics and police work against this 
backdrop were drawn together:
The Minister of the Interior at the time wanted to use predictive polic-
ing for his campaign. So he publicly said: “By the way, we have this new 
software, and the police will soon use it. We will prioritize the fight against 
residential burglary.” And that kicked off the whole process for us.
(I17)
Political pressure to introduce crime prediction software was also reinforced by 
parliamentary debates. Opposition parties would in some cases frame the nonuse 
of predictive policing software as a failure of state governments and demand the 
immediate implementation of available technology in the fight against domestic 
burglary (D161), thus creating additional pressure for immediate action.
Almost inevitably, the political activism around predictive policing caused 
some annoyance within the police. As predictive policing software was politi-
cally portrayed as a technoscientific miracle fix that just needed to be applied to 
the domestic burglary problem, police departments faced misguided and over-
blown public expectations about its immediate effects. Our respondents told 
us that they felt that an unnecessary level of pressure to rapidly produce results 
was put on them (I02; I13; I36; I33; P09; D089; D172). At the same time, the 
expectations of politicians were seldom matched by their expertise in terms of 
police work and crime. As one senior officer put it:
Politicians are our representatives. They are elected. But I  know of no 
single politician, at least at the Ministerial level, who has the necessary 
domain knowledge [to assess how predictive policing works].
(I17)
On the other hand, our interviewees also understood that governments needed 
to address pressing crime rates, especially when leading to such immediate 
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and tangible victimization experiences as residential burglary (I07; I22; I78). 
One senior police officer summarized how violations of privacy and intimacy 
contributed to putting predictive policing on the political agenda and even 
legitimize exceptional budgetary commitments:
[Predictive policing software] costs a lot of money, but in order to fight 
residential burglary, they were happy to spend that because there was a 
lot of pressure from the public. The thing with burglary is that the victim 
is really personally affected. It’s not like car theft, where you have a 99% 
insurance rate. I mean, some people are even happy when their car gets 
stolen, because then they will get a new one.
(I02)
The Ministry of the Interior of one German state, in response to our inquiry 
concerning predictive policing within their jurisdiction, issued the following 
statement that vividly illustrates the link between crime rates, subjectively felt inse-
curity, fear of crime, and the pressure for political action to mediate the situation:
The phenomenon of residential burglary is being prioritized politically 
and by the police in [state]. Rising case numbers, in conjunction with 
the problem of “travelling offenders” and the decline of clearance rates, 
have negatively impacted the subjectively felt security of the population. 
Residential burglary violates the most private space of the victims, making 
them feel insecure within their own home.
(I10)
Predictive policing was, however, not only perceived as a promising way to cope 
with the residential burglary situation by governments. Just as well, police depart-
ments themselves decided to take advantage of the political agenda and leverage 
the willingness of governments to spend money and accelerate processes into new 
competencies. Several of our interviewees foregrounded how their departments 
managed to “ride the wave” (I02) and to turn the political climate into unprec-
edented opportunities to push the boundaries with regard to data, IT infrastruc-
tures, and crime analysis (I02; I26; I79; I80). According to one police officer, the 
high crime numbers were in fact perceived as a windfall for innovation:
We had this [burglary] problem and we knew that we had to exhaust every 
possible solution. . . . Had the software been on the market five years ear-
lier, we probably would not have been able to purchase it, because back 
then we did not have that problem.
(I26)
This interpretation is backed up by the fact that other German and Swiss states, 
when at a later point in time faced with the decision of whether to start using 
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predictive policing software or to expand the use of already implemented soft-
ware to other cities and/or regions, were far more reluctant to do so (I41; I46). 
In a statement from November of 2017, one Swiss state, for example, found 
that there already had been “a continuous decrease in [residential burglary] 
numbers since 2014. . . . Therefore, the procurement of the software would 
not yield much added value” (I41). Several of our interlocutors also noted that 
after the peak in residential burglary numbers in 2012 and the ensuing political 
activity, the hype around predictive policing had already started to die down 
slightly and political attention shifted to other matters (P49; P52).
Lots of pressure
Generally speaking, the political prioritization of predictive policing had 
ambiguous effects on police departments. On the one hand, it bolstered budgets 
and provided a window of opportunity for police departments to tinker with 
new methods and technoscientific tools. On the other hand, the framing of 
predictive policing as a “strategic goal” (I18) in the fight against residential 
burglary put pressure on the police in a number of different ways. First of all, 
as we have already briefly discussed in Chapter 3, things needed to move a lot 
faster than usual. In almost all the jurisdictions covered by our research, gov-
ernments pushed police agencies to initiate research projects and/or trial runs 
as quickly as possible (I04; I12; I26; I36; I42; I44; I45; I79; I80; P30; P44) – up 
to the point that police departments felt rushed and only partially prepared for 
a systematic approach to implementation. As one senior officer recalls:
The project was just really political, it was initiated very quickly, and we 
had no chance to prepare our people for what was coming. I wasn’t really 
prepared either. The order was: “We start next week”.
(I04)
This “time pressure” (I43) put police departments in a position where they had 
to choose either to purchase off- the- shelf commercial software (with the only 
readily available tool at the time being PRECOBS) or to get their own R&D 
projects off the ground without adequate preparation in terms of data and 
infrastructure but also in terms of qualified and available personnel. Notably, 
in various instances, governments demonstrated a willingness to fast- track field 
tests, development, and/or procurement of software packages, coupled with a 
willingness to make adjustments later on should they turn out to be necessary 
(I02; I03; I11; I16; I17; I48; I57).
The initial time pressure, once predictive policing was up and running, then 
turned into what one police officer framed as “innovation pressure” (P28). 
Being given the political carte blanche to experiment with data and different 
theoretical approaches and models, police departments were put in a position 
where the results from predictive policing experiments would almost by default 
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have to demonstrate that what they were doing was indeed innovative and 
would present an unprecedented and new way to address the age- old problem 
of domestic burglary (Hessisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, 2016). 
After all, politicians had already promised that predictive policing would be the 
technoscientific remedy for what was troubling the population (Egbert, 2018). 
Established criminological knowledge, according to the prevalent imaginary, 
could now be infused with data and algorithms and thus be mobilized in novel 
ways – a combination that had already proven to be effective in other domains 
of public administration and police work (Hauber, 2019).
Last, but not least, police departments experienced what could be best 
described as peer pressure. As some early adopters had already started to work 
with predictive policing software, and in doing so had generated considerable 
attention from the media and the public, other – particularly neighboring – 
jurisdictions suddenly needed to explain why they were not using such pre-
sumably cutting- edge technoscientific methods as well (P13). As one police 
officer described the justification ripple effects that were created once predic-
tive policing went “live” in the first jurisdictions:
With [police technology], it’s the same thing everywhere. Zurich started 
the trend. And then Bavaria quickly followed. The guys in Bavaria had in 
fact been preparing for something like this for a long time and had just 
waited for an opportunity to put it into practice. . . . And that put a lot of 
pressure on other states and cities, because they saw that everyone around 
them was implementing and using predictive policing systems.
(I45)
The logic at play here is of course the very same one that compelled gov-
ernments and police departments to look into predictive policing in the first 
place: high levels of crime leading to public demand for effective counter-
measures, which in turn led to governments prioritizing new approaches to 
crime prevention, thereby enabling police departments to make use of the lat-
est technological tools. Now, though, the pressure was additionally aggravated 
by comparisons with other states and cities (I13; D054; D161). One senior 
officer described the peer pressure effects among police departments in differ-
ent jurisdictions as follows:
I’m convinced that when other Swiss cantons all of a sudden have to deal with 
a burglary problem, they will feel the pressure. And they will be asked why 
they don’t have that software that the others are using. And what’s the argu-
ment then? To say that they don’t need it? That’s going to be tough to justify.
(I79)
These diverse pressures were aggravated still further by the media hype sur-
rounding predictive policing. Especially in 2014/15, when predictive policing 
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software had already been fully implemented or was subject to ongoing research 
projects or trial runs, some police departments were almost overrun by media 
inquiries (I02; I07; I16). And while media coverage presented a welcome 
opportunity for the police to demonstrate that they were actively pushing 
the boundaries in the fight against residential burglary, our informants told us 
about several instances where they felt predictive policing was seriously mis-
represented by journalists. Common themes were that media reports would 
conflate the spatiotemporal approaches to predictive policing used by German 
and Swiss police departments with profiling, mass surveillance, or science fic-
tion works such as Minority Report (I44; I45; I80). Generally, police officers 
complained about the lack of adequate detail and contextualization of predic-
tive policing in media accounts – something they attributed to the ignorance of 
journalists as much as to media formats and the attention economy. One senior 
officer recounted the following anecdote that vividly illustrates how harshly the 
lifeworlds of the police and journalists clashed at times:
These media types came to us with a crystal ball. They wanted footage 
with a crystal ball. It was impossible to get that out of their heads. We told 
them we wanted nothing to do with crystal balls. We use mathematical 
formulas, it’s calculus. If we put ten smart colleagues to the task, they could 
do the same thing. But no: crystal ball. They had the crystal ball in mind, 
and they wanted to use that as a selling point for their story.
(I45)
While the use of actual crystal balls is certainly an extreme example, our inter-
locutors also told us about cases where police representatives would be inter-
viewed for 20 minutes, but only the very last sentence from the interview would 
end up as part of the eventual TV feature – and this would be the part where 
they stated that they could not tell whether predictive policing actually pre-
vented burglaries. The footage where they explained the intricacies of crime 
prevention and why it is so difficult to establish statistical proof for causal effects 
would be cut entirely (I07; I44). Even though our respondents showed some 
understanding for the news media perspective that needs to look for an angle 
and come up with a catchy headline (I36), at that time some police departments 
became quite cautious when speaking with the media and even got advice from 
their internal police PR divisions about what could be said publicly (I07). In the 
end, most of our respondents who had been featured in various media outlets 
came to similarly unfavorable conclusions about the journalistic coverage of 
predictive policing. One senior officer summarized the verdict as follows:
That media hype had some really negative effects on our work. All of a 
sudden, [predictive policing] was portrayed as the ultimate solution. And 
of course, we said that this is exactly what it is not. It is a supplement to 
what we have been doing already. But nobody wanted to hear that. So 
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yeah, that was a problem for us. That created certain expectations that such 
systems can never meet, never mind which specific software application we 
are talking about here.
(I02)
Last, but not least, demonstrable success of predictive policing was also consid-
ered a key requirement for the police force itself. As we discussed in Chapter 3, 
new police strategies, tactics, or technologies are often met with skepticism. 
This is particularly the case when they have the potential to unsettle established 
work practices, foster organizational restructuring, and thus force police officers 
out of their comfort zone. Resistance to the introduction of new technoscien-
tific tools is not unusual and can, for example, lead to the nonadoption of new 
analytical tools or simply to ignorance about new types of knowledge that are 
produced by these tools.
In summary, political prioritization of the fight against residential bur-
glary not only opened a window of opportunity for the police to put novel 
approaches and tools to practice but also generated a considerable number of 
interlinked pressures on police departments. The level of attention that predic-
tive policing was subjected to forced police departments to continually dem-
onstrate to governments, the media, and not least, the general public that they, 
as one police officer framed it, “tried everything to get on top of the burglary 
problem, to push the numbers down. Not just in terms of personnel, but also 
in terms of infrastructure, software, organization, everything” (I79). For the 
police, the ultimate way to prove that what they were doing was not a waste of 
taxpayers’ money would be to find a way to demonstrate that predictive polic-
ing had an actual, causal effect in terms of declining burglary rates. This turned 
out be rather problematic, however.
Epistemic uncertainties
The key assumption behind predictive policing is that custom- tailored crime 
prevention measures based on data- based prediction methods and resulting spa-
tiotemporal risk estimates should, if properly translated into operational pre-
vention measures, lead to less crime – which can then be equated with the 
successful implementation of the approach. The question is, however: How 
can “hard evidence” for success be conceptualized and demonstrated? Usually, 
evidence for any kind of new policy or tool would be presented in the form 
of statistics that show a significant and robust relationship between the measure 
and the desired goal. In the case of predictive policing, however, it is not clear 
exactly what should be considered success in the first place. Moreover, epis-
temic uncertainties render the measurement and statistical demonstration of 
success criteria rather difficult. During our research, we found that police 
departments were in fact struggling with the production of statistical evidence 
for the successful application of predictive policing methods.
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In the best case scenario, in order to statistically measure the impact of pre-
dictive policing one would need to conduct a study in an experimental setting 
that is both randomized and controlled. Only such a setting would make it 
possible to eliminate selection bias and intervening variables and thus establish 
causal relations between the independent and dependent variable (i.e., between 
patrolling based on risk estimates and variation in residential burglary num-
bers). To do so, one group would need to receive the treatment – that is, a 
selection of geographical areas (districts, neighborhoods, or streets) would need 
to be patrolled based on algorithmic crime predictions. Another group, the 
control group, would not receive this treatment. Not receiving the treatment 
could, for example, mean that the control group would be patrolled in a non-
directed, random fashion (Hunt et al., 2014). It could, however, also mean that 
the control group would be patrolled on the basis of human analysts’ recom-
mendations, as opposed to algorithmic calculations (Mohler et al., 2015). At 
the end of the experiment, crime statistics from the treatment and the control 
group could be compared, and variation in crime numbers between the groups 
could be attributed to the treatment, thus establishing statistical evidence that 
targeted patrols did or did not lead to declining burglary numbers.
The problem is that experiments in real- life social settings face a number of 
constraints (Harrison and List, 2004). Not only is it practically and ethically 
questionable to run experiments on public service provision, especially when 
this public service is security (Mohler et al., 2015: 1400), but it is also very 
difficult to properly randomize studies on predictive policing due to the idi-
osyncrasy of space. The idea behind randomization is that the overall sample 
covered by a study could be randomly distributed among the treatment group 
and the control group so that each element of the sample has an equal chance 
of being part of either the treatment or the control group. Running the same 
experiment with different randomized treatment/control groups and replicat-
ing the findings then ensures the robustness of the results. While this can be 
achieved in a straightforward fashion in a controlled laboratory setting, it does 
not easily translate to the real world. There is a lot of variation among cit-
ies, districts, neighborhoods, and even streets, which makes it difficult to cre-
ate reliable treatment and control groups from them. They differ in topology, 
infrastructures, architecture, and the sociodemographic characteristics of their 
population. Most importantly, however, they differ with regard to the occur-
rence of criminal activity. As Mohler et al. (2015: 1401) put it, “crime prob-
lems of one region are never strictly equivalent to those of another region”. 
This puts severe constraints on randomization as a key principle of statistical 
reasoning.
Moreover, it is almost impossible to run a social experiment in a controlled 
setting. Ideally, one would need to keep stable all variables that could have any 
effects on the dependent variable (i.e., crime statistics), except for the actual 
treatment variable (i.e., predictive policing). In this way, the measured effect 
could then be attributed to the treatment alone, and distortion by one or more 
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intervening variables could be ruled out. Again, such a setting can be realized 
comparatively easily in a laboratory environment where possibly interfering 
factors can be controlled for. However, complex real- world social settings with 
lots of uncontrollable dynamics present a major challenge for an evaluation of 
predictive policing effects. One police officer vividly illustrated what dynamic 
live environments mean for a possible attribution of causal effects:
Let’s say we have a risk area, effective from today. Then we increase 
patrols in this neighborhood. And when the burglar gets there, he will 
be observed by our PRECOBS forces and they watch him entering and 
exiting a house, and they arrest him. PRECOBS success. We had that 
two or three times. It becomes more difficult however when the neigh-
bor hears suspicious noises coming out of the apartment, and he calls the 
police and tells us: “I think someone broke into my neighbor’s apartment.” 
Now remember: this happens during a PRECOBS alert, and maybe we 
also have several regular patrol units nearby. Then the whole thing turns 
into a service call issue. We inform our patrols, they drive over there, see 
how the burglar exits the house, and they arrest him. Had there not been 
a PRECOBS alert, the service call would still have happened. The patrol 
would still have responded. Maybe they would have arrived 30 seconds 
later, who knows. So is the success due to PRECOBS or not? Hard to tell.
(I02)
In a controlled setting, there would not have been a vigilant neighbor. Depend-
ing on the study design, there might not have been a regular, random patrol in 
the area either. There would only have been a designated risk area patrol – and 
had that patrol caught the offender red- handed, this could have been directly 
attributed to algorithmic calculations and operational crime prevention meas-
ures based on the risk estimate. These measures, however, could have included 
additional activities besides patrolling. There could have been additional plain- 
clothed forces, or traffic controls, or maybe the police would have run a pre-
vention campaign that made residents more aware of burglary risks. The fact 
that crime prevention is not one single measure but often consists of a multi-
plicity of parallel activities that could create interaction effects presents a major 
challenge for the assessment of predictive policing. One of our interlocutors 
described this constellation in the following words:
Measuring the effect of preventive work is generally very difficult, particu-
larly when several prevention measures are active at the same time. And 
that was the case with PRECOBS. So we had community engagement 
officers who went from door to door and informed people about technical 
access protection, and why this would be a good idea at the moment. And 
PRECOBS analyses and targeted patrols ran simultaneously. And then we 
arrested someone because they attempted a burglary but failed. Did they 
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fail because of upgraded access protection or because of PRECOBS? You 
simply cannot tell what the reason was. We would need to run a study 
where we have one single preventive measure and an identical control 
group without that preventive measure. . . . Very difficult.
(I04)
The fact that it is extremely difficult to set up conditions under which the 
effects of predictive policing could be measured and analyzed does not, how-
ever, mean that this would be completely impossible. Coincidentally, the 
extraordinarily high numbers of migrants and the temporarily open borders 
of the European Union in 2015 had created a situation that at least resembled 
an experimental setting and provided the police with argumentative ground 
for the success of what they were doing. As one senior police officer recalled:
We had that whole refugee situation in the fall of 2015, quite massively in 
[city]. And the support forces that we usually assign for PRECOBS were 
not available because they were dispatched to help out with the refugee 
situation. And so what happened was the following: PRECOBS kept on 
producing alerts that indicated the risk of near repeats. And all of them 
actually happened. During that period we had a significant increase in resi-
dential burglaries in [city]. And thank God that happened. I mean every 
burglary is one too many, but that was just the right thing with regard to 
methodology, because it demonstrated: if you take away the forces that are 
usually on patrol, then all of a sudden there’s crime again in these areas.
(I02)
Evidence from this situation would need to be considered anecdotal at best. It 
does, however, foreground normative issues in studying the effects of predic-
tive policing. Producing a situation like the one described would create severe 
ethical concerns. As we discussed in Chapter  7 and will pick up again in 
Chapter 9, police presence and crime prevention should for the sake of justice 
in principle be more or less equally distributed. The police’s mandate prescribes 
the protection of the entire population and a deliberate exposure of selected 
subgroups (i.e., neighborhoods or streets) to less crime prevention and thus 
higher risk should therefore be ruled out.
More epistemic trouble with regard to predictive policing and crime pre-
vention is caused by possible displacement effects (Gabor, 1981; Cornish and 
Clarke, 1987). Based on the same assumption of rational actor behavior that 
underpins crime prevention theories, crime displacement theory assumes that 
prevention measures will not actually prevent the occurrence of crime in the 
first place but simply push criminals to other geographical areas where no (or 
at least fewer) prevention measures are in place (Bowers et al., 2011; Johnson 
et al., 2014). Moreover, the likelihood of displacement effects will, under the 
assumption of a rationally acting criminal, increase when the knowledge base 
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for crime prevention is made publicly available. Our interviewees in fact sus-
pected that media reports about predictive policing software could have ren-
dered other jurisdictions (spatial displacement), times (temporal displacement), 
or types of offences (offence displacement) more attractive (I02; I03; I06; I07; 
I36; I41; I43; I44; I76; I77; I80). The following statement illustrates how this 
turned out problematic for the question of whether the success of predictive 
policing could be proven:
It’s easy to say [that burglary numbers go down] because we dispatch more 
patrols. But we will probably never know what the real reason was. When 
the “opposing party” notices what is going on, that we increase patrols 
after a reported burglary . . . that could be a reason why we don’t get so 
many near repeats. That they have done their research. It has been in the 
media a couple times.
(I29)
Measuring potential displacement effects is not easy, and during our research, 
no evidence for actual displacement effects was available. In fact, crime statis-
tics in neighboring jurisdictions with no predictive policing measures did not 
show sudden or unusual increases in residential burglary activity, thus implying 
that predictive policing did not produce any measurable spatial adjustments in 
residential burglary activity (I02; I16; I48). The apparent lack of spatial dis-
placement was thereby largely attributed to the “sunk costs” that professional 
criminal behavior produces – that is, that burglars need to invest considerable 
time and resources to scout particular neighborhoods and that in case these 
neighborhoods should become subject to increased police presence and other 
target hardening measures, they would simply not be able to readjust their 
scope to other jurisdictions in a timely enough fashion (P38).
As the aforementioned statement also highlights, media coverage and the 
public availability of information about predictive policing activities pose 
another problem for the measurement of successful crime prevention. Most 
police departments, as we discussed in Chapter 6, did not actively disseminate 
information about risk areas to the public. Nonetheless, predictive policing was 
a pertinent topic in news media throughout our research period, both nation-
ally and locally. In particular, local media reports about police activity in the 
fight against residential burglary were framed by our interviewees as ambigu-
ous: On the one hand, they were considered welcome PR for the police’s 
active and innovative efforts to protect the public, while on the other hand, 
there were concerns that such reports would also be noticed by offenders and 
used to their advantage (I02; I29). Professional burglars who did their research 
would in this sense be able to “game the system” and use an understanding of 
spatial patterns and near- repeat theory to restructure their activities. Equally, 
they could mobilize available information about trigger and anti- trigger crite-
ria in order to adjust their modus operandi – that is, actively trying to conceal 
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their work as nonprofessional in order to prevent the software from producing 
an alert.
Some of our interviewees also hinted at larger regional trends that could have 
played a role in the development of crime statistics regardless of whether or not 
police departments used predictive policing software. Residential burglary had 
more or less simultaneously become a pertinent problem in many German and 
Swiss states (as well as in other European countries) between 2010 and 2012, 
whereas a less sharp, yet similarly ubiquitous, trend in the opposite direction 
could be observed roughly after 2014/2015. This broader tendency toward 
decreasing residential burglary numbers was not limited to those areas where 
predictive policing had been implemented. In light of these overall statistics, 
police departments struggled to situate their work with predictive policing soft-
ware vis- à- vis larger trends. One senior officer framed the situation as follows:
What’s also interesting, of course, is when we have a decrease [of residential 
burglary numbers] in [city A] and [city B]. And the other districts, where 
they don’t use PRECOBS, also have a decrease in that same period of 
time. Why do they have the same effects that we have? Would we have had 
them anyway, because the others had them as well? Or do we exert some 
kind of influence on them, including via the media? Do criminals avoid 
the whole region because of PRECOBS? We can’t answer these questions.
(I02)
Others voiced the suspicion that larger crime trends had nothing to do with 
predictive policing in the first place. Arguing on the assumption that a large 
proportion of professional burglars would come to Western European countries 
from Eastern Europe for orchestrated raids, they considered increased coopera-
tion with Eastern European police agencies, as well as the temporary reinstate-
ment of border controls in the Schengen zone, as major factors for declining 
overall numbers. The reasoning here was that cross- border police cooperation 
would lead to higher conviction and incarceration rates of known offenders in 
their home countries, while border controls would increase the risk of being 
identified and arrested and thus de- incentivize criminals from coming to Ger-
many, Switzerland, and other Western European countries (I43).
Taken together, all these factors considerably complicate the gathering of 
evidence for the success of predictive policing. However, an even larger issue 
undermining the measurement of successful crime prevention lies in the fun-
damental contingency of the future. For a long time, security professionals 
have sought to get a grip of the future in order to fold it back into the present 
and make it amenable to interventions so that specific, desired futures would 
unfold and other, undesired futures would be prevented. Arguably, the trend 
toward anticipatory security methods and tools has been aggravated by events 
such as 9/11 and has been further enabled by the onslaught of data that are 
now produced and turned into predictions on an everyday basis (Amoore and 
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de Goede, 2008; Anderson, 2010; Aradau and van Munster, 2011). The case 
of predictive policing vividly illustrates how the police are participating in this 
quest to tame the future.
However, whether anticipatory modes of knowledge production are framed 
in terms of risk, probability, preemption, prevention, or even possibility, what 
unites them is the fact they have to face the general openness of the future. 
Each specific mode of addressing the future produces a specific set of possible 
narratives that depend on the methods and the data mobilized to create them. 
None of them might ever materialize, though. Contingency prescribes that 
any set of calculated, imagined, or otherwise enacted futures is possible but not 
necessary. The future, in other words, might turn out to be crime ridden – but 
it might as well remain peaceful.
In predictive policing, it must thus always be kept in mind that crime pre-
dictions are precisely that – statistical predictions that have been brought into 
being under the conditions of practical constraints and theoretical assumptions, 
the most important of them being the assumption of rationality in human 
behavior. Predictions thus may or may not be accurate, and they may easily be 
canceled out by human behavior that does not follow the paradigm of rational 
choice. What if a criminal decides to go with their gut feeling rather than act-
ing on the basis of meticulous cost- benefit calculations? Or what if it is simply 
bad weather conditions that deter an offender from “going to work” rather 
than prevention measures carried out by the police? One police officer framed 
general conditions of contingency and their epistemic effects as follows:
If an offender doesn’t strike, we have no idea whether he was really dis-
couraged by enhanced patrols or whether there were other reasons. Maybe 
he got sick, or he would have moved on [to a different city or neighbor-
hood] anyway.
(I76)
Sure enough, if no burglaries materialize in a designated risk area, one could 
consider preventive police work as successful. But maybe the offense would 
not have happened anyway, even without predictive policing – maybe even 
without any police patrols at all. Measuring something that has not happened, 
is not happening, and may never happen is something of a conundrum. If 
predicted criminal activity does not materialize, does this actually mean that 
the prognosis was correct and criminal activity was prevented due to preven-
tion measures based on the prediction? Or does it, quite on the contrary, mean 
that the prediction was not correct in the first place? The police will likely 
never find out what would have happened in counterfactual scenarios. As one 
officer put it:
In the end, it’s impossible to measure. That’s our problem. When we 
increase patrols and nothing happens, when we offensively demonstrate 
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presence in uniform, for a full week, when we check license plates and 
persons – we still won’t be able to say that we actually prevented crimes 
because of our work.
(I06)
While the combination of diverse epistemic uncertainties renders it almost 
impossible for the police to come up with robust evidence that predictive 
policing actually helps to prevent crime, it equally well renders it quite difficult 
to understand which parts of predictive policing would have failed in case of an 
assumed non- effect of risk estimates and operational crime prevention measures 
(Hunt et al., 2014; Gerstner, 2017). Were the underlying data faulty or 
incomplete? Was the model of the software or the algorithm flawed? Did the 
human operator accept or reject the wrong system recommendations? Were 
police internal communication structures for the dissemination of crime risk 
inadequate? Did patrol units consciously neglect predictive policing orders, or 
were they simply swamped with calls for service and had no time to properly 
patrol risk areas? Along the complex chain of translations that make up pre-
dictive policing, any single element or a combination of these elements could 
be the one that disrupts the production and transmission of knowledge and 
power, thus thwarting any potential impact of crime prevention measures on 
the criminal environment.
In summary, there is a rather stark contrast between the epistemic uncer-
tainties that surround predictive policing and its “success” in fighting crime 
on the one hand and the considerable financial and organizational resources 
that governments and police departments have spent on the procurement and 
implementation of predictive policing software. After all, staff needed to be 
trained, work processes needed to be adapted, in some cases IT infrastructure 
needed to be overhauled, and some departments even used the implementa-
tion of predictive policing as an opportunity to restructure their crime analysis 
divisions (I02; I18; I35; I31; I36; I48; P 61). These efforts inevitably raise the 
question of how police departments managed to justify the continuous use of 
predictive policing software against the backdrop of an apparent lack of hard 
evidence for its effects.
Redefining success
Faced with the lack of statistical proof for the effects of predictive policing 
and targeted crime prevention, police departments came up with a number of 
ways to redefine success criteria, such that the use of algorithmic crime analysis 
software could nonetheless be presented as a valuable addition to their toolbox 
and its use could be continued. The arguably most pertinent strategy was to 
abandon the idea of evidence in the first place. Instead of trying to come up 
with viable measurements and statistical evaluations, police departments would 
opt to simply stick to crime numbers. Indeed, in many cases, the declining 
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residential burglary statistics (i.e., the development of burglary cases since pre-
dictive policing had been implemented) could in a vacuum be interpreted as 
success and be rather easily presented as such to politicians and the public. 
During the time of our research, some police departments recorded a decrease 
in residential burglary numbers in the range of 10% (I18), 30% (I02), or even 
40% (I17). This ties in with reports from other jurisdictions that also recorded 
decreases of between 20% and 30% (I32; I43; I44; I48). For our interlocu-
tors, these numbers could be considered to speak for themselves, never mind 
whether there was actual evidence that they could be attributed to the use of 
predictive policing software. As one senior officer put it:
After the trial run, we felt like our experiences were good. And funnily 
enough, residential burglary numbers went down by 30%. PRECOBS yes 
or no – doesn’t matter. It was 30% less, so we could not really argue that 
it wasn’t getting the job done. That’s the experience that we had. . . . Of 
course we did a lot, we had a lot of patrols in the streets, we also increased 
controls. With predictive policing, there are lots of things in the mix: patrol 
presence, the software, new internal organization forms. But the success 
validated our approach. What exactly caused it did not even matter.
(I79)
Such an outcome- oriented perspective on predictive policing was in many 
cases also backed up by official political positions. The ministerial response to 
one of our inquiries included the following statement with regard to the suc-
cess of the KrimPro software package:
For the first nine months of 2016, statistics indicate an increase of residen-
tial burglaries by 5.8% (compared to the previous year period). Since the 
KrimPro trial started in October of 2016, monthly residential burglary 
numbers have consistently been below the numbers for the respective pre-
vious month. . . . Expectations regarding the implementation of KrimPro 
in all six districts have been met. Whether the effects can be attributed to 
the use of KrimPro is not clear. . . . Regular implementation will be rolled 
out gradually.
(I38)
Rather than looking for “real” (i.e., epistemically viable) evidence to demon-
strate the success of predictive policing and justify its continued application, 
for both police departments and governments, it was seemingly sufficient to be 
able to show that the original problem (i.e., high residential burglary numbers) 
had been effectively addressed. Instead of critically questioning how declining 
burglary numbers came about, the actors involved were, in this sense, willing 
to let the numbers speak for themselves in order to effectively brush aside epis-
temic uncertainties and methodological critique.
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This stance, though, has profound implications for how the police under-
stand and address the complex relations between society, space, and crime. 
Without proper statistical proof of whether (and what elements of) predictive 
policing did or did not work, there can be no inferences about the underly-
ing root structures of crime. Predictive policing will thus by default be lim-
ited to a treatment of symptoms rather than addressing the causes of criminal 
phenomena (Wilson, 2018: 124; Završnik, 2018: 142). A “numbers only” 
approach to predictive policing, in this sense, resembles the “good enough 
theory” approach that police agencies in the US in the 1980s resorted to in 
response to the predominant penal pessimism that had resulted from fruitless 
attempts to address the root causes of crime (Martinson, 1974; Weisburd et al., 
2017). The subsequent mentality was to throw any promising new method at 
crime without insisting on a robust theoretical understanding of the complex 
relationships between crime, society, and the police – as long as it was seen to 
be workable and produced the desired results. Without proper comprehension 
of its epistemic underpinnings and its effects on society and space, predictive 
policing could fall into a similar trap. We will discuss this question in more 
detail in the following chapter.
However, the invocation of numbers was not the only strategy that could be 
observed as a way of turning predictive policing into a success despite the lack 
of statistical evidence. Initial trial runs with predictive policing software were in 
most police departments followed up by formal evaluation studies. The results 
and recommendations of these studies were considered crucial for whether 
departments would proceed with algorithmic crime analyses and targeted pre-
vention measures. Evaluations were either conducted internally or contracted 
to external research institutes. While the results of such studies are usually 
not publicly accessible, some departments decided to publish them. The most 
pertinent available studies come from three German states: the report on the 
SKALA software developed by the State Police Department of North Rhine- 
Westphalia (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein- Westfalen, 2018b, 2018a; Dungs 
and Erzberger, 2020), the report on the PreMAP software developed by the 
State Police Department of Lower Saxony (Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 
2018, 2019; Gluba, 2020), and the report on the PRECOBS pilot study in 
Baden- Württemberg (Gerstner, 2017, 2018, 2019).
Especially the SKALA report, conducted by the State Police Department 
in cooperation with the independent social science research institute GISS1 
(Landeskriminalamt Niedersachsen, 2018), paints a surprising picture of what 
police departments file under “success” with regard to predictive policing. 
Rather than opting for an impact evaluation (i.e., foregrounding the effects of 
risk estimates and targeted patrols on crime prevention), the report reframes 
the success of predictive policing in terms of a much broader process evalua-
tion that covers organizational aspects that go way beyond a narrow technical 
scope of risk estimation and crime statistics (Dungs and Erzberger, 2020: 201). 
Overall residential burglary numbers were in this case considered as only one 
Does it work, though? 181
of six main criteria for the evaluation of whether predictive policing should be 
continued after the initial trial phase.
The full list of evaluation criteria, as defined by the report, reads as fol-
lows: (1) risk estimates for all included neighborhoods have been calculated, 
visualized, and ordered by magnitude; (2) SKALA has been successfully imple-
mented in all departments participating in the project, and risk estimates have 
been integrated into the situational picture and daily operations; (3) patrols 
can be dispatched more effectively; (4) the more effective use of patrols leads 
to improved operational measures; (5) improved operational measures lead 
to decreasing case numbers and an increase in clearance rates; (6) the system 
opens up new potentials for crime prevention (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein- 
Westfalen, 2018b: 35f). Similarly, the PreMAP report highlights how, although 
no direct effects on crime numbers could be proven, the software had unfolded 
positive effects on communication structures and cross- unit cooperation and 
had accelerated the process of equipping patrol units with mobile devices. 
Moreover, it highlights the successful in- house development of the soft-
ware without reliance on external expertise or resources (Landeskriminalamt 
Niedersachsen, 2018: 48).
Such evaluation criteria, needless to say, differ quite a bit from an under-
standing of success in terms of decreasing crime numbers. Rather, they cor-
respond closely with a more holistic understanding of predictive policing as 
a process that is embedded within complex organizational structures, and it 
speaks to issues of potential resistance as much as it speaks to the sociotech-
nical character of predictive policing. Implementing new technological tools 
within police organizations, as we discussed in Chapter 3, is not an easy task. 
As predictive policing software forms a number of sociotechnical relations with 
functionally differentiated environments, it needs to align both human actors 
and other technical tools and infrastructures. The SKALA evaluation report 
foregrounds such alignment work as an accomplishment that must in itself be 
considered a success. While it might appear rather banal that the police were 
able to compute risk estimates and disseminate them throughout their organi-
zational structure, it is, as we have seen throughout the previous chapters, by 
no means self- evident that police departments would be able to seamlessly 
integrate predictive policing software into entrenched occupational cultures 
and work practices.
In fact, many of the success criteria identified by the SKALA report speak 
to an understanding of predictive policing as a chain of translation activities 
that enable risk to come into being and travel through several stages of police 
work. Predictive policing, from such a perspective, could be considered suc-
cessful if it triggers organizational adaptation. In other words, the capability 
of police departments to translate data into action without breakdowns along 
the way would in itself be a more profound achievement than short- term sta-
tistical reductions in residential burglary numbers. The implementation of the 
complex sociotechnical processes that predictive policing requires could just 
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as well be considered as a positive indicator for further reform in terms of IT 
infrastructure and analytics. Success criteria are moreover already geared toward 
possible future functionality upgrades of the software, such as successful inte-
gration of data from other sources into the system and an expansion of analyti-
cal capacities (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein- Westfalen, 2018b: 137). We will 
discuss these trends in more depth in Chapter 10.
Notably, not all of the evaluation studies produced positive outcomes. The 
Ministry of the Interior of Baden- Württemberg, after two rounds of rather 
controversial evaluation of PRECOBS (the results of the second round have at 
the time of writing not yet been published; for the first round, see Gerstner, 
2017, 2019), decided in 2019 to discontinue the use of the software package 
(Mayer, 2019). Ironically, a major political criticism of the use of predictive 
policing software was that, due to the massive decrease in residential burglary 
case numbers, no robust statements about the quality of the algorithmically 
produced risk estimates could be made (I44; D18; P71). Moreover, the lack 
of increased arrest rates in risk areas was also interpreted as an indicator for the 
lack of effects (Mayer, 2019). Similarly, the Cantonal Police of Zurich, unlike 
the Municipal Police, also decided to discontinue the use of PRECBOS in 
2019 after an initial test phase (D363). Major criteria for that decision were the 
complicated integration of the software into the IT infrastructure of the orga-
nization, the rather high number of baseline cases required for the meaningful 
application of the software in everyday use, and the restriction of the experi-
ment to residential burglary (Schneider and Leutenegger, 2020). Both the State 
Police Department of Baden- Württemberg and the Cantonal Police of Zurich 
have stressed, however, that their respective decisions should be understood as 
decisions against a specific software package, and not against predictive policing 
in general. The Cantonal Police of Zurich in this sense decided to explore in- 
house development capacities for predictive policing software (D363).
Conclusion
In summary, the question of whether predictive policing actually works is not 
easily answered. However, it is not a single question either. Depending on 
how one conceptualizes the “success” of predictive policing, how one decides 
to operationalize and measure success factors, and how one seeks to establish 
evidence, questions and possible answers will differ quite considerably. We have 
in this chapter discussed how public pressure and the political prioritization 
of the fight against residential burglary have served as catalysts for the imple-
mentation of predictive policing and have created the demand for proof that it 
actually yields results. Police departments, as we have shown, faced a number of 
pressures vis- à- vis this constellation. Not only did they have to cope with unre-
alistic expectations in terms of the effects of predictive policing but they also 
needed to rapidly integrate new software into their working routines, present 
themselves as innovative actors mobilizing the latest cutting- edge technological 
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advances, and demonstrate that they were not lagging behind other police 
departments in the fight against crime.
These pressures stand in stark contrast to the epistemic uncertainties that sur-
round the possibilities of actually measuring the impact of predictive policing 
and targeted crime prevention measures. Establishing causal claims that “prove” 
that it was actually predictive policing that brought about a reduction in resi-
dential burglary numbers is an almost insurmountable task. In complex social 
settings with dynamic interaction effects, there are numerous possible inter-
vening variables that can hardly be controlled. Moreover, contingency renders 
possible criminal futures as possible yet not necessary, thus crucially limiting the 
possibility of making definite statements about the reasons for the occurrence 
or non- occurrence of events.
In light of these quandaries, police departments found rather creative ways 
of bypassing epistemic troubles. Apart from framing the favorable develop-
ment of crime statistics as proof in itself, they managed to reformulate suc-
cess criteria from a narrow focus on statistical relations between independent 
(i.e., predictive policing and targeted crime prevention) and dependent (i.e., 
residential burglary numbers) variables into a wider agenda of organizational 
reform. By focusing on the successful production and translation of knowledge 
and power, a processual perspective on success goes beyond specific software 
packages or even predictive policing itself, as it foregrounds the sociotechnical 
future- readiness of police departments in terms of data, algorithms, and the 
capacity to enact any kind of digital intelligence in the streets.
Note
 1 Gesellschaft für innovative Sozialforschung und Sozialplanung e.v., Bremen (Association 
for Innovative Research and Social Planning), https://giss- ev.de (accessed 30 April 2020).
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The impact of predictive policing on police work, as we discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, has been systematically explored by a number of evaluation studies. 
The focus of these studies was, by design, on the police themselves. They have 
assessed whether targeted crime prevention measures based on algorithmically 
produced risk estimates do actually stop the occurrence of crime. Faced with 
a number of epistemic quandaries that make statements about a causal relation 
between predictive policing and crime numbers difficult or even impossible, 
they have chosen to partly redefine success in terms of the effects of algorith-
mic crime analysis tools on larger organizational capabilities for handling data 
and communicating intelligence. However, studies that analyze the effects of 
predictive policing on police work are only one side of the coin. The other 
side of that coin is how algorithmically produced crime predictions affect the 
relations between the police and society.
This chapter is dedicated to a systematic exploration of the normative and 
ethical aspects of predictive policing. A critical perspective on predictive polic-
ing and society should not be limited to an assessment of the technical perils 
and pitfalls of algorithmic risk calculations but should also include considera-
tions of the real- world implications that targeted crime prevention measures 
based on algorithmic calculations can unfold (Degeling and Berendt, 2018: 
355; Benbouzid, 2019: 129f). Policing is a fundamental function of the state’s 
monopoly of violence, and the actions of police officers are bound to inter-
fere at times with people’s lives, including their physical integrity and morally 
and legally enshrined values such as privacy and intimacy. There is a fine line 
between legitimate and illegitimate police action, and the boundary between 
what the police are allowed and forbidden to do vis- à- vis the protection of 
civil liberties and human rights on the one hand and the execution of necessary 
coercive force on the other is constantly being renegotiated through normative 
considerations and court decisions.
Bringing a new technological tool into this fragile balance can have con-
siderable effects. Predictive policing, as we have shown, redefines to a certain 
extent how the police produce knowledge about society and crime, and it 




crime prevention measures directly affect citizens, and they have an effect on 
how the police and their actions are perceived by the population. As predictive 
policing respecifies where police presence is considered particularly effective, 
it redistributes the provision of policing as a service throughout space – being 
welcomed by some, and seen by others as a nuisance or a threat.
As has become apparent throughout the previous chapters, there are in fact a 
number of ways in which crime predictions can turn out to be “bad”. They can 
be plain wrong – for instance, because they are based on faulty or incomplete 
data or because there were errors in modeling or in the programming of the soft-
ware – and send patrols into neighborhoods where there is no increased crime 
risk after all. They can, however, just as well be “bad” in terms of the behavior 
they encourage or the policing strategies they enable and reinforce. And they can 
even be “bad” because they undercut traditional forms of knowledge generation 
and decision- making and replace it with opaque, automated processes that lead 
to a lack of accountability for subsequent action. “Bad” predictions should in this 
sense be broadly understood in terms of the possible undesirable effects predictive 
policing can unfold at the interface between the police and society.
Several issues are particularly pertinent for data- driven analytical tools, 
including the production and perpetuation of bias in computational processes 
(Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996; Barocas and Selbst, 2016) and the lack of 
transparency in complex and black- boxed systems (Zarsky, 2013; Kroll et al., 
2017). In the words of Ferguson (2019: 497), predictive policing “involves 
real risk when it comes to justice, equality, and protecting individual liberty”, 
and there is no shortage of critical legal and ethical literature that has analyzed 
the effects of prediction tools for policing and criminal justice on civil liber-
ties and human rights (Ferguson, 2012; Bennett Moses and Chan, 2014; Joh, 
2014; Miller, 2014; Ferguson, 2015; Koss, 2015; Angwin et  al., 2016; Lum 
and Isaac, 2016; Barrett, 2017; Ferguson, 2017a; Selbst, 2017; Bakke, 2018; 
Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018; Robinson, 2018; Mann and Matzner, 2019; 
O’Donnell, 2019; Susser, forthcoming).
Most of the available literature on predictive policing and civil liberties/
human rights, however, is geared toward person- based approaches to risk 
profiling and primarily addresses how threat/vulnerability comes into being 
based on information about individual persons and their social networks. Many 
arguments presented in these analyses are thus only applicable to place- based 
predictive policing approaches in a limited fashion (Albrecht, 2020). Software 
packages such as PRECOBS currently do not process individual data. With 
reference to the nonuse of such sensitive information, software manufacturers 
and police representatives alike have in fact tried to brush aside normative and 
legal concerns about predictive policing (Rey, 2014; Okon, 2015; Schweer and 
Schweer, 2015; Schweer, 2015, 2018, 2020).
There are, however, nonetheless a number of issues that warrant caution 
even in place- based approaches to predictive policing. In this chapter, we high-
light how technoscientific tools and methods can cloak bias and injustice in 
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an alleged neutrality and impartiality of machines, how the data foundations 
of predictive policing can perpetuate bias and produce feedback loops, how 
spatial risk estimates impact the production of suspicion and physical inter-
vention, how targeted crime prevention perpetuates a focus on the treatment 
of symptoms rather than addressing the root causes of crime, and how the 
accountability of the police as an institution might be in danger due to a lack 
of transparency in complex algorithmic analysis tools.
The cloak of technoscience
Technology is usually equated with innovation (Rogers, 2003; Godin and 
Vinck, 2017), and such innovation has regularly been understood as a means to 
address prevailing social and economic problems and build a better future (Ellul, 
1965; Moravec, 1988; Kurzweil, 1992). A rather common theme in narratives 
of technoscientific progress is to highlight how machines are able to overcome 
human deficiencies – be it because they can lift heavy things, exercise complex 
calculations with large quantities of data, or simply because they do not tire or 
need a break (Sheridan and Verplank, 1978; Parasuraman and Wickens, 2008). 
More importantly, there is an implicit assumption that machines do not make 
mistakes. As long as a forklift is properly constructed and a software application 
is properly programmed, following this perspective, they will reliably execute 
their tasks and not produce the random failure or error that is so inherent 
in human behavior. Humans make mistakes for many reasons, be it because 
they are incapable, overburdened, or distracted. But they also make “mistakes” 
because their perception of the world and specific situations is preconfigured by 
prejudice that impacts judgment and decision- making. Proponents of techno-
scientific tools argue that machines would be free from such prejudice, as they 
assess situations based on facts alone, thus rendering their judgment impartial, 
accurate, objective, and fair (Balabanian, 2006; Wolf, 2010).
Although, as we discussed at some length in Chapter  3, such simplistic 
assumptions have long been deconstructed, they remain surprisingly persistent 
(Miller, 2020). Advocates of predictive policing tools use them to frame algo-
rithmic risk production and targeted crime prevention as a remedy for many of 
the problems the police have been blamed for, including prejudice, racism, pro-
filing, and a lack of fairness and just distribution of services (Ferguson, 2017b: 
28f; Sanders and Sheptycki, 2017: 10; Shapiro, 2019). Building on the pre-
sumption that a machine, unlike a human officer, will not care about skin color, 
social status, kinships, or neighborhoods, predictive policing is thus advertised 
as a way of effectively “eliminat[ing] the bias that people have” (Malinowski, 
cit. in Goode, 2011) and addressing existing concerns about the compliance of 
police work with civil liberties and human rights.
An understanding of predictive policing as a technoscientific cure for entrenched 
“human problems” is additionally supported by a second narrative that seeks to 
establish predictive policing as superior to error- prone human behavior: the 
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invocation of science. Science, it is widely believed, is an impartial endeavor that 
is exclusively driven by the desire to accumulate facts in the pursuit of universal 
knowledge (Fuller, 2003). There are, in such an understanding, no politics in facts, 
and scientific theories reflect the best knowledge about a phenomenon that is cur-
rently available. Predictive policing tools are, following this logic, designed based 
on criminological theories, which are in turn derived from empirical research, 
and their hypotheses have been tested and proven multiple times, thus lending 
predictive policing a “seal of scientific approval” (Jefferson, 2018: 11).
It almost goes without saying that science is never the value- free project 
it is at times presented as (Collins, 1985; Latour and Woolgar, 1986; Daston 
and Galison, 2007). Scientific knowledge is by no means uniform or unani-
mously accepted but is characterized by a multiplicity of paradigms, theories, 
and methods – some of which stand in stark contrast to each other and pro-
duce continuous debate and contestation with regard to how we should under-
stand and interpret the world. And yet, its popular appeal of being somehow 
above prejudice, politics, or petty conflicts comes in handy to present predic-
tive policing as something that is based on pure reason and the power of the 
superior argument alone.
Taken together, the narratives of science and technology can be used to effec-
tively deflect any critique of predictive policing technology itself and its effects. 
Predictive policing in this sense comes with a shiny algorithmic façade that 
“tech- washes” (Crockford, cit. in Burrington, 2015) its practices and effects. 
The possibility of “bad” predictions that discriminate, exclude, overexpose, 
or violate should, if one was willing to accept these premises, thus be looked 
for outside the sanitized realm of algorithmic crime analysis itself. Predictive 
policing would in this sense be largely “immune” to any allegations made with 
regard to the possible infringement of civil liberties and human rights.
As we have shown in this book, such a techno- solutionist narrative of pre-
dictive policing of course fundamentally neglects the sociotechnical effects that 
are inevitably produced once technologies become institutionally implemented 
and are put into practice. No technological tool and its capacities can be ana-
lyzed in an isolated fashion. On the contrary, technology must be carefully 
placed in social and organizational contexts, and it must be analyzed through 
the multiplicity of relations that it forms with its environment. Any kind of 
predictive policing, this much should have become clear by now, is a highly 
selective assembly of data, theories, modeling, organizational practices, and 
operational crime prevention measures. While this complicates the analysis of 
societal drawbacks, it makes it very clear that for police departments and politi-
cians alike there is no easy way to evade responsibility for “bad” predictions.
Data and bias
Critical algorithm and data studies have highlighted the social constructed-
ness of data (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Gitelman, 2013; Kitchin, 2014). Data 
190 “Bad” predictions
do not exist independent of their production, and such production inevitably 
functions as a selection mechanism that determines what will be represented in 
a dataset and what will be left out. Moreover, data are not only actively con-
structed; their construction takes place with specific use cases always already 
in mind, thus predefining to a large extent how data take shape in order to fit 
into classification systems, how they can be combined with other data, and 
how they can be processed and analytical value extracted from them. In sum-
mary, data are never raw and cannot be innocent in the sense of providing an 
untainted reflection of the world.
Moreover, the relation between crime and data is a difficult one. Crime 
data are notorious for their shaky quality. When the police produce data from 
crime scenes, there are usually lots of unknowns and uncertainties, rendering 
the resulting datasets prone to be incomplete and/or faulty. Although police 
departments aim to mediate concerns about the data basis for predictive polic-
ing through multiple layers of quality control, questions about its accuracy and 
reliability must always be asked. We discussed these issues at length in Chapter 4. 
Rather than reviewing them once more, we want at this point to draw attention 
to how bias can in predictive policing be perpetuated and create feedback loops 
that project it into the production of criminal futures that need to be patrolled.
Bias (i.e., the selective representation and/or over- /underrepresentation of 
specific features in a dataset) is in fact one of the most persistent issues for any 
kind of data analysis (Barocas and Selbst, 2016). Disparities in a dataset are not 
only likely to prevail throughout algorithmic processes but equally likely to be 
extended, transformed, and, in the worst- case scenario, both aggravated and 
hidden in alleged machine rationality (Gandy, 2010). Questions of bias are 
pertinent for predictive policing for various reasons. First of all, not all crime is 
known to the police. Only crime that has been detected or reported becomes 
part of official crime data and thus part of any analysis (Biderman and Reiss, 
1967). Undetected and unreported crime cannot be represented, thus render-
ing the data basis for predictive policing almost inevitably partial.
Residential burglary, as we detailed in Chapter  4, is less affected by this 
problem than other types of crime, as it is usually directly reported by burglary 
victims and so requires no active control activities. Private property is in the 
majority of cases insured, and burglary victims have an intrinsic interest in get-
ting the police involved and producing official documentation for insurance 
purposes. While there is usually a rather good data basis with regard to domes-
tic burglary, this might be much more difficult for types of crime that are only 
detected by the presence of police officers. Drug dealing, for example, is highly 
unlikely to be reported by those involved and will thus usually go unnoticed 
unless actively discovered by police controls.
This means that although there might be a patterned spatiotemporal distri-
bution of incidents that is similar to domestic burglary, any estimates for areas 
and times of the day with an increased likelihood for drug dealing might be 
highly biased and represent earlier police activity rather than actual numbers. 
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In short, different types of crime come with different types of bias, and not all 
of them are equally suitable for algorithmic crime analysis (I02; I16; I44; I51; 
I62; P49). Particularly vis- à- vis the expansion tendencies of predictive policing 
that we will highlight in the next chapter, not only the existence of bias in the 
first place but also the existence of different kinds of bias should thus always be 
kept in mind.
Predictive policing software perceives the world exclusively on the basis of 
the data it is presented with. Even a “perfect” algorithm – if there was such a 
thing – would produce biased results based on biased data. Spatial bias result-
ing from crime data production as a function of patrolling and selective police 
activity could thus, as Edwards (2016) puts it, in fact turn predictive policing 
from a practice of predicting crime into a practice of “predicting policing”. 
Spatial bias relating to the past could, in other words, turn into spatial bias relat-
ing to the future – indicating a greater likelihood of finding crime in those areas 
where most crime was actively detected in the past.
A similar problem occurs when arrest data are used as input for predictive 
policing (Ferguson, 2017b: 74f). Arrests are highly contingent on the actions 
and decisions of individual police officers. Whereas one officer might decide to 
take an intoxicated driver to the station to let them sober up (thus producing 
official documentation and data), another officer might decide to let them off 
with a warning as long as they are willing to leave the vehicle in a parking lot 
and call for a taxi instead. Predictive policing in this sense would mean rep-
licating individual choices on where to patrol, who to control, and not least, 
discrete decisions on whether/how to apply the rules.
Another problematic aspect with regard to data bias is that not all criminals 
are equally likely to be detected by the police. The risk of being arrested for 
illegal activities is often unequally distributed among the population and/or 
space, with ethnic monitories and inhabitants of poor and/or already crime- 
ridden neighborhoods having a greater chance of being controlled, getting 
arrested, and/or being prosecuted (Weitzer and Tuch, 2006; Bowling and 
Philipps, 2007; Reiner, 2010: 159ff; Brantingham et al., 2018: 2; Chavis, 2019: 
465). Biased police practices in turn become reflected in crime data that show 
a distorted account of the empirical distribution of crime between different 
population groups and neighborhoods. Crime analyses based on these data are 
subsequently likely to overrepresent certain ethnic groups and areas as more 
dangerous/vulnerable (Sheehey, 2019: 57). Such bias might even persist when 
individual identifiers are removed, as space and ethnic belonging are often 
linked (O’Neil, 2016: 87).
As a consequence, predictive policing can lead to significant overpolicing 
of specific communities or neighborhoods, in turn rendering them even more 
susceptible to the detection of further criminal activity, thus creating a feedback 
loop that reinforces data bias over time and can potentially perpetuate suppos-
edly short- lived risk estimates and turn neighborhoods into perceived crime 
hot spots, leading to long- term spatial stigmatization (Završnik, 2018: 12). This 
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can also include secondary consequences, such as declining real estate prices 
and property values (Rosenbaum, 2019).
The extrapolation of the data basis into the future is a general danger that 
any kind of risk- oriented analysis faces vis- à- vis biased data. When operational 
measures are planned and carried out based on insights that came into being 
through biased data, such measures are likely to reproduce the discriminatory 
actions that led to the bias in the first place. Moreover, as this happens, they are 
likely to “confirm” that bias by finding what would be expected based on the 
selective representation and/or over- /underrepresentation of specific features 
in the dataset. Crime predictions can, through the algorithmic perpetuation 
of bias, become self- fulfilling prophecies that create the crime risk they aim 
to predict (Lum and Isaac, 2016; Ensign et al., 2018; Richardson et al., 2019). 
Ultimately, persistent data bias could escalate predictive policing into a per-
petuum mobile, where crime prediction and crime prevention enter “circular 
decision- making loops ad infinitum” (Završnik, 2019: 12). Being conscious 
about the data that go into predictive policing, in summary, is paramount when 
trying to understand how algorithmic crime analysis tools – even assuming that 
there is absolutely nothing wrong with how they model and execute the detec-
tion of patterns – can reinforce discrimination and stigmatization.
Suspicion and intervention
In Chapter  7, we discussed how patrol officers described their practices of 
producing deviance and suspicion against the backdrop of predictive policing 
and the attachment of risk to space. Whereas from their perspective, at least 
on the surface, not much had changed through the additional information 
about risk, it nevertheless became apparent that the notion of specific criminal 
futures within dedicated areas had effects on how they went about their busi-
ness. Notably, our interlocutors reported increased attentiveness to their envi-
ronment, more interest to detail, and longer periods of time spent in risk areas. 
Most importantly, patrol officers reported that potential mismatches between 
persons and space would be investigated more carefully, and more controls and 
checks would be carried out based on a supposed misfit between the appear-
ance of a person and the character of the surrounding neighborhood.
Against the background of these observations, it is important to think about 
questions of suspicion and intervention vis- à- vis the algorithmic production 
of crime risk. Although predictive policing does not directly interfere with 
the techniques and occupational culture of the patrol, the context of allegedly 
higher risk within dedicated spaces raises concerns about reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, and lower thresholds for police intervention (Ferguson, 2012; 
Joh, 2014: 55f; Ferguson, 2015). Moreover, it raises the question whether 
inferences about individual threat or dangerousness can be justified on the basis 
of place- based risk estimates and how such inferences affect fundamental rights 
such as the presumption of innocence (Hardyns and Rummens, 2018: 214).
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Generally speaking, the notion of risk space can lead to the cognitive and 
epistemic transfer of spatial characteristics to individuals who reside within 
that space. With regard to crime and policing, such “ecological contamina-
tion” translates into an assumption that, as Smith (1986: 316) puts it, “all per-
sons encountered in bad neighborhoods are viewed by police as possessing the 
moral liability of the area itself ”. Risk thus produces a form of spatial liability 
that equates space and person (Assall and Gericke, 2016: 67; McCarthy et al., 
2019: 1092f) – while at the same time introducing what could be described as 
“generalized suspicion” (Ferguson, 2017b: 125) and removing concrete indi-
vidual behavior as a variable from the attribution of threat. Subsequently, even 
“good” behavior would not render a person within a risk space exempt from 
an alleged implication in criminal futures. As Joh (2014: 59) has argued with 
reference to the nudging potential of risk, predictive policing “may encourage 
the police to ‘see’ suspicious behavior when there may be none”.
Carrying out controls more frequently and with more rigor is patrol behav-
ior known from established high- crime areas and hot spots, and it raises ques-
tions about the appropriateness and just distribution of police action (Ferguson 
and Bernache, 2008; Casady, 2011; Ferguson, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2019). The 
difference between an algorithmically produced risk area and a hot spot is, of 
course, that the latter is an extrapolation of past crime clusters, whereas the 
former might not be a crime- ridden neighborhood at all and the presumption 
of risk is merely based on the identification of a single trigger incident (e.g., 
a suspected professionally executed burglary). In patrol practice, however, this 
nuanced distinction might get lost. Predictive policing might thus encourage 
patrolling behavior similar to that within hot spots, including the assumption 
that extraordinary measures would be justified (Ferguson, 2017b: 79).
Intervention and control practices in risk areas must also be critically investi-
gated vis- à- vis legal concepts. Within “danger zones” (“Gefahrengebiete”), Ger-
man police forces are granted exceptional competencies in the fight against 
persistent crime issues or with regard to other extraordinary circumstances 
(Assall and Gericke, 2016; Keller and Leifker, 2017; Keitzel, 2020). Patrol 
officers in those areas are, for instance, allowed to search bags without reason-
able suspicion, thus extending a general assumption of dangerousness/criminal 
intent to anyone residing within predefined spatial parameters (Ernst, 2014). 
It is possible that risk areas and danger zones could become conflated in the 
perception and practices of patrol officers. It is therefore important to clarify 
that algorithmically produced crime risk must not be equated with legally 
declared exceptional circumstances. The criminal futures engendered through 
predictive policing are abstract ones that should not be confused with a con-
crete, imminent threat that would legitimize legally sanctioned enhanced law 
enforcement competencies (Meinicke, 2015: 377; Rademacher, 2017: 383f).
Patrol behavior in risk areas can also perpetuate existing stereotypes. Ethnic 
and racial prejudice in policing is well documented (Glover, 2009; Herrnkind, 
2014; Philipps and Bowling, 2017; Behr, 2018), and corresponding profiling 
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practices are likely to become aggravated against the backdrop of allegedly 
increased crime risk. As discussed in Chapter 7, we found prejudice and pro-
filing primarily prevalent with regard to persons from Eastern Europe and/or 
with an Eastern European appearance. Our interviewees would openly admit 
that these persons, identified either by their looks or by license plates on their 
cars, would by default be considered potential burglars.
Among German and Swiss police professionals, such an attitude is under-
pinned by the narrative that professional burglars from Eastern Europe travel 
throughout the continent – and particularly to rich Western European coun-
tries such as Germany and Switzerland – in pursuit of their business and that 
this behavior is facilitated by the lack of border controls within the Schengen 
area (Winter, 2015; Egbert, 2018). This narrative is persistent, although there 
is no actual empirical evidence that a disproportionate number of recorded 
burglaries are committed by offenders with an Eastern European background 
(Bartsch et al., 2014). Nonetheless, by specifically looking for individuals that 
fit the profile of a professional burglar from Eastern Europe, patrol officers per-
petuate this cliché through their practices. A disproportionately high number 
of selective controls, justified by the alleged burglary risk indicated by predic-
tive policing software, is moreover also likely to lead to a disproportionately 
high number of detections and arrest of persons from Eastern Europe, thus in 
turn reinforcing the profile through the creation of skewed numbers.
In summary, there is reasonable concern that predictive policing can aggra-
vate already problematic issues such as spatial liability and prejudice. The algo-
rithmic production of risk estimates thereby turns into a reference point for 
the actions of police officers, allowing them to relate to a supposedly neutral 
and objective assessment of space. If predictive policing comes to matter within 
society through the actions it enables, then the generation and reinforcement 
of suspicion and intervention are issues to which close attention must be paid.
Treating symptoms, not causes
Predictive policing is in the majority of cases operationalized in a preventive 
way – that is, to allocate patrols more effectively and deter criminals through 
increased police presence in allegedly more vulnerable spaces. A  tactic that 
is less frequently used is to deploy plainclothes police officers in risk areas 
instead, trying to catch offenders red- handed and to arrest rather than deter 
them (Gluba and Pett, 2017). Such a repressive approach is usually not con-
sidered particularly effective, as it requires substantial personnel resources and 
offers only slim prospects of success vis- à- vis assumed cautious offender behav-
ior and the size and topography of the spaces to be covered. What unites 
both operational approaches is that they represent law enforcement–oriented 
strategies of policing. The occurrence of crime is assumed as a given, and the 
focus of police work is on deterrence and/or arrests. In other words, predictive 
policing is not interested in the reasons why crime happens in the first place 
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but contents itself with its successful short- term prevention (Ferguson, 2017b: 
81; Wilson, 2018: 124).
Predictive policing thus structurally prefers the treatment of symptoms over 
the treatment of root causes. This preference is very much evident in the char-
acteristics of the criminal futures produced. Short- term risk estimates within 
limited spaces are not suitable for long- term prevention strategies, as they pro-
vide no insights about who commits crime and why. The repressive crime- 
fighting activities that predictive policing enables and facilitates have, in this 
sense, been described as superficial and unsustainable (Singelnstein, 2018: 9). 
They might be able to grasp the spatiotemporal distribution of crime but fail 
to penetrate this descriptive surface or make substantive statements about eco-
nomic conditions or social relations. Predictive policing, in other words, is at 
its best when it comes to identifying and tackling disruptions to social order, 
but at its worst when it comes to preventing such disruptions in the first place 
(The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights et al., 2016; Barabas 
et al., 2018; Susser, forthcoming).
Predictive policing is thus in many regards narrow and short- sighted – and 
ironically, these are the attributes that make it a seamless fit with existing policing 
strategies. In Chapter 2, we discussed how predictive policing has evolved at the 
intersection of larger trajectories of crime analysis, patrolling, and crime pre-
vention. Maybe most importantly, rational choice theory and situational crime 
prevention approaches have shaped the idea of algorithmic crime analysis and tar-
geted intervention. Both approaches are rather simplistic in their understanding 
of human behavior (rational choice theory) and how to influence it (situational 
crime prevention), but they can easily be translated into operational measures. 
Predictive policing, in an effort to effectively get traction within police organi-
zations and their work practices, takes up these tendencies and further develops 
them – without, however, questioning their basic rationales. The choice of polic-
ing strategies and the choice of technological tools are in this sense closely entan-
gled and mutually constitutive, with predictive policing tools enabling certain 
operational measures and foreclosing others (Ferguson, 2019: 493).
This means that turning predictive policing from an operational response 
tool into a diagnostic tool that helps the police to understand and address the 
root causes of crime might not be easy after all. Crime analysis is predicated 
upon the recognition of patterns in data in order to reveal phenomena or rela-
tions that had not hitherto been noticed. On the flipside, pattern recognition is 
fundamentally limited to the existence of patterns in the first place. Anything 
that does not come in the form of a pattern can by definition not be statistically 
captured and thus falls out of the scope of analysis (Kaufmann et al., 2019). But 
the socioeconomic root causes of crime, unlike its manifestations, might not 
come in a neatly patterned form and are likely to be more complex. In other 
words, statistics and large- scale datasets, as mobilized in predictive policing, 
might not be particularly well suited for an in- depth understanding of social 
issues.
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What predictive policing presents is a strategy of addressing issues that are 
easily observable, quantifiable, and can be easily exposed to treatment with 
established operational methods (Ferguson, 2017b: 78; Shapiro, 2019: 469). 
This can lead to selective policing strategies that turn a blind eye to types of 
crime that cannot be subjected to algorithmic analyses and large datasets, for 
instance white- collar crime (O’Neil, 2016: 90; Richardson et al., 2019: 21). 
Certain types of crime could thus become systematically underpoliced, with 
a disproportionate emphasis put on specific offences and offenders (Kochel, 
2011: 363; Hardyns and Rummens, 2018: 214; Završnik, 2019: 14).
In summary, predictive policing will, by definition, always be confined to 
the limited perception of social phenomena that an algorithm predicated upon 
theories, models, and data can offer. This is not per se “bad”, but when think-
ing about predictive policing and its larger societal impacts, it is important to 
keep in mind that algorithmic crime analysis can only offer added value for a 
limited range of policing strategies and operational measures. It is a specialized 
tool with a predefined, narrow application range. Overreliance on algorithmic 
crime analysis will therefore inevitably result in blind spots in policing strate-
gies, rendering them disproportionately law enforcement heavy and potentially 
push back on programs that are geared toward exploring how crime comes into 
being in the first place.
Transparency and accountability
A final area that is pertinent when examining the wider societal impact of 
predictive policing concerns the potential lack of transparency of algorithmic 
crime analysis tools. A lack of transparency could, in the worst case, lead to a 
fundamental lack of accountability of police action (Bennett Moses and Chan, 
2014: 674ff; Ferguson, 2017a: 1169ff; Chavis, 2019: 465f). The idea of account-
ability is a fundamental principle in democratic systems. It presupposes that 
those in power – be they governments, administration, or public agencies that 
act on behalf of the state – have to answer to the public (Mulgan, 2003; Bovens, 
2005; Barnett, 2016). Accountability, in practice, means that institutions and 
their representatives need to be able to “give an account” of how decisions 
were made and how and why actions were carried out. In doing so, actors are 
given the opportunity to present their version of what has happened, including 
personal and institutional roles in the course of events. Actor accounts can then 
be used to trace decision- making processes, to identify erroneous or irrespon-
sible behavior, or to uncover corruption. Most importantly, responsible actors 
can be “held to account” for the consequences of their decisions and resulting 
action, for instance in court proceedings or public hearings.
The police are not exempt from these processes. In democratic systems, 
police organizations have to be able to explain and justify their actions (Sten-
ning, 1995; Jones, 2008; Walker and Archbold, 2020). This is particularly 
important vis- à- vis the far- reaching competences that police organizations 
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have, including the use of force and the deprivation of liberty (Skolnick and 
Fyfe, 1993; Punch, 2011). Holding the police to account comes with its own 
set of problems, including the role of discretion in police practice (Walker, 
1993), recalcitrance to external control in police culture (Punch, 2009), and 
because managerial approaches to accountability might not be well suited for 
police organizations (Chan, 1999).
The introduction of algorithmic analysis tools considerably complicates 
questions of accountability (Neyland, 2016; Zarsky, 2016). Giving an account 
of one’s actions requires awareness of how one’s decisions and actions came 
about in the first place. An ideal- typical human decision- making process would 
involve the collection of data about the issue to be addressed, an evaluation 
of the data, the weighing of different options, and potential deliberation with 
other persons and/or institutions, eventually culminating in a decision that can 
be rationalized and justified based on that process.
Decisions made with the help of algorithmic support systems differ quite 
radically from this sequence. Here, it is the machine that collects and processes 
the data by itself, in the end only presenting a menu of predefined outputs that 
the human user can choose from. Picking one of these options might not nec-
essarily result in better or worse results compared to a human decision- making 
process, but it largely removes the capacity to explain how the decision was 
taken. Retracing how an algorithm came up with a decision recommendation 
might be impossible for several reasons. The data might involve information 
that is not accessible for human cognition (Matzner, 2016), the evaluation of 
the data might involve complex methods and techniques that are not easily 
understood by humans (Introna, 2013), and/or analytical processes might be 
black- boxed and inaccessible (Leese, 2014; Pasquale, 2015).
Little surprisingly, predictive policing has already been deemed “ ‘black- box’ 
policing” (Wilson, 2018: 112) on the grounds that it hides analytical processes 
and the production of risk more or less completely from the human user. As 
we discussed in Chapter 5, algorithmic analysis tools restructure the ways in 
which human officers and machines work together and split work tasks. The 
automation and speeding- up of complex statistical tasks is the primary rationale 
and sales pitch of predictive policing, and it inevitably comes with a degree 
of black- boxing that shuts out the human operator from at least parts of the 
analytical work. The operator is thus usually only presented with the system 
output (i.e., a risk estimate) and often has little opportunity to retrace how 
exactly this outcome came about.
This might only be a comparably minor problem with static, rule- based 
algorithms and a limited amount of processed data points, but it can quickly 
escalate when the amount of data and the complexity of the analytical processes 
increase (Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018: 818; Wilson, 2018: 120; Chavis, 
2019: 466). Even in current predictive policing applications, there might be 
plenty of analytical functions that are not easily understandable for human ana-
lysts. When system outputs form the basis for decisions about where and how 
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to patrol, full accountability for police action will thus effectively be undercut. 
In simple terms, when police departments cannot fully trace how the basis for 
their own decisions on where to patrol came into being, they will simply not 
be able to present an account of their choices.
Issues of transparency in algorithmic systems are additionally aggravated 
when applications are developed by private companies and procured by police 
departments as off- the- shelf solutions. Even though predictive policing and 
other crime analysis tools are usually customized for use within a particular 
organizational environment, their source code is considered a proprietary 
trade secret that will not be shared with the customer (Wexler, 2017). Private 
companies in fact have little interest in losing their competitive advantages in 
the marketplace by laying open the inner workings of their products. Even 
for tech- savvy and skilled crime analysts, it might therefore be impossible to 
understand and retrace how a specific system output was created (Joh, 2017: 
118f; Bennett Moses and Chan, 2018: 818). For several German and Swiss 
police departments, this was in fact a major reason for their decision to rely 
on the in- house development of predictive policing tools rather than purchase 
software from an external vendor (I11; I16; I36; I48).
Last, but not least, the lack of transparency in predictive policing can have a 
chilling effect on the possibility of claiming an account from the police. Detailed 
knowledge about the technical details of predictive policing software is usually 
hard or even impossible to obtain for outsiders. Publicly available information 
about the software packages that police departments use and the data that feed 
them is in many cases sparse and superficial, and police departments are often 
reluctant to talk about their tools and operational measures. Without adequate 
documentation, however, questions about the responsibility and liability for 
police action are hard to formulate in the first place (Ferguson, 2017a: 1173ff).
In summary, predictive policing might be effectively removing decision- 
making processes with regard to crime prevention from democratic oversight 
and control. Algorithmic systems, by design, come with a tendency to hide ana-
lytical processes from the human eye and transform the decision- making pro-
cesses that are so fundamental for the idea of accountability. Regardless of these 
difficulties, predictive policing should be a domain where, as Shapiro (2017: 
460) puts it, “transparency is paramount”. Finding ways to ensure transparency 
and accountability will be one of the major challenges in the further develop-
ment, implementation, and regulation of algorithmic crime analysis tools.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed some of the most prevalent current con-
cerns with regard to the societal impact of algorithmic crime analysis systems. 
The interface between the police and the public is where discrimination, vio-
lence, and injustice potentially manifest. It might not always be possible to 
neatly separate algorithmic risk production and “ordinary” police misconduct, 
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but predictive policing comes with a number of caveats that must be carefully 
monitored in order to make sure that crime risk does not (further) undercut 
civil liberties and human rights. Predictive policing tends to rationalize police 
practices, and its alleged technical neutrality enables police departments to use 
algorithms as reference points to legitimize and tech- wash otherwise prob-
lematic practices and policing strategies. This tendency is reinforced by the 
scientific appeal of predictive policing tools that mobilize theories and meth-
ods. The technoscientific character of algorithmic crime analysis tools is often 
discursively used to create an overarching illusion of impartiality and to brush 
away a number of ethical and legal concerns.
The first concern affects the data processed by predictive policing tools. Crime 
data are likely to be biased, which means that certain features are over- or under-
represented in the dataset. Algorithmic systems might transform bias into less 
obvious shapes, but bias will inevitably persist and inform police action. Second, 
the creation of criminal futures is likely to affect how police officers perceive 
their environment and construct suspicion as a function of deviance between 
individuals and neighborhood characteristics. Predictive policing shows a ten-
dency to reinforce already problematic practices of how patrol officers render 
individuals suspicious, and the alleged connection of space and risk might lead to 
more aggressive forms of policing. Third, predictive policing has demonstrated a 
tendency to favor the treatment of symptoms (i.e., crime) over the treatment of 
causes (i.e., the reasons why crimes are committed in the first place). It facilitates 
law enforcement strategies, rather than encouraging long- term and solution- 
oriented programs. Finally, predictive policing tends to remove transparency 
from knowledge production and decision- making processes, leading to a lack of 
accountability of police organizations for their actions.
This list could be continued. We have chosen to limit our discussion here 
to some of the most pertinent concerns over predictive policing and its soci-
etal impacts. They should, however, have sufficiently demonstrated that there 
are numerous pitfalls and caveats in the sociotechnical production of criminal 
futures that need to be closely monitored. In light of the themes that we have 
discussed, the tendency of algorithms to both conceal and rationalize potential 
civil liberties and human rights violations is a worrying one that might become 
even more pressing as predictive policing tools, as we will discuss in the final 
chapter of this book, can be expected to become more elaborate and pervasive 
in the future.
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Throughout this book, we have unraveled the intricacies of predictive policing. 
We have demonstrated how sociotechnical practices of crime prediction and 
crime prevention include a multitude of human and nonhuman actors that all 
need to work together in order to produce and transmit knowledge and power. 
Without proper coordination between heterogeneous elements such as theo-
ries, algorithms, databases, maps, emails, and perceived deviance and suspicion, 
so our study has highlighted, insights about possible futures will fizzle out and 
targeted crime prevention will come to a grinding halt. An analysis of predic-
tive policing, as we have argued, must thus pay careful attention to the diverse 
translation processes that continually happen between a multitude of social and 
technical components.
Translation sites are the critical junctions in the production and enactment 
of criminal futures. Without translation, insights about potential crime risk 
will not find their way from the back office to the patrol car. Analyzing crimi-
nal futures in terms of everyday police work then means to foreground the 
organizational, cultural, and epistemic gaps within the sociotechnical system 
that is predictive policing. We have seen that there are few instances of smooth 
transition from one stage to the next. Criminal futures must be actively enabled 
to speak to the lifeworlds of different, specialized stages of police work. This 
renders crime prediction a labor- intensive process that needs to be continually 
repeated in order to stay ahead of – or at least keep up with – current criminal 
events.
When introduced into police organizations, predictive policing realigns things 
and humans so that they can work together in the production and prevention 
of criminal futures. This means that work routines become tweaked, job profiles 
redefined, internal and external communication processes restructured, and not 
least, that police officers on all levels need to be convinced to integrate algorith-
mically produced crime forecasts into their daily work practices.
However, predictive policing does not only trigger organizational change. 
As we have shown through the study of the everyday work practices of crime 
prediction and crime prevention, it reconfigures the ways in which the police 
produce knowledge about the occurrence and distribution of crime across time 
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and space. It recalibrates how the police perceive and patrol danger and vul-
nerability, and it affects the relationships between the police and the public. 
In particular, it involves some concerning tendencies in terms of aggravating 
already problematic police practices with regard to the production of deviance 
and suspicion – while at the same time cloaking discrimination and profiling in 
alleged rationalization and algorithmic opacity.
In- depth empirical engagement with predictive policing in everyday police 
work, that much was obvious from the start, would inevitably debunk some 
of the grand claims that software companies, politicians, and police managers 
attribute to it. Going back to the opening paragraph of this book, we could at 
this point ask ourselves what IBM’s predictive policing commercial might have 
looked like if it was not about a glorified techno- utopia where a patrol officer 
just needs to look at a screen in order to receive precise information about 
where and when crime is bound to happen, but was instead an honest account 
of crime prediction and crime prevention.
Rather than simply showing us the patrol officer and the high- tech equip-
ment installed in his patrol car, the commercial could have started with how 
some of his colleagues produce data at a crime scene. Alternatively, it could 
have illustrated how data from external sources such as other public agencies 
or private companies become integrated into police databases. In any case, it 
would have needed to foreground how any dataset needs to undergo quality 
control processes and be carefully prepared for analysis before it can be algo-
rithmically processed.
The commercial could have shown how analysts work with crime prediction 
software. Even though the division of workload between humans and machines 
is being reconfigured through automation of analytical processes, there remains 
a substantial manual element. For operational, legal, and not least, normative 
reasons, police organizations insist on meaningful control of algorithmic pro-
cesses. Fully automated and continuous crime analysis as a background process 
is technically possible but, in fact, unlikely to manifest in security contexts 
where decisions based on faulty intelligence can have severe consequences 
and where public servants need to act – at least in principle – in accountable 
ways. The commercial could in this sense have highlighted how human analysts 
double- check machine recommendations and discuss the plausibility of crime 
risk among themselves before any risk estimates are made available to patrol 
units.
Equally, the commercial could have shown how analysts send emails, pick 
up their phones and call their colleagues, or even attend meetings and shift 
briefings in order to communicate their analytical insights. Likewise, it could 
have engaged with the work environment of patrol forces and shown how they 
often need to act as “fire brigades” that rush from one urgent incident to the 
next, having little time left to actually patrol the way one would imagine: by 
freely roaming space and watching out for danger, en route deterring criminals 
by rendering the police visible and changing the cost- benefit ratio of crime.
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Last, but not least, if nothing else, an honest commercial would have made 
it clear that precise predictions for individual behavior (i.e., a known criminal 
attempting to rob a specific convenience store on a particular day and at a par-
ticular time) are not something that can be achieved with statistical methods. 
Approaches to predictive policing can take diverse shapes. They can range from 
rule- based to dynamic models and might even include machine learning tech-
niques. They can cover the distribution of crime across time and space or assess 
individual threat/vulnerability levels. And they can process a wide range of data. 
But even the most advanced algorithmic calculations remain precisely that – cal-
culations, based on data input and theoretical assumptions. And any calculation 
might be easily rendered irrelevant by the sheer contingency of the future.
But, of course, a commercial is not interested in telling us that things are 
complicated and uncertain. It is not interested in explicating the formation 
of sociotechnical systems. It is not keen on showing how police organizations 
deal with change that is brought about by new technologies or how such new 
technologies might trigger resistance as they force officers out of their comfort 
zone and redefine job profiles. It is not interested in exploring how predictive 
policing might in theory be quick enough to operate in real time and provide 
ongoing situational awareness and the possibility for flexible intervention but, 
in practice, becomes considerably slowed down by the entrenched, rhythmic 
interplay of social life, crime, and police work.
A commercial is also not interested in an analysis of how algorithms and 
humans produce different kinds of knowledge, based on how they perceive 
and understand the world in fundamentally different ways. It is not interested 
in how police organizations struggle to maintain meaningful control over algo-
rithmic systems and subject them to multiple layers of institutional and practical 
oversight. It is not interested in detailing the ways in which crime risk is visual-
ized and placed on maps in order to make it intelligible, tangible, and action-
able – while at the same time assuring the beholder of its existence in the first 
place. And it is certainly not interested in the power that is inherent in choices 
about how to visually represent criminal futures in specific ways.
Neither is a commercial interested in foregrounding how predictive polic-
ing undermines the occupational culture of the police patrol and clashes with 
the traditional ways in which officers exercise their craft. It is not interested in 
an assessment of whether algorithmically produced crime risk is actually acted 
upon in the streets – and if so, in what fashion. Likewise, it is not interested 
in the uncomfortable epistemic quandaries that significantly complicate the 
question of whether predictive policing actually works – that is, whether it 
prevents crime. Positive side effects such as improved data- handling capaci-
ties or streamlined communication channels between different police divisions 
might be long- term assets for police organizations, but they are less well suited 
as legitimation for the procurement of an expensive new technology.
Finally, a commercial is not interested in telling stories about how the turn 
toward data and digital methods not only renders the police potentially more 
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effective and efficient, but at the same time, creates a number of deep- rooted 
ethical and legal concerns about how algorithms reproduce and transform bias 
and how such bias affects the behavior of humans in ways that add to already 
existing social tensions vis- à- vis policing.
Needless to say, a commercial would of course not be the adequate format 
to discuss these issues. That is what this book is for. We hope that our study 
has provided some of the depth that is needed to understand the characteristics 
of predictive policing, to grasp its embeddedness in larger political agendas as 
well as police culture, and to assess its transformative potential for police work. 
Through our empirical engagement with predictive policing not as an isolated 
technical artifact but as a sociotechnical practice that is placed within larger 
trajectories of police organizations, we have foregrounded the importance of 
translation processes that allow knowledge and power to travel through police 
organizations and make their way from the analyst’s desk to the street level.
Rather than simply summarizing the main arguments we have presented 
throughout the book, this final chapter aims to place our study within larger 
trajectories of police reform and future trends of policing. As we have shown, 
current algorithmic crime prediction tools are on the one hand firmly rooted 
in established criminological theories and crime analysis methods, but on the 
other hand significantly move beyond them. By automating and speeding up 
complex analytical tasks, predictive policing has introduced unprecedented 
capabilities into police work. And while it might for many police departments 
have been the first concerted effort to venture into the possibilities of the digi-
tal, it will certainly not be the last. Police departments are in fact just scratch-
ing the surface of digital methods and data exploitation. The remainder of 
this chapter will explore how predictive policing has exposed a number of 
structural shortcomings and put them on the reform agenda and how future 
versions of predictive policing software are likely to further strengthen trends 
toward the datafication and platformization of police work.
Most importantly, however, we will use the empirical findings from our 
field research to draw up some insights about how data- driven analytics in 
police work could now and in the future be implemented and used in respon-
sible ways. These practical recommendations will speak to the needs of police 
organizations as much as they will speak to the protection of civil liberties and 
human rights.
From experiment to structural reform
The implementation of predictive policing software was in many regards a lit-
mus test for police departments’ capabilities to process data in unprecedented 
quantity and with unprecedented speed and frequency. As we argued in Chap-
ters 3 and 8, the introduction of predictive policing was seen by police depart-
ments as a form of experiment, designed not only to respond to the need to 
bring burglary numbers down but also to explore their organizational readiness 
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to incorporate cutting- edge digital tools. The frictions that the production, 
dissemination, and enactment of algorithmic crime predictions have caused in 
everyday work practices were in this sense at least partially to be expected. The 
incorporation of novel crime analysis tools is in this regard not much different 
from the first major wave of digitization of police work that took place in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.
At the same time, as evaluation reports on predictive policing have shown, 
police departments have seized the opportunity of the implementation of a 
new technology to identify areas for future reform. Predictive policing has in 
fact revealed a number of possible breaking points that could undermine police 
organizations’ ability to thrive on data- driven tools. If there was a major lesson 
that police departments learned from the implementation of predictive polic-
ing software, then this lesson was that they were not “ready” to fully embrace 
algorithmic means of crime analysis. In many cases, existing IT infrastructures 
were not able to meet the data- handling requirements needed for the seamless 
use of predictive policing software. In addition, predictive policing highlighted 
legal limitations that restricted systematic data exchange across jurisdictional 
boundaries. And not least, it became apparent that police departments tended 
to lack adequately trained personnel with a clear understanding of how to 
implement and operate advanced analytical tools.
Some of these issues were well known even before the advent of predictive 
policing. The procurement and/or development of predictive policing soft-
ware, coupled with the public attention that was directed at the police, how-
ever, did provide a window of opportunity to put entrenched problems at the 
top of the reform agenda. Reform efforts must thereby be understood both 
as a remedy for predictive policing itself and as a broader investment in the 
future that might be paving the way for more systematically “datafied” ways of 
policing.
However, as our informants admitted, structural reform does not come easy 
vis- à- vis the idiosyncrasy and relative autonomy of regional and local police 
departments (I02; I18; I51). It is further complicated by federal structures that 
subject police organizations to varying political programs and levels of financ-
ing. In both Germany and Switzerland, there is a large degree of fragmentation 
between police departments when it comes to databases, software solutions, 
and network structures. Coordination between jurisdictions is often only loose 
and informal, and there might even be more or less open “rivalries” between 
police departments, leading to solo efforts in the fight against crime rather than 
cooperation (USIS, 2001b, 2001a, 2002; Schiess and Schneider, 2003; Leese, 
2018; Heitmüller, 2019).
A pertinent effect of such fragmentation is that crime analysis by default 
stops at jurisdictional boundaries. Police departments can work with the data 
that they have available for their jurisdiction (i.e., city or state), but they have 
no real way of identifying larger patterns that extend beyond their digital field 
of vision (I19; I22; I46; I78; P49). In practical terms, this means that there is a 
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risk of potential trigger incidents not being identified at the edges of a certain 
territory, thus undercutting the capacities of predictive policing software. At 
the same time, it means that criminals could, by regularly crossing jurisdictional 
boundaries, easily avoid the “patterning” of their activities and effectively shield 
themselves from targeted prevention measures. In other words, even when two 
police departments in neighboring jurisdictions are using compatible databases 
and the same software package for predictive policing, they may not be able to 
pool their analytical activities. Data exchange across jurisdictions is, of course, 
in principle possible, but due to data protection legislation, it cannot usually 
be done in an automated fashion. Rather, it must be justified individually on 
a case- by- case basis, thus eradicating the time- saving potential of algorithmic 
crime analysis and undercutting the idea of timely response (Leese, 2018).
In light of these limitations, several initiatives have now been launched that 
seek to address the legal foundations for data exchange between jurisdictions. 
In Switzerland, the high- level working group of cantonal police chiefs (Konfer-
enz der Kantonalen Polizeikommandanten, KKPKS) in 2019 identified the need 
for cross- cantonal pattern recognition in crime analysis as a primary goal in 
order to keep up with criminal activity that is considered highly mobile and 
professionalized (D373). As a response, a project on “National Crime Analysis” 
(Nationale Kriminalanalyse) has been tasked with the identification of a com-
mon definition of crime analysis and corresponding processes, the definition of 
software standards, and the exploration of legal prerequisites for an automated 
exchange of crime data between all Swiss cantons (D373). As a model for 
national harmonization, the KKPKS has pointed to the regional police asso-
ciation of Northwestern Switzerland (Polizeikonkordat Nordwestschweiz), com-
prising the cantonal police departments of Aargau, Berne, Basel- Landschaft, 
Basel- Stadt, and Solothurn (D374), which has already put forward an initiative 
for formalized data exchange for crime analysis (D373).
Based on the assessment that the legal basis for the cross- cantonal exchange 
and processing of data that are relevant for crime analysis and larger situational 
assessment was weak, Northwestern Swiss police departments had in 2018 
started to explore how coordination on crime analysis could be rendered more 
technologically up to date, more future oriented, faster, more efficient, more 
coherent, and less costly (D360). The initiative explicitly referred to predictive 
policing and other risk- oriented forms of crime analysis (PRECOBS as well as 
the police- internal analysis tool PICAR) as a main reason for the cross- cantonal 
harmonization requirement, arguing that analytical insights would otherwise 
be restricted by cantonal borders (D360). At the same time, the need for strict 
legal oversight of any form of automated data and intelligence exchange was 
highlighted, particularly given the uncertain and volatile nature of some of 
the data that would be shared (D361). Eventually, a formal arrangement for 
data exchange for use in digital crime analysis systems was agreed upon in 
September 2019 (D375). At the time of writing, parliamentary approval is still 
pending, but this is expected to materialize at some point in 2020 (D373). 
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A similar agreement could, according to the plans of the KKPKS, in the future 
be established on a national scale.
However, not only are legal foundations currently being targeted but also 
the fragmented landscape of police departments and the variations in technical 
infrastructures. One of the most prominent initiatives for the harmonization of 
federal police structures is Police 2020 (Polizei 2020). Initiated by the German 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, one of the primary goals of the project is to 
improve the availability of crime data and to overhaul fragmented and outdated 
IT systems (Kaller, 2019; Bundeskriminalamt, n.d.). It explicitly foregrounds 
the goal of streamlining the digital databases of all relevant police agencies in 
Germany in order to facilitate data sharing and crime analysis between different 
police organizations (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2018: 8). In order to do 
so, it aims at establishing a centralized digital platform that can be accessed by 
any authorized officer (Lezgus, 2019: 26).
Framed as a milestone on the road to modern police organization and digi-
tal methods (Bundeskriminalamt, n.d.), Police 2020 is being promoted as the 
key innovation piece that will finally empower German police departments to 
exploit the analytical possibilities of large quantities of data in a systematic fash-
ion. Police 2020 is not only set to facilitate the collaborative development of 
capabilities and tools between different police organizations but also supposed 
to provide both a development platform and a kind of app store for future 
crime analysis applications (Münch, 2019). Commentators expect that Police 
2020 will indeed provide a stepping stone for the modernization of police 
work and fundamentally change how police departments will restructure their 
activities based on data analysis (Kaller, 2019).
Another pertinent example of structural reform is the Police Information 
and Analysis Network (Polizeilicher Informations- und Analyseverbund, PIAV), 
which partially went live in April 2016 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016: 8) and 
has, after an initial stand- alone phase, been integrated into the larger project 
context of Police 2020 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2018: 6f). Being part 
of the Information System of German Police Organizations (Informationssystem 
der Deutschen Polizei, INPOL), PIAV pools data from the process management 
and case management databases of all federal and state police organizations and 
makes them available for strategic and operational crime analysis. One of the 
primary goals of PIAV is to enable police departments to identify regional and 
supra- regional crime series and trends more quickly and empower a systematic 
response (Bundeskriminalamt, 2017a; Bundesministerium des Innern, 2018). 
PIAV thus corresponds closely with the main rationale of predictive policing 
(i.e., the identification of patterns in criminal activity) but widens the analyti-
cal scope from localized phenomena to, at least in theory, the entire country.
At the same time, PIAV directly speaks to questions of the data basis for 
crime analysis. As we discussed in Chapter  4, the availability of data within 
police organizations is usually not a primary concern. The police produce large 
amounts of data on a regular basis as part of their daily activities. Moreover, 
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additional data can be either obtained from other public service agencies or pur-
chased from private companies. One of the main issues surrounding crime data 
is rather its accuracy and reliability. The rationale of PIAV is that combining data 
from a large number of police organizations will allow for the synchronization 
and verification of information and thus address persistent concerns about the 
quality of crime data. Through a centralized and vetted provision of high- quality 
crime data, PIAV is thus supposed to provide a structured hub for data collec-
tion and data exchange across different police organizations, thereby opening 
up novel and unprecedented forms of cooperation (Bundeskriminalamt, n.d.).
The desire for a reform of data infrastructures was also a common theme 
during our research. Our interviewees, particularly more senior officers and 
analysts, frequently put forward that traditional database architectures needed 
to be replaced by data warehouse structures that would enable police organiza-
tions to cross- search databases, use automated data exchange processes, and get 
rid of problems with poorly designed and nonstandardized user interfaces (I07; 
I26; I31; I36; I38; I45; I46; I50; I56; I78; I79; P49; P52; P70; P77). One senior 
officer described the current fragmented landscape of police databases and the 
resulting problems for crime analysis practices as follows:
We have a number of core systems: process management, case manage-
ment, INPOL applications, telex, communication data, and so on. There 
are quite a few. . . . The point is: all of them are silos, all of them are stand- 
alone systems. It is important to establish connections between these sys-
tems, so that we don’t have to query 35 different databases when we want 
to know something about a person.
(I51)
Finally, as we already briefly discussed in Chapter 5, the implementation of 
predictive policing has foregrounded the need for specialized personnel with 
professional training in computer science and statistics. In- depth understand-
ing of how to translate theoretical assumptions into models and how to inte-
grate data and run these models within an existing IT environment is not only 
important for the implementation of commercial off- the- shelf applications 
such as PRECOBS but is even more pertinent when it comes to the in- house 
development of analytical tools. Such expertise, however, is not usually a core 
competence for police officers, and even if individual officers are able to build 
such a skill set, traditional career paths are usually rather unsustainable in terms 
of institutional learning and knowledge management, as they prescribe the 
rotation of individuals between different divisions. In order to address these 
shortcomings, departments have started to explore how to systematize and pro-
fessionalize crime analysis profiles as a distinct career path within police organi-
zations, establish training programs, and to generally increase digital literacy 
among their staff (Bettermann- Jennes and Rabitz- Suhr, 2018; Hauber et al., 
2019; Mahnken and Rabitz- Suhr, 2019).
214 The future of (predictive) policing
The initiatives we have outlined also correspond with a general professional 
framing of full- scale digitization as the most pertinent future direction in police 
work (Brückner, 2018). The agendas of large professional gatherings such as 
the European Police Congress or the “Police Days” (Polizeitage), for exam-
ple, are currently overwhelmingly dominated by lectures and seminars on data 
analysis, artificial intelligence, digital work environments, and organizational 
readiness (Behörden Spiegel and Gewerkschaft der Polizei, 2019; Schmitz, 2019).
Against this backdrop, predictive policing must be understood as a symptom 
of larger trajectories of datafication of police work (i.e., the implementation of 
algorithmic systems for decision assistance and corresponding practices), just as 
it must be understood as a catalyst for structural reform (Egbert and Krasmann, 
2019). The introduction and rapid diffusion of crime prediction software ini-
tially caused a hype in media coverage and public attention, but its long- term 
implications might be far more relevant for the future of policing. Predic-
tive policing has put infrastructural, professional, and legal concerns around 
advanced data- driven forms of police work high on the reform agenda, where 
they resonate with the attention of politicians, police managers, and private 
industry.
The expansion of predictive policing
Structural reform projects are, however, only one side of the coin. Almost 
needless to say, predictive policing itself is not likely to stop its evolution at the 
current development level. As we have illustrated, existing predictive policing 
applications are in many regards still rather pedestrian. As with any technologi-
cal tool that is still in the early stages of development, rollout, and institutional 
implementation and use, there is ample room for further development. This is 
true both for existing functionalities and for the incorporation of new features. 
In Germany and Switzerland, as we discussed in Chapter 3, trial runs were in 
fact deliberately kept open by both police departments and the software sup-
plier so that practitioner feedback could be integrated into further develop-
ment of the software. The general assumption was to start with a product that, 
while fully functional, was far from polished, and to jointly work out the kinks.
This principle of codevelopment has been extended into the regular use of 
predictive policing software. In the case of PRECOBS, in addition to being 
informally in touch with its clients on a regular basis, software manufacturer 
IfmPt organizes practitioner workshops where actors discuss their experiences 
and problems with the software – in this way providing valuable hints for future 
modifications (I02; I05; I09; I20; I44; I46; I50; I51; I80; P02; P52). Predictive 
policing must thus, just like any other software application, be considered a 
work in progress that will be subjected to changes over time and in accordance 
with its users’ needs and preferences.
PRECOBS is in fact a pertinent example of how predictive policing soft-
ware gradually expands in scope (the types of crime that are targeted, the 
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underpinning theories, the concrete models that are used to detect patterns), 
data (more data, data from disparate sources), functionality (new analytical 
functions, visualization modes, improved interfaces with databases and other 
software tools), and technical architecture. The original version, launched in 
2012 and now rebranded as PRECOBS Classic, was widely considered “too 
banal” (P77), as analysts felt that its narrow and static approach to the prediction 
of domestic burglary was limited with regard to both functionality and opera-
tional flexibility (I11; I41; I51; I62). These shortcomings were subsequently 
addressed through dialogue between users and developers. As one respondent 
detailed this process:
In the beginning, the functionalities were rather narrow. It was reliable, 
we could work with it. . . . We were in dialogue with [police department 
A], [police department B] and [police department C] who were all also 
working with the software – and of course we figured out certain demands 
that we all had. Like “It would be nice if we could do this or that”. And 
then we had a meeting with IfmPt and told them that we needed more 
functionalities and more flexibility. And they were like “Ok, we need to 
address that” – and this is how PRECOBS evolved over time.
(I02)
Eventually, IfmPt decided to channel their clients’ operational requirements 
into a radically overhauled new version of the software, PRECBOBS Enter-
prise, which was rolled out throughout 2019 and has, at the time of writing, 
been implemented by several German and Swiss police departments (I46; I50; 
I62; I66). There are several striking differences between PRECOBS Clas-
sic and PRECOBS Enterprise, including a completely new user interface, a 
revamped multilayer architecture based on a database connector/application 
server and multiplatform (browser, mobile devices) and web- based front- end 
applications for different user roles (i.e., analyst, operator, viewer), as well as 
remote maintenance and service functions (D002; D091; D287). While the 
new technical architecture is supposed to guarantee smooth import and pro-
cessing of datasets from disparate sources and ensure flexible and adjustable 
interfaces with other software tools (D287), PRECOBS Enterprise also broad-
ens the scope with regard to criminological theory and the statistical modeling 
of criminal patterns.
The new version includes (1) the possibility of using sociodemographic data 
in order to allow for a more fine- grained modeling and understanding of the 
relationship between crime and urban space, (2) the possibility of using weather 
data as a variable for criminal behavior, (3) the possibility of using data on 
mobility infrastructures such as highways or train stations in order to model 
offender movement, (4) “far- repeat” methodology to estimate risk spaces in 
rural areas where near- repeat theory cannot be applied, (5) a “journey- to- 
crime” approach that seeks to identify where anchor points for crime series 
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could be located, (6) a “delta hot spots” function that indicates long- term 
trends in crime clusters, and (7) semantic analysis of free text reports (I77; 
D091; D288; D301).
These new analytical functionalities go hand in hand with the inclusion of 
other types of crime in addition to domestic burglary. PRECOBS Enterprise 
is now additionally supposed to be able to address shoplifting, robbery, pick- 
pocketing, property damage, car theft, and theft from vehicles as well as sexual 
offenses (D288). It is not yet clear how some of these types of crime will be 
statistically captured and analyzed, as not all of them have yet been fully imple-
mented (I50), but some police departments have, for instance, already started to 
use the journey- to- crime approach in order to pursue property damage caused 
by illegal graffiti. Starting from the assumption that sprayers tend to start work-
ing on objects close to their places of residence, the software thereby attempts 
to identify possible anchor points from the spatial distribution of graffiti (P49). 
Another key novelty in PRECOBS Enterprise is an early warning function 
that requires no active human intervention but is predicated upon the passive 
monitoring of predefined spaces, objects, persons, or events. Alerts will then be 
triggered automatically, based on manually configured thresholds for criminal 
activity or other variables (P49).
In light of these new features, it becomes quite clear that PRECOBS Enter-
prise, similar to recent developments in other applications such as PredPol 
(PredPol, 2019) or HunchLab (ShotSpotter, 2018), goes far beyond the initial 
scope of “merely” predicting criminal activity through an analysis of crime data. 
As a multifunctionality platform, it encourages analysts to tinker with available 
data and to carry out analyses based on intuition in a low- threshold, explora-
tive fashion (I02; P49). Its stronger focus on a dynamic understanding of space 
and threats/vulnerabilities over time can be seen as an indicator of a gradual 
move toward risk terrain modeling. This conceptual move also corresponds 
with the incorporation of significantly more data and data sources. Moreover, 
in addition to analyses for operational use, PRECOBS Enterprise now enables 
a supplementary focus on the identification of long- term trends and support 
for strategic decision- making. Finally, the inclusion of several other types of 
“high- volume” crime is supposed to ascribe a larger role to its application in 
everyday police work.
From an economic perspective, such a reconfiguration of predictive policing 
certainly makes a lot of sense. There is a limited market for algorithmic crime 
analysis tools, and several German and Swiss police departments have already 
decided to pursue in- house software development strategies rather than rely 
on commercial products. Commercial predictive policing tools must thus, as 
one software developer put it, offer substantial added analytical value for police 
work that goes beyond the algorithmic production of risk estimates for specific 
types of crime: “PRECOBS must be more than just a tool for prognostics. . . . 
We need to provide a tool for criminological analysis, and that includes geo- 
profiling, landmarks, sensors, and so on” (I01).
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The evolution of PRECOBS from a specialized tool for domestic burglary 
prevention toward a full- blown analytics suite was generally welcomed and 
appreciated by our interviewees. To a certain extent, of course, police depart-
ments had little choice but to be content with the direction of the develop-
ment. After all, they were more or less closely involved in the process through 
their feedback. Moreover, having already procured the software, they needed 
to demonstrate that taxpayers’ money was being well spent (I18; I50). Finally, 
the internal adjustments that police departments had made in order to accom-
modate predictive policing in their organizational structures and work rou-
tines presented additional sunk costs that made it difficult to pull the plug on 
PRECOBS and pursue a different strategy (although both the State Police 
Department of Baden- Württemberg and the Cantonal Police Department of 
Zurich decided in 2019 to withdraw from the use of PRECOBS and pur-
sue in- house approaches to predictive policing instead). Overall, however, our 
interviewees did appreciate PRECOBS Enterprise and its new functionalities. 
As one police officer put it:
You have to admit that the PRECOBS software has come a long way. In 
the beginning it really was a niche application for predictive policing. But in 
the meantime, they have implemented a couple GIS functions and statistical 
tools. And they keep working on improving these features. . . . PRECOBS 
Enterprise is a completely new version, with a new architecture, new user 
interface. . ., its capacities now go way beyond predictive policing.
(I44)
Similar expansion trends can also be witnessed in other predictive policing 
applications. The SKALA project, coordinated by the State Police Department 
of North Rhine- Westphalia, builds on supervised machine learning techniques 
for the further development of the SKALA | MAP software that targets sev-
eral types of crime, including domestic burglary and burglary in commercial 
properties, car theft, and theft from vehicles (I35; D129; D142). Moreover, 
the project has started to hire computer scientists and data scientists whose 
task it is to model and integrate further types of crime into the software and 
to improve prediction quality and accuracy, for example through text mining 
techniques (I43; D129). In addition, SKALA now incorporates more fine- 
grained topographical data (D142; Seidensticker, 2017), and the project team 
has experimented with different forms of visual representations and their effects 
on knowledge dissemination (Merbach and Stoffel, 2020). Similarly, continu-
ous reform of the State Police Department of Lower Saxony’s in- house predic-
tive policing tool PreMAP is envisioned, including plans for broader prognostic 
functions and the inclusion of more types of crime (B57; Landeskriminalamt 
Niedersachsen, 2019).
However, the most radical version of “predictive policing and beyond” cur-
rently in use is arguably hessenDATA. Developed under the supervision of 
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the State Police Department of Hesse, hessenDATA is based on the analyti-
cal platform Gotham by US software company Palantir Technologies and has 
been operational since 2018 (Hessischer Landtag, 2019b: 17). Palantir adver-
tises Gotham on their website as a system that “integrates and transforms data, 
regardless of type or volume, into a single, coherent data asset” and facilitates 
intuitive, easy- to- use data mining methods.1 Gotham already had gotten some 
traction within US police departments (Brayne, 2017, 2021: 37ff), but Hesse 
is the first jurisdiction in Germany or Switzerland that has opted to pursue the 
use of a full- fledged cross- database analytical tool for policing and homeland 
security (Hessisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, 2018b: 59; Hessischer 
Landtag, 2019a: 1f).
The platform approach of hessenDATA speaks closely to the articulated need 
to modernize and harmonize IT infrastructures and databases in a proclaimed 
age of datafied police work. hessenDATA resembles the technical architecture 
of PRECOBS Enterprise, in that it establishes a virtual database layer that allows 
for the assembly and integration of data independent of its original location and 
format. In this fashion, analyses across multiple databases can be conducted 
through one centralized platform that can be accessed from anywhere  – in 
theory resulting in unprecedented analytical volume and speed (Brayne, 2017: 
994, 2021: 37ff; Hessischer Landtag, 2019b: 18). Not surprisingly, such an 
approach to data handling and crime analysis was praised by our interviewees 
and was at times even framed as a role model for other police departments 
(P52). One senior analyst described the advantages of hessenDATA as follows:
For future police work, from my perspective, it will be important to not 
just focus on data analysis but to use platforms and to recognize con-
nections between our databases. That is our big challenge: not having 
to manu ally prepare data for analysis, but to fetch data from the source 
databases and integrate them in an automated fashion. Currently, our main 
task is to get the data ready for analysis. That’s a lot of work, and it eats up 
time and resources that we would rather put into the actual analysis. That is 
what we must tackle: to have systems . . . to find possibilities to harmonize 
data from disparate sources in an automated fashion, and to make these 
data available for analysis. . . . hessenDATA for instance does exactly that. 
I’m a big fan of hessenDATA, it’s exactly what we need.
(I51)
Other German states have already made plans to follow the example of hes-
senDATA. North Rhine- Westphalia has announced the development of a sys-
tem for cross- database analysis and research that strongly resembles Palantir’s 
Gotham software (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein- Westfalen, 2019), and there 
are concrete plans for further collaboration with Palantir (Landeskriminalamt 
Nordrhein- Westfalen, 2020). The State Police Department of Rhineland- 
Palatinate has launched a similar project to evaluate the added value of analysis 
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platforms for police work, including the modernization of the department’s 
database system and the development of a cross- cutting, comprehensive ana-
lytics platform (Schmidt- Wyk, 2019). And the State Police Department of 
Bavaria is currently conducting a research project on the potential of a research 
and analysis platform (Bayerisches Landeskriminalamt, 2019).
An aspect that warrants close monitoring in the future is the potential con-
flation of place- based and person- based approaches. hessenDATA and simi-
lar applications such as RADAR- iTE (an analytical tool for risk assessment 
geared towards terrorism and violent extremism developed by the German 
Federal Criminal Police Office) include functionalities for the identification 
and evaluation of individuals who are considered to pose a particular risk for 
public safety, particularly with regard to terrorism and organized crime (Bun-
deskriminalamt, 2017b; Hessisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, 2018a). 
Although such analyses are mostly still limited to a scoring system based on tra-
ditional questionnaires (I47; I72; D221), the functional integration of counter-
terrorism and transnational law enforcement into analytical platforms for police 
work could be an indication that the boundary between domestic policing and 
intelligence/national security might in the future become eroded.
Predictive policing, as these examples demonstrate, remains a dynamic field. 
After a brief consolidation phase, it appears that both software companies and 
police departments themselves are now aspiring to take the next step. New and 
updated versions of predictive policing tools include larger quantities of data 
from various sources, they incorporate additional criminological theories and 
model threats and vulnerabilities in a more dynamic fashion, and they are mov-
ing away from a narrow focus on domestic burglary by including other types of 
pertinent high- volume crimes and possibly individual risk profiling approaches. 
New analytical functions go beyond the initial idea of merely predicting crime, 
as predictive policing tools aspire to become more firmly anchored in analyti-
cal work through a number of explorative and investigative features. The most 
important trend, however, seems to be the move toward technical architectures 
that allow for the establishment of virtual, cloud- based analysis platforms that do 
away with the limitations of outdated databases and silo structures.
Such a “platformization” (Egbert, 2019; Gates, 2019; Wilson, 2019) of 
police work corresponds closely with datafication trends and structural reforms 
that are supposed to put police departments in a position where they can fully 
embrace the opportunities of digital environments. Taken together, these 
trends might in fact unfold a mutually reinforcing dynamic – the more police 
departments improve on infrastructures, professional skills, and legal initiatives, 
the more advanced analytical tools they will be able to use. And the more 
data- hungry platforms are incorporated into police work, the more likely will 
the increased production of crime data and integration of other data sources 
become.
It seems to be a safe bet to say that predictive policing is here to stay. There 
might be uncertainties regarding its look, scope, and capacities. After all, the 
220 The future of (predictive) policing
outlined trends are once more based on the imaginaries of police organiza-
tions, politicians, and private companies – and there is no guarantee that they 
will materialize in the currently outlined forms. Nonetheless, our interlocu-
tors unanimously agreed in their assessment that predictive policing will in the 
future be an integral part of police work (I02; I03; I05; I07; I10; I17; I18; I27; 
I31; I36; I42; I43; I46; I50; I51; I57; I76; I80). As one respondent concisely 
summarized the general expectations:
Ten years from now . . . I mean I have no idea where we will be techno-
logically by then, but the major difference to today will be that predictive 
policing will be an inherent part of our toolkit and how we police. Inde-
pendent of how software develops and which domains it will cover, it will 
be widely accepted as a standard tool. Just like today we work with tools 
that would have been inconceivable ten years ago.
(I18)
The idea of predictive policing, as we have shown in this book, speaks closely 
to a number of pertinent long- term trends in police work, including future- 
orientation, scientification, rationalization, managerialism, and not least a 
certain techno- fetishism. Moreover, it picks up and reinforces current trends 
toward digitization and datafication in policing. And at the same time, it can 
be considered a stepping stone toward structural reform and the large- scale 
integration of data and analytical tools in multipurpose platforms. Predictive 
policing can thus be seen as emblematic for a multiplicity of larger trajectories 
in police work, and insights about how predictive policing reconfigures police 
organization and police practices can provide valuable indications of broader 
societal questions that emerge from the combination of data, algorithms, and 
security.
Although our study has been empirically limited to predictive policing in 
localized contexts, we believe that some general pointers for the future of data- 
driven security practices can be derived. The final section of this book outlines 
a number of takeaways that will be relevant both for academics and practition-
ers and decision- makers.
Closing remarks: some words of caution
As we have demonstrated throughout this book, predictive policing, even in 
narrow and straightforward variants, is an inherently complex practice that 
involves a multiplicity of human and nonhuman elements working together 
in intricate ways. Independent of possible future scenarios of data abundancy 
and all- encompassing, cross- cutting analysis platforms, data- driven analytics 
have profound implications for the police and their relations with society. The 
algorithmic production of criminal futures is already reconfiguring the ways in 
which the police as an organization perceive the world and act within it. It is 
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already striking at basic principles of nondiscrimination and the just distribu-
tion of public services. And it already has the potential to cloak intelligence 
production, decision- making, and institutional accountability within complex 
and opaque systems.
Some words of caution are thus in order. Not without good reason, algo-
rithmic systems for crime analysis and crime prevention have sparked con-
cerns among civil liberties groups and critical scholars. While some critiques 
might be overblown and/or based on science- fiction narratives or hypothetical 
future scenarios rather than on actual analyses of existing tools and practices, 
debates about the societal impact of predictive policing are highly important. 
The way in which society is policed directly concerns one of the most funda-
mental societal challenges: the creation and maintenance of social order and 
justice. Predictive policing calls for close and critical attention, both now and 
in the future.
Rather than perpetuating a presumed conflict between the police and soci-
ety where the former seek to exploit data and technology for purposes of sur-
veillance and coercion and the latter tries to defend its freedom, our research 
calls for a more nuanced perspective. At least some of our interlocutors demon-
strated a refined understanding of the problems that algorithmic crime analysis 
can bring into police work. Senior officers and analysts, in particular, were well 
aware of both the opportunities and the potential drawbacks that are inherent 
in technoscientific advances. And although the police are certainly no advo-
cates of rigorous privacy and data protection legislation, we found throughout 
our research that police departments demonstrated an awareness of the need 
to act in accountable ways. This was maybe most pertinently reflected in the 
ways in which departments were bent on maintaining control over automated 
analytical processes and on retaining authority in decision- making processes 
between humans and algorithms.
At the same time, scholars have already suggested ways in which data could 
possibly be used not just to support police work, but also to foster police 
accountability and improve police departments’ relations with the public. Fer-
guson (2017: 143ff) has, for instance, introduced the idea of “blue data” that 
could be used to reduce police violence and racialized practices. Databases 
could, in this sense, be used to store and analyze complaints about individual 
officers or entire departments and to identify patterns of misconduct and their 
structural underpinnings. Similarly, Barabas et  al. (2018) have suggested that 
data- driven tools could be geared toward the identification of root causes of 
crime, thus enabling more sustainable, long- term strategies for crime preven-
tion. What these and other proposals have in common is the idea to turn ana-
lytics inward and to mobilize the capacities of algorithms and data to improve 
the quality of policing.
It remains to be seen how such promising approaches play out in the future. 
Organizational adaptation and learning, as earlier studies on the implementa-
tion of new technologies within police departments have demonstrated, take 
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time. Just as actors and technological infrastructures need to be aligned with 
predictive policing software in order to ensure the translation of risk estimates 
into operational prevention measures, normative and legal considerations must 
also become aligned with new capacities of data processing and targeted action. 
The formation of a sociotechnical system, as we have shown throughout this 
book, is likely to generate a number of unforeseen consequences and curious 
side effects. For instance, questions of data production and classification systems 
all of a sudden gained renewed importance. Crime analysts found themselves 
arm- wrestling with algorithms. And there was a renaissance for crime maps 
that give a tangible form to complex calculations.
The police have, in many respects, arrived late to the digital party, but they 
are now trying to catch up with debates and best practices that have been 
prevalent in the private industry for quite some time. Ferguson (2017: 188) has, 
in his analysis of the discriminatory potential of the use of “Big Data” tech-
nologies in US police departments, foregrounded that police decision- makers 
should at any point in time be able to identify the risks that a technology is 
trying to address, defend the inputs and outputs of a system, test a technol-
ogy, and ensure its respectful use. These are important points, and we fully 
endorse them. Complementing Ferguson’s recommendations from an “inside 
perspective” based on more than three years of empirical research on predic-
tive policing and the frictions and tensions we were able to witness in everyday 
police work, we would like to end this book with the following advice for 
practitioners – be they politicians, police chiefs, managers, analysts, shift super-
visors, or patrol officers:
(1) Data must not be mistaken for a true representation of the world. They 
are always a partial account that has been constructed within a particu-
lar context and for a particular purpose. A healthy degree of skepticism 
toward data is appropriate, especially when they are acquired from external 
sources.
(2) Algorithmic crime analysis tools must always remain transparent and com-
prehensible, independent of whether they are commercial products or in- 
house developments. Overly complex and/or black- boxed applications 
will undercut institutional accountability and potentially trigger resistance 
among police staff.
(3) Full automation of analytical processes should in principle be ruled out. 
Human analysts must always remain in the loop and have meaningful con-
trol over system functions. That means that algorithmic systems must not 
withhold information from the user or proceed at critical junctions with-
out user approval.
(4) Decisions must always be made by humans. In light of possible automa-
tion bias, critical engagement with algorithmic recommendations should 
be encouraged and the right to override them should be facilitated and 
institutionally enshrined.
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(5) Communication of risk estimates should specifically indicate that risk must 
not be treated as evidence, but as a possibility. Criminal futures, even when 
convincingly presented, may not come into being after all.
(6) Risk estimates can have performative effects on individual behavior. Patrol 
officers, in particular, should be aware of how their perception might be 
affected by imaginaries of criminal futures and how this might impact their 
interactions with citizens.
(7) The capacities and limitations of predictive policing must be carefully 
assessed. It should remain a complementary tool and not replace long- term 
strategic programs that address the root causes of crime.
We hope that paying attention to these principles will speak to the require-
ments of civil society as much as to the requirements of police organizations. 
They apply to current forms of predictive policing, and they will apply equally 
to future versions of predictive policing and other conceivable analytical tools. 
In the end, no one should have a serious interest in either impeding the capaci-
ties of the police as a guarantor of social order or in curtailing civil liberties and 
human rights.
Note
 1 Available at www.palantir.com/palantir- gotham (accessed 30 April 2020).
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